Towards an explanation of the North Sea cod crisis. The perspective of knowledge by Nolde Nielsen, Kåre
TOWARDS AN EXPLANATION OF  
THE NORTH SEA COD CRISIS 
 
 

























A thesis submitted for fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 








Norwegian College of Fisheries Science 









First of all I would like to thank my supervisor, Petter Holm, for what I consider to be 
the best supervision I could wish for: Granting considerable freedom and on the same 
time guiding by small comments which, I think, all proved to be very useful. Further, 
he managed to encourage me when I though it was difficult, and to get me started on 
writing down all my fuzzy ideas in - almost - due time. 
 
 
I want to thank Bjørn Hersoug for encouraging me to try out an idea that at the outset, 
and many times later, seemed to be almost impossible to carry out in only 6 months. 
 
 
I have had many valuable discussions and conversations with several persons with 
persons with much experience within the field of fisheries science. Among these 
persons are:  
 
Per Grotness, Arne Eide, John Pope, Jorge Santos, Ludvig Kragh, Jørgen Christiansen 
and Hector Rodriguez. Without your help this thesis would not have been what it is. 
 
 
In particular I want to thank Ole Poulsen from the Danish Ministry of Food, 
Agriculture and Fisheries for some very valuable discussions, and for providing me 
















Kåre Nolde Nielsen, 
 
Tromsø, May 18th , 2003 
Table of contents 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 4 
A credo 4 
Why the knowledge perspective? 5 
Explanations and explaining 5 
Method and theory 6 
Establishing the crisis as a fishery system crisis 6 
The fishery system 7 
“Truth”, epistemology and ontology 8 
Crisis in the resource state 9 
Crisis in the knowledge system 11 
Management system crisis 12 
The fishery 13 
Fishermen's crisis 13 
A complete fishery system crisis 14 
Explanans: possible causes of the stock decline 14 
The potential of a fishery explanation: The significance of F’s 15 
The axiom of controllability 17 
Limits to controllability: Recruitment and the “gadoid outburst” 18 
Redirecting the explanation 19 
Returning to the role of the gadoid outburst 20 
A fishery problem 21 





Recommendations and TACs 26 
TACs and landings 28 
Recommendations and landings 29 
The assessments: Retrospective analysis of SSB and F 31 
The base of the advice: Short-term predictions 40 
Predicted F values 41 
Actual F values 41 
Actual vs. predicted F 42 
The TACs don't work 45 
Intended F reductions 47 
Chapter 3: Qualitative analysis of the recommendations 48 
Known and unknown problems 48 
History of advice 48 
The advices of the 1970s: "Straight answers" 49 
The early 1980s: Flexibility and uncertainty 52 
1985-1989: Development of the first crisis 54 
1990-1995: The first crisis 56 
1996-2003: Recovery and new crisis 58 
A brief history of the advices 63 
The recommendation to reduce F was not followed 64 
Technical regulations 64 
It was known that the TACs did not work 65 
Effort regulations were implemented – but insufficiently so 65 





Chapter 4: Science, Management - and Industry 67 
Three questions 68 
4.1 TACs vs. effort regulation 70 
TAC vs. effort regulation through the history 70 
Problems of TAC regulations were early recognised 73 
Technical and political problems 73 
Unclear division of responsibility 74 
The barrier of the CFP to effort regulation 75 
The view of the Danish Minister 76 
The conservation policy of CFP: Relative stability 77 
The Marathon Negotiation 77 
The House of Cards 79 
From a shaky house of cards to the impossible strength of paradox 79 
A confirmation 80 
Can the barriers to ER be specified? 80 
4.2 About over estimations 82 
The explanation by Finlayson 83 
Interpretative flexibility 84 
The main themes and social forces: 84 
Over assessment of North Sea cod 85 
The essence of VPA 86 
Data and parameters 86 
VPA procedures 87 
The dilemma of VPA 87 
XSA tuning 88 
An impression 89 
Interpretative flexibility 90 
Possible interpretations 91 
The case of North Sea cod assessment: Possible social forces 91 
Independence and political neutrality 92 
Struggling to be "objective" - and worried 93 
Steps towards a technical explanation 94 
Bias, precision and uncertainty 95 
So what? 96 
The 1999 ACFM meeting 96 
Transparency 100 
Assessments could be better 100 
4.3: The maximum recommendable 103 
The advisors' objectives and their initial self-perceived role 103 
The first dialogue (May 1980) 104 
The 2nd dialogue (October 1980) 106 
Boundaries and institutional dilemmas 107 
The missing objectives 108 
The 3rd dialogue (September 1981) 108 
Statement of CEC: The industry problem 109 
Adopting roles and rules 110 
From normative to explorative advice 111 
The CFP Conservation policy of 1983 112 
The 5th Dialogue (October 1985) 112 
The 7th Dialogue (November 1989) 114 
The lack of commitment to 170/83 114 
Safe biological limits 115 
Management by avoidance 116 
Introduction of MBALs 116 
Biological critique of MBAL advices 118 
The multispecies perspective: Changing the paradigm? 119 
Safe biological limits and MBALs 121 





Surrogate objectives 122 
The Precautionary Approach 122 
PA in ACFM advices 123 
The Maximum Recommendable 127 
Explanation in metaphors: power and frames 128 
How the three questions meet 129 
Rituals and institutional cramps 130 
Chapter 5: Conclusions, recommendations and comments 132 
5.1 Conclusions 132 
5.2 Recommendations 135 
Recognition of problems 135 
Institutional tradeoffs 136 
Final credo 140 
References 142 
ICES Cooperative Research Reports (CRR): 145 
ICES Council Meeting documents 146 
Appendices 148 
Appendix 1: ICES areas 148 
Appendix 2 149 
Appendix 3 150 
Appendix 4: 151 
Appendix 5 152 
Appendix 6 153 
Appendix 7 154 
Appendix 8 155 






























Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Why it is important to investigate the current crisis of the cod fishery in the North Sea 
is self-evident. The crisis represents a threat to the livelihood of thousands of people 
dependent on fishery in coastal areas adjacent to the North Sea. The crisis of the cod 
stock is not only affecting the cod fishery but also other demersal fisheries, which 
currently have to be regulated with regard to the cod stock. Further, it is obviously not 
only the fishermen, who are affected but also the processing facilities and the 
marketing and distribution channels. Consequently, such a crisis, on a longer time 
scale, represents a threat to fragile coastal communities, where occupations unrelated 
to fishing are few.  
 It is only through identifying and describing what led to the crisis that one can 
hope to provide improvements - both with respect to the current state - and as regards 
possible arrangements for avoiding reoccurrence of such a crisis.  
 
A credo 
This thesis could be taken to be critical - and it is so. But I stress that it is not intended 
to be critical to any individuals. First, I think there is no reason to criticise individuals. 
I basically think everyone is trying their best - subjected to the constraints they each 
perceive. The scientist tries to give the best possible advice given his constraints, the 
manager tries to decide on the fishery in the way he finds to be best subjected to the 
constraints he perceives, and the fisherman tries to abide by the regulations until he 
finds it not possible to do so.  
  Secondly, there would not be much point in criticising individuals. What is 
much more interesting, is to analyse, and hopefully improve, the fishery system or the 
relations between the institutions involved in advising, managing and using the 
resource. If the constraints the different stakeholders perceive are barriers to 
improvements, we must understand the nature of these in order to come up with 
something better.  
In this work different perspectives are explored and give different although, I 
think, complementary answers. Therefore I ask you to read the whole thesis or not to 
read it at all. Otherwise the impression you will get is very likely to be different from 
what I want to say. 
 





Why the knowledge perspective?  
Knowledge is a necessary condition for the development of a perception of the crisis 
but at the same time the lack of knowledge can be an important factor in explaining it. 
Further, management can be thought of as the use of knowledge in a fishery system. 
The issues of trust and legitimacy (and compliance to the policy) are also related to 
the knowledge perspective. Knowledge is, therefore, a central issue with respect to the 
performance of a fishery system, and therefore also in explaining a crisis in such a 
system. I will state a further limitation of my work in that I will focus only on the 
perspective of scientific knowledge, which is most central to the current management.    
 
Explanations and explaining 
A simple account of what an explanation is that it is an answer to a (explanation 
seeking) why-question (Hempel, 1965: 334). It is essential to consider what is to be 
explained (explanandum) and what is doing the explaining (explanans). My intention 
is to try to explain why we have the North Sea cod crisis. Therefore I must first 
establish the explanandum; that we actually have a cod crisis - and what it means.  
How is the explaining done? With the classic covering law model of 
explanations (Hempel, 1965: 331- 425), something is explained when it is shown that 
given some specified initial conditions and some causal laws (nomological or 
statistical laws), the explanandum was either necessary or highly likely. These models 
have later been criticised by strong counterexamples. However, I find that the basic 
idea is sound. Something is explained to the degree that you understand that it 
actually was a likely outcome, given the context. For a phenomenon as complex as the 
one in question an ideal or "rigid" explanation can probably never be provided. In 
such cases, the term explanation sketch is often used (Hempel, 1965: 423-425).  As a 
consequence of the complexity of the issue and the limits of empirical evidence, the 
explanation will be short of the ideal explanation of the covering law model, and the 
explanans is then limited to suggest the explanandum.  
  Another property of the explanation is its level of resolution. Say, that it is 
established that the crisis was due to over fishing. A simple explanation is then: “The 
crisis was a result of too much fishing”. The explanation would be true but not 
particularly informative. On the other hand, an explanation of a complex phenomenon 
can loose itself in details. The proper task is to make the explanation both relevant and 
informative. I think a useful aim of explanation of such a complex phenomenon 





would be a pragmatic aim. Such an aim of the explanation could be that an “informed 
person” would say: “Yes, now I understand – it is highly likely to have happened such 
as you describe it”.  
 
Method and theory 
I have used no formal method or theory. Rather my approach has, broadly, been to 
pose ad hoc research questions, which either are “closed” or followed up by further 
ad hoc questions. I have used all sorts of literature that seemed promising towards 
shedding light on the general question. The approach thus comes close to that of an 
anarchistic “anything goes” approach. Given the limitations, I cannot perform "new" 
science. What I do is mainly to make a sort of selective patchwork of previous 
studies, resulting in a sort of “informed interpretation”. I compare and analyse 
previously published information from different sources. 
The proper evaluation of such a somewhat indefinite method is by its result; If 
you find the following informative, I take method to be in situ justified – and vice 
versa. Specifically, I have used quite simple data analysis in chapter 2, the methods of 
which I will describe briefly as I proceed.    
The bulk of the thesis consists of three different histories of the scientific 
advice: A quantitative history (chapter 2), a qualitatively history (chapter 3) and a 
discursive history - i.e. an analysis of the relation between scientists and managers 
(chapters 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3). I generally start out with the perspective of biology and I 
generally end up with the perspective of social science. The main reason for this 
structure is the logic of the ad hoc questions I set, which at the same time can be said 
to reflect my own cognitive journey in trying to understand and explain the crisis. It is 
a complex story to tell and I found that it was perhaps safest to tell it in more or less 
the same way as I experienced it. 
 
Establishing the crisis as a fishery system crisis 
Why do I term the current situation a “crisis”?  I find the word crisis suitable since I 
think it adequately covers what it is and how we got there. I think of a "crisis" as in 
the context of illness. A body is in crisis when you, for example, do not know whether 
it will die from a disease or not. A “collapse” is beyond the crisis - it is when a body 
has already succumbed. Further, a collapse indicates that the transition from the 
healthy to the unhealthy state was sudden or instant, which was not the case for the 





cod stock in the North Sea. We could, then, call it a “decline” - it certainly is - but that 
is a neutral description, whereas “crisis” has the advantage of indicating the very 
undesirable consequences of the decline. Further "decline" refers to the process of 
stock change, whereas "crisis" here refers to a certain state after that decline, where 
the state has the properties as mentioned above. I will argue that the cod stock is in a 
state balancing between the path to recovery and the path to, possibly, an irretrievable 
depletion, and that it therefore is justified to refer to a “cod crisis”.  
 In the metaphor of the body, the disease that is causing the crisis can spread to 
more organs and lead to different types of symptoms as it develops. Similarly, the 
crisis can be evident in other parts of the fishery system than in the part that the 
resource state represents. I will present a simplified view of the fishery system and 
describe symptoms of crisis for each of its parts. But be aware that it at this stage is 
too early to say what is only a symptom and what is causing disease.  
 
The fishery system 
A modern, industrial fishery system, such as the one in question, can be thought to be 
a complex of four interacting subsystems: The resource system, the user system, the 
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The arrows indicate, somewhat vaguely, main processes flows. From the resource 
system to the knowledge system, the flow consists of collected information. The 
knowledge system will process this information and deliver a "perceived state" to the 
management system. The management system will respond to the "perceived state", 
but its output is not only information (i.e. decisions), but also physical (e.g. 
Monitoring Control and Surveillance). The arrows, however, only indicate the main 
processes and influences. The subsystems are in reality intrinsically and complexly 
linked, which soon will become apparent. For example the user system will influence 
the management system through lobbyism. 
 
“Truth”, epistemology and ontology 
The heart of the problem is of course the stock level of the cod. If there were enough 
cod there would be no crisis. This could be thought of as the ontological side of the 
problem, whereas the knowledge system deals with the epistemological side 
(understood such that interactions between the two are allowed).  
I will present the latest "perceived state" of the stock, which is provided by the 
Advisory Committee of Fishery Management (ACFM), the scientific body 
responsible for scientific advice on the stock. The question is then: Can we trust this 
"picture"?  Of course we cannot. This is exactly one of the central problems in fishery 
management; we will never access the ontology - it will remain a “ding an sich”.  
However, the latest picture is the picture that we have best reasons to believe since we 
had more information for its production, than we had for the previous pictures. I will 
return to this issue later when reviewing elements of the methods used for stock 
assessment of this stock (chapter 4.2). In the following, the latest assessment is, at 
least indirectly, referred to as  “true”. I stress that "truth" here should be considered in 
the limited sense that the latest assessment is the most reliable for the time being. 
Truth will then only be a sort of abbreviation for the current, relatively strongest, 
confidence in the assessment due to a process of justification. Unlike Finlayson 
(1994), we must however assume truth, since there otherwise will be no point in our 
analysis. For if there is no truth it is not true that there was a cod crisis to explain and 
so on.  
 





Crisis in the resource state 
The following graphs represent what is the “currently best justified” stock history of 
the cod, namely from the latest assessment of ACFM, which includes the detailed data 














Figure 2. Graph of Spawning Stock Biomass (SSB), Fishing mortality F and landings from cod in ICES subarea 
IV (North Sea), Division VIId (Eastern English Channel), and Division IIIa (Skagerrak). The data is from ACFM 
2002: 45. For ICES areas: See appendix 1.    
 
From figure 2 it is evident that the spawning stock biomass has declined quite steadily 
from a (historical) maximum level of 271.000 tonnes in 1971 to a (historical) 
minimum in the last years (30.000t in 2001 and 38.000t in 2002). The maximum was 
reached following a recovery from around 150.000t in 1963. There was a moderate 
recovery in the late 1970s to the early 1980s and a very modest recovery in the late 
1990s. 
 The fishery mortality - the rate of cod death from fishery - was building up 
considerably from the 1960s until the late 1970s. Then it levelled out until the late 
1990s where there was a dramatic increase followed by, apparently, a sharp decline in 
F in 2001. As will be explained later, the assessment of the latest year is nevertheless 
always the least certain. The trend in landings has roughly followed the trend in SSB. 
Note that the SSB recovered somewhat in the late 1970s in spite of some of the 
highest landings in the record. This was because of a very high recruitment in this 
period.   



























































Figure 3.  Average recruitment to age one and spawning stock biomass for the period 1963 to 2002  in ICES 
subarea IV,  VIId  and  IIIa. The average recruitment level is indicated by the straight horizontal line (= 357 
millions). The data is from ACFM, 2002: 45. 
 
From figure 3 it is evident that the recruitment is highly variable. The recruitment 
reached very high levels from the mid 1960s to the mid 1980s ("the gadiod outburst"). 
Since 1986, 1997 has been the only year with the recruitment being above the average 
of the depicted period. 
 Let us consider what perceived state of the resource ACFM is transmitting to 
the managers. In the latest report by ACFM the stock was said to be “outside safe 
biological limits”. The spawning stock had been below the precautionary reference 
point (Bpa = 150,000 tonnes) since 1984 and within the region of the historical limit 
reference point (Blim = 70.000t) since 1990. The fishing mortality was said to have 
remained about the historic high, and above it its precautionary reference point (Fpa = 
0.65) since 1980, and also to exceed Flim = 0.86, which is “the fishing mortality 
estimated to lead to impaired recruitment”. Further, the recruitment was said to have 
been below average for all years since 1987, where the 1997 and 2000 year classes 
have been the poorest on record (ACFM, 2002: 37). In the 2001 report, ACFM said 
that the risk of stock collapse was high. SSB was at a historic low of 55.000t (CRR 
246, 2001: 230-232). The next year, the 2001 SSB estimate was revised down to 
about half - only 30.300t and the 2002 estimate was 37.600t. In the 2001 report it was 
noted that the reduction in recruitment in the later years could be explained by the low 























































































In its latest assessment ACFM summarized its advice on management as 
follows:  
 
Given the very low stock size, the recent poor recruitments, and continued high fishing mortality 
despite management efforts to promote stock recovery, ICES recommends a closure of all 
fisheries for cod as targeted species or bycatch (ACFM, 2002: 37). 
 
I find that the notion of crisis to be the most adequate for this situation. 
 
Crisis in the knowledge system 
Since the assessment is mainly based on the landing data, the knowledge system is 
sensitive to a crisis in the user system, since the latter is the source of these data. 
ACFM stated that there was “reason to believe, that the landings for 2001 were under-
reported”. The landings were less than the TAC, which “implied a reduction in fishing 
mortality of the order of 50%”. However, the fishing mortality in 2001 actually 
increased considerably. Further: “The results of a time-series analysis indicated 
predicted removals in 2001 almost double the reported landings"(ACFM, 2002: 39-
40). In the report it was stated, that the fishing mortality had "consistently been 
underestimated and stock size overestimated in previous assessments, and the current 
assessment suffers from the same problem”. Assessments since 2000 were believed to 
have improved due to exclusion of CPUE data, which were inducing biases. 
Nevertheless, the latest assessment also showed retrospective bias, “possibly because 
of a decrease in the quality in landings data in 2001.”  Finally: “The current SSB is so 
far below historic stocks sizes that both the biological dynamics of the stock and the 
behaviour of the fleets are unknown, and therefore historic experience and data are 
not considered a reliable basis for medium term forecasts of stock dynamics under 
various rebuilding scenarios” (ACFM, 2002: 39-40).  
 I find that the notion of a knowledge crisis adequately sums up the 
significance of these statements. Further, the commission of the economic 
communities recently (CEC, 2002, EU-PR, 2002) presented a strategy to improve the 
quality and timeliness of the scientific advice. The knowledge problems are thus also 
evident within the management system. 
 





Management system crisis 
What indications would there be that the management system is in crisis? To answer 
that the management system is in crisis because it apparently does not function is not 
adequate. The inadequacy of the system management is a potential cause of the 
fishery system crisis. If the inadequacy of the management system at an earlier stage 
had led to development of perception of its crisis, a fishery system crisis might have 
been avoided.  
The criteria for state of crisis are different for something physical and 
something "mental". Whereas a body or a cod population can be in crisis without our 
knowledge thereof, the management system can only be in a state of crisis when we 
think it is in that state, since the system is a construct of mind and social actions. 
Further, there is a difference between claiming something dysfunctional and claiming 
it to be in crisis. The crisis of the mental and social domain is a result of changing 
perceptions; e.g. “we don’t think this system is good anymore, so we have to revise 
it”.  
Now I hope it is clearer what I want to argue; that the perception that the 
management system really should change is developing, which is equivalent with the 
notion of crisis. From the following quote it is apparent that the Commission of the 
Economic Communities recognises a crisis:  
 
The CFP has reached a turning-point. The challenges are urgent and serious. The current poor 
sustainability performance of the CFP proves that many of the instruments applied over the last 
twenty years have reached their limits. In this state of crisis there is a need for major change. 
Reform of the objectives, principles, priorities and instruments of the CFP is more than ever 
necessary to deliver sustainable development and to ensure that the European fishing industry 
has a secure future (CEC-COM 181, 2002).    
 
The Council of Ministers has adopted some of the proposed revisions suggested by 
the CEC - however not always to the full extent (EU-CM, 2002).  For example the 
Council this year, in the view of a crisis, introduced a fishing days limit for the 
roundfish fishery in the North Sea. I will later explain why this change is important, 
even though it was only introduced on a provisionally basis. 
 
 






Cod is mainly caught in a mixed, demersal roundfish fishery (some cod is also taken 
as bycatch in flatfish fisheries). The fishery is carried out with different trawl types, 
seines and gillnets (CRR 246, 2001:221). Gillnetting is the most selective fishery, and 
it is the fishery that is most directly targets cod.  
 The North Sea is a multinational fishing area, subjected to the interest of many 
nations. The cod fishery is accordingly managed as a joint EU-Norway stock, where 
EU is allocated 83% of the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) and Norway 17%. UK is the 
main fishing nation followed by Denmark and Norway. The others are in order of 
decreasing importance: The Netherlands, Germany, France and Belgium – and to a 
very limited extent: Poland and Sweden. 
 
Fishermen's crisis  
The latest adopted TAC was 27.300 (No. Dep. of Fisheries, 2002). This is about half 
of the TAC in 2002, one third of the TAC for 2000 and less than one fifth of the 
average TAC since the first TAC was given in 1975. Given the notorious problem of 
over capacity it goes without saying that the fishermen face serious economic 
problems. That is of course why fishermen have been very much opposed to the 
recent and drastic reductions in TACs. Note, however, that the cod is mostly taken in 
a mixed roundfish fishery - together with whiting and haddock. This amends the crisis 
impact somewhat to the degree that the fishermen can rely on the catches of the other 
species. The quotas for the other gadoids have nevertheless also been reduced in order 
to protect the cod - so the fishermen with mixed catches will still face serious 
problems. Obviously, however, the fisheries most directed towards cod are going to 
be most affected by the TAC reductions.        
 
Let us consider the Danish case as an example. The “gillnet and hook” fleet will be 
the most sensitive fleet to the dramatic cut in cod quotas, since it is largely targeted 
for cod. In this fleet (about 450 vessels) the revenue is expected to decrease by 
between 30% and 40% in 2003, which implies that a large part of this fleet will not be 
able to cover the variable costs - they will loose money even when fishing. In 
addition, the economic prognosis was carried out without considering the effect of the 
restriction of fishing days, which in turn is expected to lead to a worse situation than 
indicated by the prognosis (FOI, 2003).  





A complete fishery system crisis 
If you are now accepting that each part of the fishery system is in the state of crisis, it 
follows that the complete fishery system is in crisis. This point is, however not so 
important. The intention was rather to show the interconnectedness of the sub-
systems: The causes and symptoms spread through the fishery system as the crisis 
develops. The main points are that there is crisis in the resource state, which implies a 
crisis for the resource users. Further, the knowledge system is in crisis as a 
consequence of the pressure on the other sub-systems. This points to the need for 
revisions in the management system and there is some indication that these are 
initiated (i.e. a management system crisis). Before we proceed with these issues, it 
must be justified that the stock crisis actually is a fishery problem – otherwise it 
would make no sense to treat the crisis as a management problem. The latter is not as 
obvious as one could think. Again the question of knowledge and lack of knowledge 
becomes focal.   
 
Explanans: possible causes of the stock decline 
What can explain a complex phenomenon as a stock decline? When trying to allocate 
explanatory importance to different candidates for causes, the best approach would be 
to proceed from evidence that makes it possible to conclude that some issue either 
was important or that it was not important. However, this may not be feasible and thus 
a “second best” approach must be used: To conclude that there is no strong evidence, 
that the issue was important and then proceed to the next possible cause, which 
hopefully is more fruitful to investigate. Given the nature of the evidence in question, 
this latter approach has to be followed. 
To the degree that the distinction can be made, it may be useful to distinguish 
between anthropogenic and non-anthropogenic causes. However, I have found no 
evidence for viewing the stock problem to any large extent as due to non-
anthropogenic causes or evidence for not doing so - with the question of recruitment 
being one possible exception (we do not yet know if temperature effects are 
anthropogenic). This is a weak point - at least so far - but allow me by  "the second 
best approach" to proceed with the explanatory potential of anthropogenic causes. The 
recruitment issue will be discussed separately in the following since it remains 
uncertain if the observed changes in recruitment patterns are due to anthropogenic 
causes or not. 





Anthropogenic causes could similarly be dichotomously divided into those unrelated 
to fishing and those related to fishing. What non-fishing causes would be good 
candidates? I have only come across two obvious ones: Pollution and eutrophication.  
Parret (1998), provided a major review of the literature, that “identifies the 
most current and relevant information relating to known and perceived effects of 
pollutant on fish” in the North Sea. This study concluded that there is circumstantial 
evidence of biological effects of chemical contaminants on the sub-organismal and 
individual level of biological organisation (examples are liver tumours and 
disturbances of immune functions) of fish and shellfish. However, “there is not 
currently any clear evidence in the literature that chemical contamination is impacting 
on populations or fish stocks”. Parret (1998) emphasises that the former should not be 
taken to mean that population effects are not taking place or that they will not take 
place in the future. To me, the conclusion, however, is a prima facie reason to proceed 
with the “second best approach”.  
 
The eutrophication case is somewhat similar. There is some evidence of toxic algal 
blooms and oxygen depletion in coastal regions affecting fish abundance directly or 
indirectly. But:  
 
Conclusive evidence that anthropogenically derived nutrient inputs are responsible for an 
alteration in fisheries abundance, however, is lacking as large scale environmental changes and 
fisheries practices are also implicated (Parret, 1998). 
 
The North Sea is a vast water body with a considerable exchange of water. Negative 
effects of eutrophication have been limited to affect the shallower, estuarine and 
coastal areas in a relatively narrow zone. Eutrophication may however affect 
recruitment of cod, since growth of its juveniles to a large extend takes place in the 
near coast areas (Boddeke and Hagel, 1991). However, I will proceed with the 
potential for fishery as an explanatory factor before I return to the recruitment issue.  
 
The potential of a fishery explanation: The significance of F’s 
The literature concerning assessment of the North Sea cod stock generally leaves little 
doubt that the decline of the stock is somehow due to its intensive fishery. On the 
condition that the estimated Fs are just very roughly within the range of their true 





values for the cod stock in the North Sea this is not surprising. Let us briefly turn to 
basic population biology to see why.  
The percentage of fish death in a time interval t1 to t2  = 100.(1-e-Z(t1-t2)), where  
Z is the coefficient of total instantaneous mortality. Z = F +M, Where F is the fishing 
mortality and M is the rate of natural (non-fishing) mortality. Let us assume the 
natural mortality M is 0.20, a value that is often used - for example by the WG on the 
North Sea cod stock for ages of 4 years and older (CM 2000, ACFM:7). The mean F 
for ages 2-8 has been estimated to be about 1 in recent years. It can now easily be 
calculated what fishing at such an F value implies. It means that about 70% of each 
year class of 2 year old and older cod will die per year and that 90% of these deaths 
are because of fishing. If we consider the mean value of F in the period 1963 to 2001 
(F= 0.78), it implies an annual death rate of 63%, of which 87% of the deaths are due 
to fishing. That is why the fishery is considered to be important in explaining the 
stock decline. 
 
M= F= Z=(M+F)  Z (%) F / Z 
0.20 0.20 0.40 0.33 0.50 
0.20 0.36 0.56 0.43 0.64 
0.20 0.78 0.98 0.62 0.80 
0.20 1.00 1.20 0.70 0.83 
0.20 1.20 1.40 0.75 0.86 
 
Table 1. Distribution of mortality. Calculated examples for illustration. 
 
One complication is that F and M are interdependent. If you fish less, more fish will 
die from "natural reasons" thus the M will increase. But it will still be true, that the 
fishing will explain half of the mortality if F is equal to M. In other words: to say that 
fishery was not the most important in explaining the stock decline would imply to say 
that M was seriously underestimated or/and that F was seriously overestimated. If M 
was really the double, and F was really only half of the current estimates, it would still 
be true, that fishery was a main cause of the stock decline.  
 Fishery science is, notoriously, an uncertain science. Fish population models 
are often very flexible to very different interpretations, as will be described later. 
Could it be that the whole series of F and M are considerably and consistently wrong? 





Could it be that we do not really have the potential of controllability, since the stock 
levels are very much less dependent on fishery than we are used to think?  
The sceptic will always win the argument: We do not know. Yet, the sceptic 
will never allow himself to explain anything. And there is some quite convincing 
evidence for the contrary; e.g. evidence for potential of controllability. 
 
The axiom of controllability 
 In "Changes in the North Sea cod stock during the twentieth century", Daan et. al. 
(1994), Pope and Macer, (1996) tried to extend the series stock history information 
backwards; beyond the period from which there is reliable data (1963 and on). The 
limitations of data, however, were such that the results must be interpreted more in a 
qualitative than a quantitative way. The writers found that the landing data were the 
most reliable source of information. Estimates of fishing mortalities based on CPUE 
data were the second most reliable information source since data from independent 
fleets essentially gave the same results. The general approach was then "an attempt to 
capture the main trends in stock sizes and recruitment to match the realised catches 
and estimated fishing mortalities".  
A very significant result from this study is that the fishery mortality (not 
surprisingly) dropped to a very low during the Second World War. F was estimated to  
be around 0.5 in the decades before the war, 0.10 during 1940-1945 and to have 
increased to 0.40 after the 1945 (for then to increase from the 1960's and until today). 
Further, the average recruitment from 1935 to 1940 and 1940 to 1945 was estimated 
to have been the lowest for the whole series from 1910 to 1994. Now, in spite of this 
very low recruitment, the SSB and TSB (total stock biomass) showed the strongest 
increase seen in the same series. The SSB increased from less than 100.000t to almost 
300.000t during the war. And when the fishing picked up again, the SSB steadily 
declined until the onset of the "gadoid outburst" in the mid 1960s.  
I admit some circularity of argument here: Fishery mortalities are used to 
evaluate themselves. However, with the proper academic reservations; this is as good 
evidence for the severity of impact of the fishery as we can get. Personally I find no 
strong reasons to suspect it to be wrong all together. It is reasonably to view fishery 
as a main cause of the low stock levels of recent time. Let us now address the issue of 
recruitment, which the former discussion really cannot be seen in isolation from. Will 
it complement or contradict this interpretation? 





Limits to controllability: Recruitment and the “gadoid outburst” 
In a review of the available literature with respect to changes in the North Sea cod in 
the 20th century, Niels Daan (1978) noted that the most significant of these changes 
appeared to be the recruitment (the gadoid outburst), which resulted in the dramatic 
increase in landings of the 1960s. Especially when seen in a longer time perspective, 
the gadoid outburst was very marked (Daan et al., 1994).  
Various hypotheses have been proposed for these changes in recruitment but 
none of them has been conclusive (Hislop, 1996). Cushing (1984) argued that the 
elevated recruitment was because of a change in abundance and timing of zooplancton 
species, which are prey to pelagic stages of gadoid larvae. This conclusion was 
however later doubted (Daan et al., 1994). Pope and Mazer (1996) examined if 
changes in predator stock levels could explain recruitment variation. But since the 
gadoid stocks themselves are important predators, the study concluded that inclusion 
of predator effects only revealed that the recruitment must have been even more 
favourable. The elevated predating stock levels following the high recruitment would 
tend to decrease the recruitment and thus not be a source of explanation of the 
outburst - on the contrary, there is even more to explain.  
Daan et al. (1994) stated that the overexploitation of the pelagic system 
(herring, mackerel) could "not be discounted" as a major causal factor for explanation 
of the gadoid outburst (predation release on juveniles or larvae, competition release 
on prey). However, this hypothesis is weakened by the fact that the timing and areas 
of the decline of these pelagic stocks does not mach the increases in recruitment in the 
gadoid stocks.  
O'Brien et al. (2000) argued that decline in cod recruitment had "paralleled" 
warming of the North Sea for the last decade. Weak year classes, however, also 
occurred in cold years, when the stock biomass was low. The (possible) temperature 
effect is therefore minor when SSB is low. The study was not conclusive but 
describes a correlation. It was argued that the combination of diminished stock 
combined with possible adverse warm conditions would be a threat to the long-term 
persistence of the North Sea cod.      
Boddecke and Hagel (1991) claimed the eutrophication of the North Sea 
continental zone to be a "Blessing in disguise". The increased productivity in near 
coast and shallow areas was taken to explain the increase in recruitment of fish, for 
which these areas serve as nursery grounds (cod and whiting). The period of elevated 





nutrient discharge matches the onset of the gadoid outburst in the early 1960s and 
with its fade-out about two decades later, when nutrient discharges were reduced. 
Further they claimed that the landings of fish species not dependent on estuarine 
nursery grounds did not increase. The latter is probably wrong, however, since 
haddock apparently was one of the species who benefited most from the gadoid 
outburst, although the variation in haddock recruitment was much higher than it was 
for the other gadoids (see fig. 5 in Pope and Macer, 1996: 1162). 
 To me this does not exclude eutrophication as a potential cause. Nielsen and 
Richardson (1996) related the increased yield of Kattegats fisheries (an area adjacent 
to the North Sea management area) to eutrophication. The evidence was however not 
sufficient for a causal relation. For the North Sea, the eutrophication could also have 
played a role for haddock, since it lives off various "leftovers" at the bottom. 
However, further work would be required to establish a possible link between 
eutrofication and recruitment. 
 
Redirecting the explanation 
I therefore agree with Hislop (1996): We don't know why the "gadoid outburst 
happened. This confusion might call for “a third best approach”: To give up or start 
all over again. I will try another strategy. Do we really need to understand the reason 
of recruitment changes in order to explain the cod crisis of today? In one way we do: 
The crisis could be seen as a consequence of a return to normal recruitment. In 
another way we do not. The gadoid outburst allowed the fishery mortality to continue 
to increase, without the SSB going down. Therefore, the gadoid outburst was really 
postponing the crisis. Or it may also explain how the fishery was able to expand that 
much, and thus explain both the postponing of crisis and the severity of the crisis (i.e. 
it allowed the effort to increase considerable). If I move the focus from the time 
perspective from the last 30 years to that of the last century, it allows me, so to speak, 
to move the gadoid outburst from the explanandum to the explanans.  
Is this a rhetoric trick? Of course it is. But, importantly, it is more than that: It 
will make the explanation interesting. For the interesting explanation must be both 
possible and useful, whereas the explanation with to many loose speculations will be 
neither. If we simply do not have the adequate knowledge on recruitment, the relevant 
explanation must take that into account. In addition, the usefulness of the explanation 
is also, partly, related to what we can change. And if the recruitment – at least at the 





current stage is not in our hands - this will accordingly point towards the 
appropriateness of latter form of explanation. I hope this all will become clearer as we 
go on. 
Why then didn't I start out with this long-term perspective? Any way you view 
there is a crisis, but the background on which the crisis becomes apparent changes 
considerable when the history is extended backwards. Interestingly, the long-term 
perspective is weakly, if at all, transmitted to the managers. Therefore the crisis is 
generally perceived within in the four decades perspective, which makes the 
exploration of this perspective unavoidable. What I suggest, is, that a useful 
explanation of the state of crisis will benefit from including the perspective of a 
longer time horizon.  
 
Returning to the role of the gadoid outburst 
Daan et al., 1994 and Hislop (1996), argue that the increased fishery mortality was the 
reason why the SSB did not increase very much in the 1970s. According to the former 
authors, the impact the elevated recruitment had on TSB during the gadiod outburst 
was much less than the impact the cessation of fishery had during World War II. 
“Nevertheless, the net effect of the recruitment must certainly have been that the 
biomass remained relatively high even at extremely high levels of fishing mortality.” 
(Daan et al. 1994).  
 In recent years the recruitment has returned to normal levels like those prior to 
the early 1960s (Daan et al., 1994). The fishing mortality has increased steadily and 
the spawning stock biomass has reached an all-time historic low (Daan et al., Hislop) 
and. The recent spawning stock level cannot be considered “normal” (Hislop, 1996). 
Consider that the SSB now has declined to about half the level of what it was 
considered to be at the time of the production of papers referred to here. 
  It could be that the decline in recruitment in recent time is caused by the 
historical lows in the SSB (Pope and Macer, 1996), (Daan et al. 1994). This suspicion 
was explicated in the 2001 ACFM report, even though the causal effect of observed 
hydrographical changes could not be ruled out (CRR 246, 2001: 222). This 
unresolved question will determine the degree to which management can restore the 
stock to the high levels of the gadoid outburst (Hislop, 1996), (Daan et al. 1994). 
However, if recruitment over fishing currently is taking place, that will only 
strengthen my point: the crisis is most reasonable seen as a fishery problem. 





A fishery problem 
Let us summarise the findings of the possible causes of the stock crisis. We don’t 
know why the gadoid outburst happened, but it postponed the crisis in enabling the 
stock to sustain a high and increasing fishing mortality. We also don’t know why the 
gadoid outburst faded out, but there is a suspicion that it was caused, or reinforced, by 
the heavy exploitation, e.g. recruitment over fishing. The recruitment is currently not 
lower than it generally was estimated to be in the last century. But the spawning stock 
biomass has recently been reduced to a historic low level, a level that is much lower 
than the lowest level seen during the poorest recruitment periods prior to and during 
World War II. There is little doubt that the decline in spawning stock biomass is 
caused by the intensive fishery expressed in the high F levels, so we have, at least, the 
potential to control the stock biomass. Therefore it is proper to view the crisis as a 
fishery problem and thus a problem of management. 
   We cannot control recruitment but we can improve the exploitation of the 
resource subjected to a given recruitment (similar to Hislop, 1996). Management and 
accordingly an explanation in terms of fishery management make sense. Let us 






















Chapter 2: Quantitative analysis of the history of advice and 
management 
 
Analysis of recommendations TACs and landings  
It is often said, that the decline in the cod stock was due the managers setting the 
quotas higher than recommended by the scientific advisors. This is claimed to be the 
case for the cod in the Barents Sea (Nakken, 1998) and this is what people with 
experience in fisheries told me when I asked them why the crisis in the North Sea 
happened. Holden (1994: 62-65, 107-108) accordingly argued that TACs for the 
North Sea cod, for political reasons, were set higher than scientifically recommended 
such that the TACs achieved nothing with respect to fishing mortality1. 
Since the quotas are the core of the management system, it is necessary to 
analyse what quotas were recommended, what quotas were politically agreed upon by 
the managers and what the associated landings were. The information needed to 
answer these questions is present in the assessment reports that the scientific advisors 
in the ACFM produce for the managers each year. The first year, in which harvest 
quotas were introduced on the roundfish fishery in the North Sea, was in 1975 (CRR 
56, 1975). 1975 will therefore be the first year in the series to be analysed. The 
ACFM reports contain a recommendation for TAC for the following year and a first 
estimate of the landings of the year before.  
 As will become clear it is not entirely straightforward what values should be 
used for the recommendations, TACs and landings. This is because the 
recommendation consists of more than a single value and because the assessment is 
often revised, whereas the landings are updated later. One must therefore consider 
what the analysis should aim at exploring when considering which values to include 
in the analysis. 
 
 
                                                          
1 The view of Holden (1994) is complex and maybe somewhat ambiguous when it comes to the issue 
of the decline in the cod stock. He claims that the TACs failed because they were higher than the 
recommended values. But he also argues that the enforcement was highly inadequate  (p159-167) and 
he stresses the importance of the failure to implement technical regulations (p91-99). Further, he 
explains that the decline in the cod stock was inevitable because of the fade-out of the gadoid outburst. 
Management would therefore only (potentially) be able to delay the consequences of the declining 
recruitment (151-156). As will be apparent I agree with his points except the first one (and partly the 
last), but his work could have benefited from some integrated evaluation and interpretation of these 
elements. 






The managers receive the assessment and the recommendation by ACFM in an 
annually produced ACFM report (a Cooperative Research Report). ACFM bases its 
recommendation on a working group report, but often recalculates and revises the 
assessment. When analysing the recommendations, the working group reports can be 
ignored, since it is the ACFM report that is relevant to the managers. Until and 
including 1988 there was a recommendation for the North Sea cod following ACFMs 
first meeting in May, which was usually revised at ACFMs second meeting in 
October. This may sound a little pointless, but really indicates a trade-off involved. 
The managers need the advice as soon as possible to be properly prepared for the 
decision-making. The scientist would, on the other hand, need the information from 
the latest surveys on recruitment in order to provide the best possible basis for the 
assessment (CRR 106, 1981: 6-7). Since I want to investigate the actual effective 
advice and decision of the management system, I always chose the latest advice given 
to the managers - relevant for the final decision on the TAC. 
 Since the advice does not only consist of one recommended TAC figure, I 
need to make a decision on a useful interpretation on what is recommended in order to 
proceed. As it will be described more carefully later, the advisors generally 
recommended a decrease of the exploitation level of the roundfish stocks. The 
managers, however, were under pressure from the industry, which generally wanted 
the TACs to be high. What turned out to be most important to the managers was then 
what allowable catch maximally could be recommended. In this relatively crude, 
quantitative, analysis I will therefore only consider the maximum recommendable 
TACs, whereas I in later sections will turn towards other features of the given advices. 
In a few cases it was somewhat delicate to judge what was maximally 
recommended. In the early 1980s the general basis of maximum recommendations 
from ACFM was that the TACs should aim to reduce F by 10% per year. ACFM 
would like the reduction of F (towards Fmax) to be faster, but used the mentioned 
policy as a pragmatic way of recommending reductions, since reductions were 
problematic for the industry. The advice corresponding to this policy would be 
220.000t for 1982 (CRR 114, 1981: 246) and 230.000t for 1985 (CRR 131, 1984: 62, 
calculated from a regression of catch options). However, because ACFM often 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 





reviews its previous advices it is possible to see what ACFM itself interprets its 
maximum recommended TACs to be. Surprisingly, the 1986 report says that these are 
235.000t for 1982 and 259.000t for 1985, which corresponds to catches of status quo 
F. I have used the ACFM interpretation in these two cases (the numerical values do 
not matter too much in this case). Should we always accept the latest interpretation of 
ACFM in this respect?              
1987 was a problematic year for ACFM. The second recommendation (given 
in November 1986) was a maximum TAC of 125.000t. This represented a dramatic 
cut compared to the previous years and it was associated with serious warnings of low 
SSB levels. In May 1987, new and much more favourable estimates of the recruitment 
revised the recommended maximum TAC to 200.000t. There was, however, not 
agreement within ACFM to advise the managers to increase the catches since it was 
an “excellent opportunity” to rebuild the stock (CM A:5, 1987). The final given 
advice was 125-200.000t. This advice was repeated in the CRR record until 1991, 
where the advice was referred to have been “<125” and finally from 1999, the 
recommendation was said to be 100-125.000t. It cannot be disputed, however, that 
125-200 implies a maximum of 200. The catch forecast used for 1987 was that of the 
May meeting in 1987 since this turned out to be the basis of the management decision 
(the TAC was revised up from 125.000t to 175.000t). 
Holden (1994: 107-108) and Karagiannakos (1996: 124-126, 133) have carried 
out similar comparisons of recommendations and TACs. However, they did not 
always choose the latest and thus effective recommendation. No TAC was 
recommended in the period from 1991 to 1995. Instead decreases in effort or fishery 
mortality were recommended. Holden (1994) and Karagiannakos (1996) used the 
latter recommendations to recalculate a corresponding recommended TAC. I find, 
however, that there would be little point in analysing some recommendation that was 
not given. Instead I have excluded these years here and leave them to be analysed 




It is much more straightforward to decide on the relevant TAC to include in the 
analysis. Sometimes the TACs that were agreed on by the managers, based on the 
recommendation of the May ACFM meeting, were changed because of revisions in 





the assessment by the November ACFM meeting. However the latest agreed TAC for 
a year is the one implemented, and therefore the one relevant to consider in the 
analysis.  
   
Landings 
The landing figures are often updated some years later than the first value (for 
example due to delayed reporting. I have used the latest available figure, since the 
best estimate of the landings is the most useful in this analysis. In the reports two sorts 
of landing figures are provided. The nominal landings are the landings as they are 
officially reported to ICES, whereas the working group landings (WG-landings or 
ACFM landings) are corrected for different reasons. In the case of the North Sea cod 
fishery, the difference between the WG-landings and the official figures are relatively 
small (figures Ia and Ib: appendix 2). This is because estimates of mis- and 
underreporting have generally not been incorporated into WG landings. An exception 
is the year 1998, for which the mis- and underreporting was believed to be 
significantly greater than for other (previous) years, even though the TAC was not 
taken. The unallocated landings for 1998 were, however, only about 5% of the total 
WG-landings.  
The differences between the nominal- and WG-landings are mainly due to 
differences in calculation procedures (e.g. conversion factors for gutted to fresh 
weights etc) (ACFM: 7, 2000). The average ratio of nominal landings to WG-landings 
in the period 1975 to 2001 is 0.97 (table I, appendix 3) indicating that the nominal 
landings tend to be slightly smaller but that the difference is generally negligible. 
Since only the WG-landings are used for input in the assessment calculations, I will in 
the following base my analysis on them. 
       When analysing the history of quotas and landings and the assessment 
estimates one complication is that the assessment area changed in 1996. Until 1995 an 
assessment was carried out for the North Sea area separately, whereas the assessment 
from 1996 was carried out for an area that also included Skagerrak (IIIa) and the 
Eastern English Channel (VIId) (CRR 221, 1996: 80). The areas that were added to 
the North Sea area are of relatively minor importance. However, the effects is 
accounted for by using the latest available landing estimate for the North Sea only 
until 1995 and by using the latest available landing estimate for the combined area 
from 1996.   





Recommendations and TACs 
Managers generally followed the TAC advice from of the scientists (figure 4a). This 
impression is in accordance with the interpretation of Karagiannakos (1996: 133), but 
is in conflict with the impression you get from Holden (1994 107-108, 132-158), 












Figure 4a. Maximum recommendable TAC by ACFM and the agreed TAC. 1975-1995: North Sea only. 1996-
2003: North Sea (IV), Skagerrak (IIIa) and Eastern English Channel (VIId). Data and sources: Table I, appendix 3. 
 
 I think that the conflicting interpretation of Holden largely stems from the fact that he 
did not always choose the latest recommendation. For 1984, 1986 and 1987 the 
adopted TAC was higher than the first recommendation for maximum TAC but less 
than the revised value. Further, the TAC adopted for the two last years in his series 
(1991 and 1992) were higher than the TACs that were taken to correspond to the 
advice of reducing effort by 30%. As mentioned, the choice of data depends on the 
intention of the analysis. Finally, the impression of the whole series changes when the 
years after 1996 are included (table I appendix 3). 
Earlier in the series the managers sometimes wanted the TAC to exceed the 
recommendation a little (Figure 4b). Later it often was the other way around. The 
average of the ratio of recommended TACs to agreed TACs is almost 1 (table I, 
appendix 3) 2. I use ratios here since they make more "biological sense" than absolute 
numbers. A difference of 20.000t means little to a large stock but may be crucial to a 
small one. Note, however, that the "recommendation" is in terms of the maximum 
                                                          
2  Years from 1991 to 1996 (no TAC recommendation given) and the TAC = 0 in 2001 excluded (see 
later explanation). 




















TAC recommendable. In other words the managers generally "take what they can 












Figure 4b. Ratio of Maximum recommendable TAC to the agreed TAC. 1975-1995: North Sea only. 1996-2003: 
North Sea (IV), Skagerrack (IIIa) and Eastern English Channel (VIId). Data and sources: Table I, appendix 3. 
 
An important exception is of course the last three years. Since 2001 the scientist have 
recommended a TAC = 0, whereas the managers have agreed on relatively small 
quotas. However, the SSB was already extremely low in 2000 – or even before that. I 
therefore view this period more as the culmination of the crisis than as containing its 
explanation. The latter does not exclude these quotas from having a potentially 
devastating effect on the stock – not so much because of the magnitude of the quotas, 
but as it turns out, because fishing was allowed to continue.  
I agree with Holden (1994) insofar that the general advice of reducing Fs was 
not followed effectively. But in terms of TAC recommendations, they generally were. 
The failure to reduce F was not because of the size of the TACs - compared to what 




                                                          
3 Holden (1994: 191-208) recognised the inefficiency of the TACs, but perhaps not the magnitude of 
the problem , which is understandable because the magnitude of the problem only escalated from the 
mid 1990's. However, Holden (1994: 151-159) explicates that the management can not alone be 
blamed for the decline in the cod fishery - the important role of the out-fading gadoid outburst must not 
be left out. I agree - but as qualified in the introduction. There is evidence that the stock biomass 
potentially can be controlled - at least so some extent, but the effect of the SSB on recruitment is not 





















TACs and landings 
If the scientific advices were followed by the managers it could suggest that the 
decline in stock was because the fishermen did not respect the quotas. The latter, 












Figure 5a. Agreed TACs and Working Group landings. 1975-1995: North Sea only. 1996-2003: North Sea (IV), 
Skagerrak (IIIa) and Eastern English Channel (VIId). Data and sources: Table 3, appendix 1. 
 
The first quotas (1975-1978) seemed not to be restrictive since they were not taken. In 












Figure 5b. Ratio of the Working Group landings to the agreed TACs. 1975-1995: North Sea only. 1996-2003: 
North Sea (IV), Skagerrak (IIIa) and Eastern English Channel (VIId). Data and sources: Table I, appendix 3. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
known. We can apparently not control the number of fish to enter the fishery, but we can, somewhat, 
decide when to harvest them.   
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From the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s, the deviations between the TACs and the 
landings are relatively small and equally spread around the line of equality (fig. 5b). 
From 1996, the fishermen have apparently not been able to fish the quota half of the 
times. Note, however, that estimates of mis- and under reporting were generally not 
included in the landing figures. 1998 was an exception from the latter - but here WG 
landings only exceeded the nominal landing by 5% anyway. At first sight it would 
make sense to assume that there is little mis- and under reporting in the years where 
the TAC is not taken. But that is not necessarily true, since there could be differences 
between regions or vessels. Whereas some possibly are not able to land their quotas 
others would land the excess illegally.   
 
Recommendations and landings 
In the figures 6a and 6b the recommendations given by ACFM are compared to the 
landings as used by the working group. There is more spread around the line of 
equality here than in the other plots, which is expectable since the link between 
scientists and fishermen is indirect compared to the scientists-managers link and the 
managers-fishermen link. The average ratio of the recommended TAC to the working 
group landings is 1.04, indicating that the advised TAC tends to be a little larger than 
















Figure 6a. Recommended TACs and Working Group landings. 1975-1995: North Sea only. 1996-2003: North Sea 
(IV), Skagerrak (IIIa) and Eastern English Channel (VIId). Data and sources: Table I, appendix 3. 
 
 

































Figure 6b. Ratio of  recommended TACs to the Working Group landings. 1975-1995: North Sea only. 1996-2003: 
North Sea (IV), Skagerrack (IIIa) and Eastern English Channel (VIId). Data and sources: Table I, appendix 3. 
 
 
To summarise, the analysis of recommendations and implementation of TACs and the 
landings (nominal or as used by the working group) seem to shed little light on why 
the stock declined. Instead we are left with two new questions: If the landings in 
general were not greater than recommended by the scientists, why did the SSB 
continuously decrease? And if the quotas were set with the aim of first stabilising and 
then reducing the fishing mortality, why did it continue rising? These questions are so 
intimately related that they can be rephrased in the following question: Were the 
quotas really effective in regulating the fishery?  
 Now, let us address the period from 1991 to 1995. Why was there no 
recommendation for TAC for these years? In its report of 1990 (CRR: 173), ACFM 
clarified problems of TAC regulations in this fishery. The TACs were ineffective and 
the explanation given by ACFM can be summarised as follows. In order to be 
effective the TACs must be below catching capacity, but since there is no limit on 
effort, the catches are in excess of TACs and the excess is either discarded or landed 
illegally. In other words, the TACs control the official landings but not the mortality 
inflicted by fishing on the stock. As will be discussed later, these views were not 
entirely new. However, they had not been emphasised as strongly before in the 
ACFM reports. For the year 1991 ACFM accordingly abstained from giving a TAC 
recommendation. The advice was instead to cut effort by 30%, which ACFM claimed 
was the only effective way of reducing F.  
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The assessments: Retrospective analysis of SSB and F 
Before we proceed with the reasons mentioned by ACFM above for the TACs not 
being effective, I want to consider another quite obvious possibility: What if the 
TACs were not really below the catching capacity? Could it be the case that the TACs 
were ineffective simply because they were set too high? As it turns out, it may be 
difficult to separate these possible causes of the failure of the TACs. Since the TAC 
recommendations are dependent on the perception of the stock condition it is 
necessary to examine the assessment history. As time passes, the stock history is 
revised. There is consequently often a discrepancy between what condition the stock 
was thought to be in a certain year, and what condition the stock is now believed to 
have been in that year - as seen by the latest assessment. Obviously, only the 
historical assessment is relevant to the management decisions, but the stock crisis can 
develop unnoticed and thus only be seen in retrospect. To the degree that the 
development of the crisis was not noticed, it is obvious that the management system 
would be incapable of avoiding it. 
In this section I will try to analyse the changes in the perception of the stock 
condition. Ironically, the assessment is here the subject of a trial of which it is also the 
judge, which underscores the ambivalent role of knowledge in explaining the crisis. 
 It is relatively easy to carry out such a retrospective analysis. It is simply a 
question of comparing the first estimates of the stock parameters of a given year with 
later estimates concerning the same year. Again all the information needed is present 
in the ACFM reports. The same type of data is also present in the working group 
reports - but the ACFM is the final advisor and it is therefore its advice that it is most 
relevant to analyse.  
 
Historical and current SSB estimates  
 It is evident from fig 7a, that the SSB estimates have been quite accurate except for 
two periods: The early 1980s and from the mid 1990s and on. But in these two 




















Figure 7a. Historical and recent (2002) SSB estimates for Cod in the North Sea. 1975-1995: North Sea only. 
1996-2003: North Sea (IV), Skagerrack (IIIa) and Eastern English Channel (VIId). The 2002 assessment was 
rescaled to cover only the North Sea for the years before 1996 (see appendix 2).  Data and sources: Table II, 
appendix 4. 
 
When would you start to worry seriously about the stock? In 1983 the SSB estimate 
was 255 (CRR: 128, 1983), in 1984 it was 120 (CRR: 131, 1984). This could be 
called a "collapse", but as will be described, it was a virtual collapse: a collapse that 
never happened. Further, this collapse did not worry scientists too much. Yet, from 
the mid 1980s the continued decline of the stock was correctly perceived, which did 
worry the scientists.  
In 1992, the SSB was estimated to be only 51.000t and the state of the cod 
stock was termed "critical" (CRR 193, 1992: 77-80). 1992 was the culmination of the 
first crisis. Then the SSB was perceived to increase again. The optimism topped in 
1997, when the SSB was believed to be back on the right side of the precautionary 
reference point of 150.000t - for the first time since 1983.4 As seen by the latest 
assessment, the stock did recover a little from the mid 1990s but the recovery was 
severely inflated in the historic assessments. From 1997 to 1999 a moderate decline 
was perceived - but the situation was actually much worse, since the SSBs of 1997, 
1998 and 1999 were overestimated by about 100%. The second virtual collapse was in 
2000. Now the seriousness of the stock state was realised - even though the SSB 
estimates of 2000 and 2001 assessments were also inflated considerably (by 38% and 
45% respectively).  
                                                          
4 There were, however, some dubious comments by ACFM in the 1997 report (CRR 223, 1997) with 
respect to whether SSB was on the right side of the MBAL (as it will be apparent in the next chapter). 




















 As before it may be useful to analyse the ratio of the historical SSB estimate to 












Figure 7b. Ratio of Historical SSB estimates to recent (2002) SSB estimates for Cod in the North Sea. 1975-1995: 
North Sea only. 1996-2003: North Sea (IV), Skagerrak (IIIa) and Eastern English Channel (VIId). The 2002 
assessment was rescaled to cover only the North Sea for the years before 1996 (see appendix 4).  Data and sources: 
Table II, appendix 4. 
 
From figure 7b it is clear, that even the latest over-estimations were not the largest in 
absolute terms, they were more serious in relative terms. From 1984 to 1996, the SSB 
estimates were quite accurate (the mean was unbiased as compared to the 2002 
estimates) but had low precision (there is considerable deviation from the mean) 5. 
Figure 7b may inspire the idea that SSB is overestimated following a recovery period 
(when things are improving, you predict them to continue improving). There is 
however a better explanation for the extreme estimates of the early 1980s.   
As mentioned the 1983 SSB estimate was 255 (CRR 128, 1983) whereas the  
1984 value was 120 (CRR 131, 1984) - a decline of 113%. In one year the SSB went 
from one of its highest recorded levels to below what later was defined as the lowest 
desirable level (MBAL of 150). However the 2002 estimates, rescaled to cover only 
the North Sea, are 138 for 1983 and 119 for 1984, which is a decline of 16%. How 
was this possible? Let us look in greater detail at the assessments of those years. A 
more detailed picture is available when we use the data from the working group 
reports, where the estimates of the stock parameters of previous years are present 
(later these were also included in first graphs and tables in the ACFM reports).   
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
5 The trend in estimates from 1992 to 1997 could be taken to indicate an initiated and increasing bias. 





























Figure 8. Series of SSB estimates for Cod in the North Sea as assessed from 1981 to 1986.  Data and sources: 
Table III, appendix 5. 
 
Figure 8 is a somewhat complex, but its elements are quite straightforward. Each line 
represents the perceived stock history with respect to SSB since 1972 - as seen from 
the assessment of a given year between 1981 and 1986. The 1983 assessment is 
obviously quite optimistic, which explains much of the difference between the 1983 
and the 1984 assessments. But more importantly, there is clearly a systematic 
difference between the assessments prior to 1983 and those of 1984 and later.  
As it is evident from figure 9, the systematic difference was due to two 
different ways of dealing with sexual maturation of the cod. Until 1983 the 
assumption of knife-edge at first maturity was used. This means that you assume that 
all cod are immature until a certain age after which they are all assumed to be 
mature6. From 1984 and onwards, the working group found it preferable to use a more 
detailed (and realistic) maturity ogive, where a proportion of each year class is 







                                                          
6 Actually is not apparent from the 1984 working group report how the knife-edge assumption was 
specifically used. It could for example be applied such that all from a certain year class are mature or 










































Figure 9. Series of SSB estimates for Cod in the North Sea assessed WG in 1984 by applying two different 
assumptions with respect to the maturation of the cod. For the upper curve a knife-edge maturity of age 3 was 
used. For the lower curve a maturity ogive (as given in table IV appendix 5) was applied. Source: Redrawn from 
Fig. 17.1, CM 1984: assesses 10. 
 
If we return to fig. 7a and 7b, we can explain the first series of over-estimations. 
These were partly a result of an overoptimistic 1983 assessment but mainly reflected 
changes in the assumptions of maturity in the assessment. Further, the assumption of 
knife-edge maturity could seem to imply greater fluctuations in SSB (fig.9), which 
could explain some of the (seemingly) lower precision of the estimates before 1984. 
Now it could seem puzzling that the 1978 and 1979 are very close to the 2002 
assessment values and much lower than the assessments from 1980 to 1983. This is 
nevertheless explained by the fact that the 1978 and 1979 SSB assessments were 
carried out on the assumption of a knife-edge maturity of age 4, whereas the 1980-
1983 assessments were based on a knife-edge maturity of age 3.7  
        Therefore the bias in the SSB estimates of the yearly 1980s is now explained. 
There is no need to examine the period with no bias, since that would shed little light 
on why the TACs may have been to generous. Let us therefore turn to the post 1995 
period, which would seem most important for an explanation of the current stock 
crisis. As before we can look in greater detail at the assessments by plotting the series 
of SSB estimates from each assessment, which is done in figure 10. 
 
                                                          
7 It is therefore plausible that the 1978 and 1979 assessments would represent considerable over-
estimations if the maturity ogive was applied to these instead of the assumption of knife-edge maturity 
of age 4. This could be calculated quite easily, but is not within the scope here.  








































Figure 10. Series of SSB estimates for Cod in the North Sea as assessed by ACFM from 1995 to 2002.  Sources of 
data: Table V, appendix 5. 
 
 
What is important to the managers in a certain point of time is the endpoint of each 
graph, indicating what the contemporary SSB is perceived to be. If you only look at 
the SSB graphs in figure 10 as if you only see one at the time, what would you think?   
From 1996 to 1997 you probably thought that the SSB was increasing rapidly 
- the crisis was over - you were “covered” by the Bpa reference point. In 1998 and 
1999 it turned out that the increase in SSB was slower than you first thought - but it 
was still slightly increasing, so there wasn't too much to worry about. You were not at 
Bpa but you were approaching it steadily. Then suddenly in 2000 the bomb is 
detonated: The increase until 1997 was actually very modest - and it was over. The 
decline has actually been going on for two years - but the SSB, fortunately, had 
stabilised since last year. In 2001 you realised that the SSB did not stabilise in 2000, 
but fortunately it had stabilised now. In 2002 you find out that the SSB did not 
stabilise in 2001, but fortunately it had now stabilised. So can we trust that it has 
really stabilised now? 
  The perception of the rate of increase is consistently changed and the 
perception of the rate of decline is consistently changed. But the perceptions of the 
end states and the rates that are in accordance with the end states are not the only 
perceptions that change. The stock history also changes in accordance with the 
changes in other perceptions. Take for instance the year 1997. The SSB of 1997 was 
first assessed in 1997 to be 160. It was reassessed in 1998 to have been only 110, in 
































1999 the figure was down to 98, then in 2000 it was 81 for then to apparently stabilise 
on 80 in 2001 and 2002 - 50% of the first estimate. The pattern of revising down not 
only the current estimate but also the previous history is consistent. The last couple of 
years were subjected to the largest revisions. As before, the most drastic change 
happened between the 1999 and 2000 assessments.  
Note that I don't say what comes first: The perception of the current state, the 
rates to achieve it or the interpretation of the precedent stock history. It probably all 
comes together, but that is an issue to be discussed later. 
 
Historical and current F estimates  
Since the recommendation and management considers not only the SSB but also the 
fishing mortality we obviously need to make an analysis for the fishing mortality 
similar to that of the SSB above. 
An F estimate for the year of assessment is usually not given in the ACFM 
reports, since the last value F is the most uncertain to estimate. Therefore, the F 
analysis will be based on the F estimate given for the year prior to the year of 
assessment in this analysis. The F estimate is really a weighted mean of a range Fs for 
different year classes. Usually F was expressed as the weighted mean of the Fs of ages 
2 to 8 (the main part of the fishable stock). For the years 1981-1985, however, the F 
estimates were means of ages 3-8. Therefore these Fs are not strictly comparable. The 
F(3-8) could quite straightforwardly be recalculated into an F(2-8) value. Yet, the latter 
did not seem to be necessary for the present purpose, since there seems to be no clear 
systematic difference between these types of Fs (table VI, appendix 6). 
 Since 1996 ACFM has not calculated separate Fs for the sub-areas. Yet, the 
2002 assessment is compared to the assessment for the North Sea area separately as 
regards the assessments prior to 1996. This appears wrong. However, I find that the 
approach is legitimate in the case of Fs. The reason why the areas were combined was 
that they could not really be assessed separately because the fish move around 
between the areas. I want to analyse if the assessment was biased in some way. 
Therefore, if it was somehow biased because of the area problem, I should really not 
try to compensate for it in the analysis. Anyway the difference is this regard is small.8 
                                                          
8 Differences between the F series as estimated in 2002 and 1995 (respectively) are, as was the case 
with the SSBs, quite small and not systematic (figures IIa and IIb, appendix 7). Generally the 















Figure 11a. Historical and recent (2002) SSB estimates for Cod in the North Sea. The historical series is for the 
North Sea only until 1996. From 1996 the estimates are for the combined are of North Sea (IV), Skagerrak (IIIa) 
and Eastern English Channel (VIId). Data and sources: Table VI, appendix 6. 
 
From figure 11a it is apparent that F estimates tend to fluctuate more between years 
than SSB estimates. The trends and levels of the historic estimates generally are the 
same as in the 2002 assessment - with the clear exception being the period after 1995. 
From 1996 to 1998 F estimates of the previous years were around 0.60. From 1999 to 
2001 the level jumped to around 0.85. But in retrospect, the F was around 0.95 when 
you thought it was 0.60, and when you thought it was around 0.85 it was at the level 
of 1.20. Since the last F estimate is the least certain we still do not really know if the 











Figure 11b. Ratio of historical F estimates to the recent (2002) F estimates for Cod in the North Sea. The  
historical series is for the North Sea only until 1996. From 1996 the estimates are for the combined are of North 
Sea (IV), Skagerrak (IIIa) and Eastern English Channel (VIId). Data and sources: Table VI, appendix 6. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
differences are within 2% to 3%, though the spread (as expected) increases with time. The trends are 
similar and the largest difference is 8% (i.e. for 1990).   



















































Figure 11b shows that F was quite accurately estimated until 1995 (as viewed from 
the 2002 assessment). Further, the precision of the estimates increased during the 
period. The fact that F was quite accurately estimated prior to 1984 is in accordance 
with the explanation of the overestimation of SSB as a "virtual" phenomenon for that 
period. When SSB is biased, you would expect the F to be biased as well since F and 













Figure 12. Series of  F estimates for Cod in the North Sea as assessed by ACFM from 1996 to 2002.  Sources and 
data: Appendix 8. 
 
As before we can make a more detailed analysis of F estimates of the period of 1995-
2001 (figure 12). Since the first F estimate given in the ACFM report usually is from 
the succeeding year, the series of estimates concerning these years are from 1996-
2002. F in 1995 was, as the only year in the series, overestimated (in 1996). The 1995 
value was revised to be an underestimate in 1997 for then to increase gradually 
halfway back towards the first estimate. 
From 1997 to 1999, F estimates of the previous year were around 0.60. From 
2000 to 2001, the level jumped to around 0.85. The most dramatic change was, as was 
the case with the SSBs, between the 1999 assessment and the 2000 assessment. The 
two last assessments are alike in claiming that the F was very high two years before 
but that it then decreased – a structure that resembles the one of the SSB estimates. 
 

























Let us sum up a little: We have seen that SSB and F have been quite accurately 
estimated until 1995, although the use of different maturity factors distorted the SSB 
estimates of the early 1980s. The precision F estimates increased until 1995, after 
which the assessments get out of hand. From 1997 to 1999 the SSB estimates are 
inflated by about 100% (125% in 1999). We also saw that over-estimations of SSB 
were linked to under-estimations of F, which is expectable from methodological 
reasons (as it will be explained in chapter 4.2). The 2000 and 2001 estimates were 
inflated by about 60% and 80% respectively. Similarly F has been underestimated 
considerably since 1996. For the period 1996-1997, the last F estimate is about 40% 
higher than the historic value. Similarly the 2002 estimates are 74% higher for 1998 
and 30% and 50% higher for 1999 and 2000, respectively, as compared to the historic 
estimates (table VI, appendix 6). 
 
 
The base of the advice: Short-term predictions 
Let us now return to the issue of the effectiveness of the TACs. Obviously the 
manager would be inclined to set the TAC lower if he sees that the SSB is low or the 
F is high. The overestimation of SSB and the underestimation of F could in this way 
contribute to the low effectiveness of the TACs in protecting the stock. However, we 
saw that the managers actually opted for TACs lower or about equal to the maximum 
recommended by the ACFM in the period from 1996 - 2000. How would the 
assessment biases affect the TACs? In order to see that, we need to consider how the 
TACs are actually decided upon by the catch predictions. 
 As mentioned earlier, the TAC advice is not a single figure and the scientist 
generally recommended large reductions in F. Prior to the advice for 1981 the 
advisers presented the managers with very limited options. On a dialogue meeting 
managers argued for freedom of choice - they wanted to know the consequences for 
the stock of different catch levels (CRR 102, 1980). This increase in freedom was 
granted from the first time in 1981 advice in form of catch options (CRR 114, 1981). 
The catch options depict - in tables and graphs - the relation between F and yield in 
the year for which the quota should be decided, and what SSB will result at the end of 
the year, when the TAC is taken.  
 
Beek and Pastoors (CM R04, 1999) conducted a similar evaluation of the catch 
forecasts of the most important demersal North Sea stocks. However, these writers 





used the catch forecasts as provided by the Working Group. With respect to 
management it is more relevant to examine the catch forecasts as provided by ACFM 
since only the latter are of importance to the managers. There are some differences 
between the catch forecasts of the WG and that of ACFM. The ACFM catch 
prediction tends to be slightly more conservative than that of the WG, although the 
difference in the later years has been quite small.  
 
Predicted F values 
Since these catch options are the base of the management decisions in the negotiations 
for the TACs, they are absolutely central to the management decision process. The 
catch option can be seen as a contingent prediction, since it predicts what yield will 
result from a given fishing mortality, and what the SSB accordingly will be in the 
beginning of the year after the TAC is taken. In order to examine the appropriateness 
of the advice as catch option, it is useful to turn this relation around, since we know 
what the yield (landings) was for a given year. Thus if we provide the catch-option 
relation for a given year with the actual landings for that year it is possible to 
determine what ACFM accordingly would have predicted the F to be. 
 Since the catch option table only provides a limited number of pairs of Fs and 
yields and because reading from graphical representation of catch options would be 
relatively imprecise, a regression between the yields and Fs was calculated for each 
years catch option table. A second order polynomial regression was found to be very 
suitable (all R2s were >0.998). The polynomial was constrained by an intercept equal 
zero, since no yield logically implies a zero fishing mortality. Applying the actual 
landings to the polynomial equation resulted in a predicted value for F. These values 
were confirmed by the graphical representation of the catch options given in the 
reports (except for the 1998 prediction)9.  
 
Actual F values 
The predicted values of F given the actual landings can now be compared to the 
"actual" or realised F as estimated by the latest assessment available. The latest (2002) 
assessment was also used to give the “actual Fs” prior to 1996, even that F was 
                                                          
9 For 1998 the predicted F value was 0.49 according to my calculation, whereas it is around 0.40 in the 
graph. I trust my calculated value more, since the graph could be the result of one misprint, whereas the 
calculation would imply misprints of 5 values in the table. Further, the graphed value would strengthen 
the significance of the results. I have therefore used the calculated value. 





predicted for the North Sea only until in 1996. This is justified by the same reasons 
for which the assessment has been carried out for the combined area since 1996. If the 
fish moves around quite freely between these areas, then the proper "actual F" is for 
the combined area. Again, there is, however, little difference between the latest, 
North-Sea-only estimated F series, which was given in the 1995 report (CRR 214) and 
the latest series of estimates for the combined area in the 2002 ACFM report. The 
averages of the Fs between 1981 and 1995 differ by less than 1% between these two 
assessments, and the trends in the series are similar. As before it consequently matters 
little if  the one or the other series is used.  
 
 
Actual vs. predicted F 
As it is evident from figure 13, there is no "proper" relation between predicted F and 
actual F.  It is tempting to compare the predictions of F to a gunshot – in the wrong 
direction. The slope of a linear regression (not shown on graph) is negative and 
significant on the 5% level (p<0.05, a = -1.12  +/- 1.00 for 95% confidence limits and 
the intercept is significantly positive (p<0.001, b = 1.69 +/- 0.91 for 95% confidence 
limits. This is of course absurd, since the negative slope, a, indicates that predicted Fs 
decrease with increase in actual Fs, whereas the intercept, b, implies that the predicted 
fishing mortality - when there is no fishing - is positive (the estimate 1.69 is higher 






















Figure 13. Predicted F (calculated from ACFM catch options as described in text) plotted against actual F from the 
latest assessment. The actual Fs prior to 1996 are from the 1995 assessment, which as the predicted values covers 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
 













































the North Sea only. From 1996 both predicted and actual values are for the combined area.  The straight line marks 
where the predicted F value is equal to the actual F. ACFM did not predict any F for 1983 (due to problems of 
assessing the stock). 
 
 
Earlier predictions, however, tend to be more accurate than later predictions and are 
also less biased since some of the predicted values in the 1980s are higher than the 
actual values (1981 is a lonely extreme outlier with a predicted F being much higher 
than the actual). Later in the series, the predicted values are considerably biased such 
that the predicted F is much smaller than the actual F. Since 1996 there has been a 
large and increasing discrepancy between the predicted and actual F. 
A very important observation is thus that catch predictions are useless as 
predictions. The scientist would have much higher success by saying that the F next 
year will be similar to the F last year (regardless of the quota), than by use of the 
catch forecast. Beek and Pastoors (CM R04, 1999) basically obtained a similar 



















Fig.14a.  Actual (ACFM 2002 estimates) fishing mortality and.fishing mortality as predicted by historical short-
term forecasts (given actual landings) as explained in text. ACFM did not predict any F for 1983 (due to problems 
of assessing the stock). 
 
 
Another way to explore the relation between predicted F and actual F is by a time 
series analysis as in fig.14a. Now a pattern is more apparent. The actual Fs have 
increased during the series and most dramatically so since 1995. On the other hand 
the predicted Fs have generally decreased. There are large fluctuations in the series of 
predicted F – especially in the early part of the series. Beek and Pastors (1999) did not 
perform such a time series analysis, but probably trends would have been apparent for 





















their data series too (1983-1994 plus the year 1997). It is nevertheless evident, that the 












Fig.14b. 3-year running averages of actual fishing mortality vs. fishing mortality as predicted by short-term 
forecasts (given actual landings). For 1983 ACFM did not predict any F. In order to produce the graph a predicted 




In order to clarify trends it may be useful to smooth the series by running averages 
(figure 14b). The individual points of such a plot make little sense, since the 
prediction in one year was a certain value and not an average of anything  - as is the 
case with the actual Fs). Yet, the running averages make sense with respect to the 
possible explanation of the crisis since it is suitable to analyse effects on the stock on 
a basis of trends and averages.    
What is evident from fig. 14a and 14b seen together, is that the predictions of 
the early 1980s were quite accurate but had a very low precision. After the late 1980s 
the relation turned around - the accuracy decreased whereas the precision increased. 
The catch forecasts showed more “consistency” between two consecutive years but 
the series of predicted F became increasingly more biased. The bias was rather 
constant from the late 1980s until the mid 1995s, when it increased dramatically. For 
the two last smoothed averages in the series, the predicted F is only about one third of 



































Fig.14c. Ratio of "actual" (ACFM 2002) F estimates to fishing mortality as predicted by historical short-term 
forecasts (given actual landings) as explained in text. For 1983 ACFM did not predict any F (due to problems of 
assessing the stock). 
 
 
The ratio of the actual F (as estimated in 2002) to the predicted F is depicted in figure 
14c. The bias in predicted F was quite constant in the decade from 1985 to 1995, with 
the predicted F being on average one third higher than the actual F. In the late 1990s, 
the bias increased dramatically. In 1996 and 1998 the "actual F" was about the double 
of the predicted F. In 1999 and 2000, the actual F was more than 3 times higher than 
the predicted from the catch forecasts. For 2001 (the latest F estimate) the assessed F 
was about 2.5 times the predicted value. 
 
The TACs don't work 
To sum up, the predictions are not only useless but also quite dangerous to follow 
with respect to TAC, since high actual Fs are associated with low predicted values. 
Say that a manager thinks that the F is too high. From the catch forecast he will think 
that the stock will recover by setting a low TAC resulting in a low predicted F. But 
the actual F will nevertheless be very high.  
 The catch prediction is a mathematical derivation of the effect of a certain 
catch with respect to F and SSB. It is, so to speak, accounting within a stock 
assessment model. It has been shown that the actual landings put into this accounting 
system yielded predicted Fs that were much lower than the actual Fs seen in 























maximum TACs, but they did not have the intended effect: To stabilise and to reduce 
F and rebuild SSB. It therefore follows that the TACs are not effective in regulating F 
(and SSB) for this fishery.  
  As mentioned before, there are two types of reasons for the TACs not being 
effective. Either the TAC recommendations were too high (so they did not constrain 
catches) or they were not too high, but they did not regulate F for the reasons 
explained by ICES in 1990. However, these reasons are not mutually exclusive - they 
could be complementary.  
 Now return to the SSB assessments in figure 7a and 7b and the F assessments 
in figure 11a and 11b. As noted above, F was accurately assessed with increasing 
precision until the mid 1990s. For the SSB there was some overestimation of another 
kind due to the use of certain maturity assumptions in the early 1980s. However, the 
SSB was quite accurately estimated (there was no serious bias) between 1984 and 
1996, though the precision was lower than for the Fs. Yet, the discrepancy between 
actual Fs and predicted Fs is significant from the late 1980s (figures 14a, 14b and 
14c). The bias from the late 1980s to the mid 1990s can thus not be explained by a 
bias in the stock assessment, which would result in the recommendation for maximum 
TACs being too high. This bias is therefore likely to be explained by the reasons 
stated by ACFM in 1990.  
 The discrepancy between predicted and actual F escalated dramatically since 
the mid 1990s. At the same time there was a dramatic overestimation of SSB and 
underestimation of F. Overestimation of stock and underestimation of associated 
fishing mortality implies too generous catch forecasts – and therefore TACs that are 
neither restrictive nor effective. Figures 14a, 14b and 14c suggest that the bias in 
catch predictions due to the reasons stated by ACFM was quite stable from when it 
developed in the late 1980s and until the onset of the effects of the assessment bias. 
This could suggest that this effect was also stable after the mid 1990s and that the 
assessment bias explains the rest. Personally I find the latter to be the most likely 
explanation from comparing the sets of figures (7a,b; 11a,b and 14a,b,c) but it would 
require a more detailed quantitative analysis to examine these issues closer. I will stop 
my quantitative analysis here since I want to address some other important issues of 
the perspective of knowledge in explaining the crisis. 
 





Intended F reductions 
Another way to see that the TACs did not work is simple to compare the objective of 
the recommendation with respect to F reduction (the basis of the recommendation) 
with what was achieved in terms of F reduction. The recommendation was given in 
terms of catch corresponding to a desired percentage reduction in F as relative to F in 
some defined base year (for example F two years ago or the mean F of the last three 
years). In the 1985 report the recommendation was based on a 25% reduction in F 
compared to a base F, in 1986 and 1987 the intended reduction was 30%, in 1988 and 
1989 the intended reductions were 20%. If all these reductions in F had come through, 
it is easy to calculate that F in 1990 would be less than 25% of what it was in 1985. 





























Chapter 3: Qualitative analysis of the recommendations  
 
Known and unknown problems 
In the analysis part it was shown that the failure of the cod management seemingly 
could be related to two main issues: Over-estimations by the scientific advisors and 
ineffectiveness of the TAC system. Naturally, the problem of over-estimations was 
not known (although there were some suspicions). The over-estimations, and the scale 
of them, took scientists and managers by surprise.  
Was it known that the TACs did not work? This is a simple question, but the 
answer may be quite complex. We need to explore the assessment and management 
history further in order to get an idea of that. However, to us the surprise seems 
inevitable. For on the one hand it would be surprising if it was not known – after a 
quite apparent and steady decline of the stock and a concurrent increase of F through 
a quarter of a century. But on the other hand it would also be surprising if it was 
known since that would make it somewhat incomprehensible that “business as usual” 
was continued.  
However there is more to explore, since the TAC recommendation was not the 
only advice given. Or you may say that the managers trusted the maximum 
recommendation for TACs but they did not follow the general recommendation by the 
scientist: To reduce the effort and the fishing mortality. These questions will be 
examined more closely in the following. 
 
History of advice  
In the former chapter I have analysed the recommendation and use of 
recommendation in a relatively crude and quantitative way - focusing only on TACs. 
It was concluded that the managers generally followed the recommendations for 
maximum recommendable TACs. However, it was noted that the advice had other 
features than these numbers and it is now the time to address these other features. Due 
to the complexity of the issue I will not analyse all the features of the advice here. 
Some perspectives of the advice, which are of a more fundamental nature (objectives, 
form of advice, type of regulation) will be addressed later. 
In the presentation of the history of advices I will continue focussing on the 
SSB and the fishing mortality. These are naturally important elements in the 
developing discourse. Further I will present and describe the development of 3 





important themes, which were discussed and developed through the history: technical 
measures (mainly mesh-size changes)10, technical interactions (when fishing gear 
catch different species) and species interactions (management of one species 
influences the stocks of others). The development of these themes contributed to the 
increased complexity but also uncertainty of the advices. 
 
The advices of the 1970s: "Straight answers"   
The first TAC recommendation from 1974 (CRR 49, 1975) intended to give 
recommendations for 1975 in order to a) maintain the F at its 1973 level or b) reduce 
F by 50% to 60% (to about Fmax, the maximum sustainable yield). Consequently two 
numbers were presented: 230.000t for a) and 120.000t for b). These numbers were 
revised from the former meeting in the Liason Committee, where the figures were 250 
and 130 respectively.  
The recent landings were said to be very high because of strong recruitment. It 
was noted that the fishing mortality for cod was higher than that of maximum 
sustainable yield per recruit, which would be obtained at 40% to 60% of the current F 
and result in an increase in yield per recruit of about 33% (CRR 49, 1975).  
The issue of technical measures was addressed in that the issues of changes in 
minimum allowable mesh-sizes were addressed. The effects of increased mesh-sizes 
were presented in tables showing immediate losses and long term gains in yield for 
cod, haddock and whiting. It was explained that the calculations were based on single 
species models for each species separately, since neither the data nor the knowledge 
required for multi-species modelling of the mesh-change were available. In a 
conclusion was stated that there should be a long term increase for all species, except 
whiting from an increase in mesh size to at least 90 mm (the mesh-size at the time 
was 75 mm.) (CRR 44, 1974 and CRR 49, 1975).    
 In the 1976 report it was (laconically) stated that the NEACF had set the TAC 
higher than recommended for 1976 (the TAC was 236, the recommendation 210) and 
that F would have to increase above the current level by 45% to catch the cod quota 
(CRR 56, 1976).  
                                                          
10  I have omitted the discussion of the closed area measures, e.g. the "Cod Box" that was introduced in 
in order to protect juveniles. The history of the cod box is in many ways similar to that of the mesh-
sizes (see for example CRR 168, 1989).  





In the 1977 report, problems of estimating F were admitted but there was a 
"general agreement" that the effort was too high and should be reduced. The effort 
reduction was recommended to be carried out in 10% steps. It was noted that the 
current exploitation pattern was wasteful and the Committee reminded of the benefits 
of a mesh-size change as presented in the CRR 44 and CRR 49 reports (CRR 73, 
1977).     
 In 1978 the Liaison Committee was replaced by ACFM (CRR 85, 1978). 
ACFM stated that it would proceed with the policy of its predecessor with respect to 
the policy of small, stepwise, recommendations in F. The annual yields and the 
spawning stock biomass were said to have declined significantly since the end of the 
1960s although they were still above pre-1960 levels. This suggested that the 
roundfish stocks were "severely over-exploited", but none of the stocks were in 
"immediate danger of recruitment". For the first time the current F estimate was 
presented in the report (F(8-2) = 0.88), where it was compared to the much lower Fmax 
(Fmax=0.33). 
 In the 1979 report the recommendation was to revise the (already agreed) TAC 
= 183 up to 247, since the TAC of 183 in a revised assessment would imply a 
reduction of F that was greater than "envisaged" at the ACFMs previous meeting (e.g. 
the policy of 10% annual reduction). It was stressed in the introduction that the state 
of the stocks and the yields from them could be "…improved much more dramatically 
by improving the exploitation patterns by way of appropriate mesh changes, than by 
reducing the fishing mortality rates." 
 
The early advices were quite brief and contained little discussion of the methods and 
the numbers. The TAC numbers seemed to reflect a quite strong confidence in the 
assessment estimates since the recommendation of 1975 was revised by less than 
10%. To the manager with little knowledge of fisheries biology, the reports would 
probably seem difficult and maybe somewhat puzzling at times. The biologists were 
talking about a fishery mortality factor, which they strongly recommended to be 
reduced but they did not explain what it meant or neither did they show any values of 
it until 1978. In the 1976 report the discrepancy in the magnitudes of cause and effect 
would probably be puzzling to the average manager. By exceeding the 
recommendation with 12% the expected increase in F was said to be 45%. The 
phenomenon, which is due to an exponential relation between catch an effort (as in 





the catch predictions of the former chapter) was explained in the working group report 
of 1977 (CM: F8, 1977) but the explanation was apparently not given to the 
managers. 
 The lower TAC and the increase in mesh size were suggested because they 
were said to lead to a more rational exploitation resulting in a higher long-term yield. 
There was no sign of danger to the stocks, which was confirmed by the Working 
group reports. For example the 1977 working group report stated that:  "There seems 
to be no urgent need to reduce exploitation rates drastically, since there is above 
average recruitment and fishing mortalities are not excessively high." The aim was 
therefore to reduce F to about half the current level because it was rational to do so. 
What about the policy of reducing F by 10% per year? There was little 
explanation of this policy. However, in the introduction of the 1977 report, it was said 
that the achievement of the objectives may "…need to be implemented in the long 
term since the measures required would in the short term be too drastic" (emphasis 
added). This, I think would indicate pragmatic political concerns to the manager.  
In the 1979 working group report, which was the background of the 1979 
ACFM report it was stated that "...,if the 1979 TAC is adhered to, it could be argued 
that the 1980 TAC should be increased considerably in order to prevent the biomass 
from building up rapidly" (CM G:7, 1979, emphasis added). Why should the scientists 
worry - was the increase in biomass not what they wanted in the first place? 
  The scientists generally wanted the F reduced towards F01, (which had 
replaced Fmax as the rational reference point in the meantime). However, a biologist 
(working in the demersal fish committee) Niels Daan had criticised the F01 concept, 
since it was based on the assumption of constant recruitment, which evidently was 
questionable. Daan argued that the expected gains in yield per recruit by applying F01 
for the demersal stocks of the North Sea were small compared to the effects of the 
long term variations in recruitment, which could somehow be related to the general 
"expansion" of the North Sea fisheries (CM: F:7, 1976). Therefore Daan suggested 
that these demersal stocks should be reclassified from as being "fully exploited" (in 
stead of "overexploited").  
To the manager it would seem that the stepwise reduction in F was due to 
pragmatic reasons but as shown there was perhaps another reason: You did not know 
what would happen if the F01 was achieved - maybe is was not desirable. I suggest the 





latter was an important reason for the suggested stepwise reductions, but the managers 
were, it seems, not informed of these concerns until later.11  
 
The early 1980s: Flexibility and uncertainty 
The managers had asked for more flexible recommendations and they got them from 
1980 and on in the form of catch options (as described in the former chapter). The 
catch option figure included a graph of the resultant SSB for the next year, which 
ACFM said was "...perhaps more revealing than the yields curves…". ACFM warned 
the managers that "…the chances of getting above average recruitment are likely to be 
seriously diminished once the spawning stock falls below a certain level". The 
importance of a long-term policy in order to secure optimum yields was stressed and 
ACFM warned of "short-term expedients adopted to meet current economic and 
political problems".  
ACFM noted that it had been its policy to reduce F by 10% per year - but little 
if anything at all had been achieved. 3 main reasons for this were mentioned: The 
TACs had been exceeded due to ineffective enforcement, there were large discards 
and the TAC recommendations had "in too many cases" been "highly optimistic". 
ACFM therefore recommended larger annual reductions than before. In the 
introduction of the report it was noted that large discards not only reduced the 
potential yield but also the accuracy of assessments since good data on discards were 
expensive to obtain. 
 In late 1979 the minimum legal mesh size was increased from 75mm to 
80mm (CRR 93, 1979). However, ACFM stated that a 5mm increase was not 
expected to have "any appreciable effect". An increase to 90mm as had been 
advocated for several years would nevertheless be expected to reduce the discard 
problem to a rather low level. ACFM found it "disappointing" that little progress on 
this issue had been made in spite of the stressed advantages (CRR 102, 1980: 16-18). 
 The question of how to deal with discards was important for the assessments. 
In the early 1980s the working group struggled to revise an inconsistent database 
which suffered from problems related to the discards (CM G:8, 1980; CM G3, 1981). 
In its 1981 report ACFM had recalculated the assessment made by the working group. 
                                                          
11  The first incident kown to me of ACFM noting that the stepwise reduction towards Fmax also was 
due to biological concerns of multispecies interactions is in the 2nd dialogue meeting in October 1980 
(CRR 106: 53). 





The reasons were that ACFM found it better to leave the discards out of the 
assessment since inclusion of weak discard estimates would add considerable variance 
to the result. Further, ACFM criticised the working groups use of new assessment 
methods (CRR 114, 1981). In the 1982 report ACFM explained that it, at the May 
meeting, had been unable to assess the stock due to uncertainty of the recruitment 
level. The advice was therefore postponed to the November meeting, where ACFM, 
in spite of new data, stated that it had been unable to provide a sufficiently precise 
assessment to allow a forecast. Instead a TAC within the range of the previous 3 years 
was recommended (CRR 119, 1982). The 1981 and 1982 reports contained long and 
detailed technical explanations of the difficulties ACFM was facing in the 
assessments for these years. A graph of the stock history in terms of SSB and F was, 
for the first time, included in the 1982 report.  
In the 1983 report it was said that the SSB had recovered somewhat from its 
lowest level in 1978, but that it was expected to decline if F was not reduced (CRR 
128, 1983). The F level was said to have been at the 1982 level for 10 years. The year 
after, in the 1984 report, F was believed "to have generally increased in the last 20 
years".  
 
The 1980 ACFM report can in some ways be seen as a turning point. The catch 
options granted the managers the freedom that they wanted. But the freedom had a 
price: The managers were now directly in charge of the SSB. This was explicated by 
the curve of expected SSB related to a certain catch in the catch forecast. The SSB 
had only been referred to occasionally and indirectly in the previous reports - no 
estimates had been shown. The managers were thus provided more information as 
their biological responsibility became, so to speak, more direct. In this way the 
managers had to become familiar with the stock biology. 
Furthermore, the biologists now shared the uncertainty of the assessments with 
the managers and detailed technical explanations of it were given. It became obvious 
that the assessment quality also was a management issue, since the assessment 
suffered from uncertainties related to the serious discard problem.  
The biologists were quite frank about their views on the management: It was 
disappointing. The rational aims had not been achieved or even approached. 
Therefore they were obviously worried when they were asked to leave more freedom 
and responsibility to the managers. 





1985-1989: Development of the first crisis 
In The 1985 report the SSB was "…estimated to be at its lowest level ever and less 
than the annual catch with the prospect of declining further in the immediate future". 
Further, the SSB level was much lower than previous recorded lows in 1963 and 
1977-79. ACFM stated that it was "unable to judge" whether the low SSB would 
"affect recruitment" but found that further declines "…must be a biologically 
unacceptable risk" (CRR 137, 1985). The appropriate mesh size was said to be "well 
in excess" of 80mm or 90mm but enforcement of a 90mm mesh would only result in a 
small increase in SSB. 
In the 1986 report it was stated that continued fishing by the current F would 
lead to a further decline in SSB. Even if the fishery was closed, the SSB would not 
increase to the level at which "consistently good recruitment" had been observed 
(150.000t - the later MBAL value) (CRR 146, 1986).   
In 1987 the stock prognosis had improved somewhat, since the 1985 year-
class had been revised up by 40%. It was stressed that the relatively strong 1985 year 
class had to be protected until it would contribute to the SSB. The report 
recommended TACs corresponding to a 30% reduction in F. It was explained that 
accurate forecasting was depending on estimation of the recruiting year class since the 
heavy exploitation resulted in the bulk of the stock consisting of a few of the youngest 
year-classes. Further, there were neither adequate data on the by-catches of the 
reduction fishery nor on the discards. The exploitation level and the data did therefore 
not allow accurate forecasts.  
A long section was dedicated to the problem of managing a mixed fishery by 
catch quotas. The cod stock was the weakest of the roundfish stocks and it required 
the greatest reduction in F. The problem was that when the cod quota was taken the 
fishery would continue to fish for haddock and whiting. The cod would then have to 
be discarded. The problem was described as an enforcement and management 
problem - to be solved by the managers (CRR 146, 1986).  
 In 1988 (CRR 161, 1988) ACFM warned about the high exploitation level. It 
was stated that the stock and survival was so low that the recruitment in most years 
would be insufficient to maintain the stock. The SSB was at a new historic low 
(95.000t). The problems of the mixed fishery was noted but, as before, left to the 
managers. The mesh-size was to be increased to 90mm from the first of January 1989 
but ACFM recommended that the mesh-size should be increased further to 120mm. 





The effects of these changes were calculated in single species models, but it was 
admitted that the calculations were in conflict with the results from multi-species 
models, which included predation effects. The single species models predicted serious 
short-term losses in yields, that would turn into gains in the long term - except for 
whiting, for which the catches would almost disappear in the short term and for which 
there would also be a loss in the long term. In the multi-species models the gains were 
less and sometimes negative. However, the mesh-size increase was believed to assist 
the recovery of the SSB - but quite modestly so in the short term. A rapid SSB 
recovery was dependent on a major reduction in F.  
 In the 1989 report the warnings of the high exploitation and the historic lows 
in low SSBs of the cod stock were repeated. Moreover, the current prospects of the 
haddock stock were said to be "very disturbing". An extensive section dealt with the 
problems of regulating F in a mixed fishery. ACFM concluded that: 
 
Because of the problem indicated above it can be understood that implementation of TACs on the 
North Sea demersal fisheries has not resulted in the required reduction in fishing mortality. At 
present it is difficult to define practical methods for improving the situation. Ideally, scientist 
would like to adopt direct effort regulation as the major conservation measure, perhaps using 
TACs as a means of strengthening this approach. However, it seems unlikely that such a procedure 
can be adopted under the current Common Fisheries Policy, although it could be adopted at 
national level (CRR 168, 1989). 
 
I have added the emphasis here. I want you to notice these two phrases since they 
indicate a very central theme (as it later will be apparent).  
Quotas for the different species fished together should ideally be internally 
consistent, meaning that the quotas should be exhausted at the same time. To cope 
with the problem required knowledge in order to recommend proper "packages" of 
quotas. This knowledge was, however, not available. Further, the national allocation 
of quotas did not amend the problem. The strategy was therefore to continue scientific 
effort to recommend internally consistent quotas and it was stressed that this strategy 
required that the national and sectoral allocation of the quotas were adequate. 
However, in consequence of the mixed fishery problem, ACFM believed that the 
TACs only would constrain the landings and not the catch and that SSB therefore 
would continue its decline. 
 Another section was dedicated to the question whether to increase the mesh-
size to 120mm. Again there were inconsistencies between results of single- and multi-
species models. The gains in yields and biomass from the former were reduced or in 





several cases reversed in the latter. The knowledge base for such a change was not 
adequate: 
 
ACFM is of that opinion that, although the idea of fishing for cod with 120 mm mesh initially 
appeared attractive, the problems revealed in trying to estimate the effect of such a measure are 
to great to overcome in the short term and that the results currently available are not sufficiently 
well-based to serve as the basis for regulations (CRR 168, 1989). 
 
ACFM warned continuously of low SSBs and high exploitation levels. The SSBs 
reached succeedingly new "historic lows" and there were concerns for the possible 
effects with respect to the recruitment. The mixed fishery problem resulted in an 
increased scepticism of the adequacy of the TAC system and the limits in knowledge 
were a constraint to fine tune quotas in order to make them "internally consistent".  
Mesh-size increases were initially recommended to rebuild the stocks but the 
complexity and uncertainty of the possible effects increased due to concerns of multi-
species interactions. There were conflicts between different model approaches: what 
was gained in realism by more complex models was perhaps lost in clarity of model 
outputs. Since results of the models were in conflict, there was no longer any basis for 
recommending changes in mesh-sizes.   
 1981 was "the year of the stomach". More than 55.000 fish stomachs were 
analysed 1981 and provided (together with stomach samples from other sampling 
programmes later in the 1980s) data for multi-species modelling. Results of the multi-
species models probably had a considerable impact on the general perception of the 
fisheries management. I will return to this in chapter 4.3. Although the results of the 
multi-species models had quite dramatic implications for other aspects of fishery 
management, they actually had quite limited effect on the short-term-forecasts (CM 
1986/Assess:9).  
 
1990-1995: The first crisis 
In the 1990 ACFM report, the problem of the high level of exploitation and low SSB 
was repeated. The exploitation level was again noted to give assessment problems 
because of the truncation of the age structure of the stock. Further, it was believed that 
mis- and non-reporting especially of cod had been taken place for many years. A 
detailed explanation of the inefficiency of the TAC system was provided (as noted in 
chapter 2). TACs were intended to limit catches to be smaller than the catching 





capability. However, only official landings were constrained. The TACs did not 
constrain mis- and under-reporting and discards.  The recommendation of ACFM 
consequently undertook a dramatic and qualitative change:  
 
Given this state of affairs, ACFM feels that any TAC which it recommends would not, of itself, 
produce the required reduction in fishing mortality. ACFM has, therefore, refrained from 
making any such proposals for North Sea roundfish stocks on TACs intended to reduce fishing 
mortality, although option tables are presented to allow management bodies to assess the 
consequences and implications of different TAC levels assuming that these TACs will be 
effective. ACFM stresses that unless fishing effort is also controlled in an appropriate manner, it 
is extremely unlikely that fishing mortality will be reduced (CRR 173, 1990). 
 
Specifically ACFM advised all effort on roundfish fishery (except for the fishery 
directed against saithe, which to a reasonable extent could be seen as a separate 
fishery) to be reduced to 70% of the contemporary level. This could for example be 
achieved by constraining the number of fishing days to the same proportion.  
 Further ACFM responded to a request from Denmark and Norway to evaluate 
the impacts of different whiting stock levels on other stocks. It was stated that 
knowledge necessary for quantification of the effects was not available, but that a 
reduced whiting stock would have a positive effect on other stocks (especially 
haddock and herring). There was however no known way of fishing selectively on 
whiting (CRR 173, 1990).  
In 1991 ACFM repeated and confirmed the depleted state of the cod and 
haddock stocks. The problems of TAC regulation were briefly described (as in the 
1990 report). The managers had implemented an 8 days consecutive tie up rule for the 
roundfish fishery. ACFM, however, noted that this rule would have much less effect 
than intended since the vessels would spend some days in port anyway, and since 
different planning of fishing trips could reduce the effect. Moreover, the managers 
had given some fishers the alternative of unrestricted fishing if a minimum mesh size 
of 110mm was used. It was nevertheless stressed by ACFM that there was no 
equivalence between such technical measures and effort reduction with respect to 
reducing F in the short term (CRR 179, 1991).  
The 1992 report repetitively reiterated the need of an effort regulation. The 
situation of the co stock was termed "extremely critical". It was stated that "Seen in 
isolation the fishing mortality on cod should be reduced to zero". Recovery of the cod 
would require "…at minimum a marked and sustained reduction of effort or even a 
closure of the fishery". As it had already been stressed for some years, there were 





concerns that the egg production (as a consequence of the low SSB) was so low that a 
high survival rate was required to produce an average recruitment. A risk analysis 
showed that given the current F there was 90% probability that SSB would fall below 
the SSB level of 1991 (56.000), which was about one third of "the lowest desirable 
level" of 150.000t, from which ACFM previously had observed recovery (CRR 193, 
1992).   
 The 1993 and 1994 ACFM reports were quite similar and the messages 
resembled those of the 1991 and 1992 reports. ACFM confirmed the critical state of 
the cod stock and reiterated that an effective effort reduction by at least 30% was 
needed. Consequently ACFM continued the policy of abstaining from giving TAC 
recommendations. It was mentioned that data were deteriorating (in spite of 
agreement between TACs and landings), which would imply problems for the 
assessments (CRR 196, 1993, CRR 210, 1994).  
 The 1995 report was the last report where no TAC recommendation was 
given. The stock was still "outside safe biological limits" but the SSB was forecasted 
to increase in 1996 because of maturation of the relatively strong 1993 year class - 
even if F was not reduced. The recommendation was to reduce effort by at least 20% 
(CRR 214, 1995).  
 
The SSB had continued its decline and the state of the cod  (and haddock) stock was 
becoming critical. ACFM provided an explanation for the inefficiency of the TACs in 
regulating mortality that was of a more general nature than before. Further, there were 
increasing concerns with respect to the quality of data because of discards and illegal 
landings. Direct effort regulations were now seen as the only effective medicine and 
consequently ACFM abstained from giving recommendations for TACs.  
Unfortunately, the management bodies were unable to provide significant 
doses of that medicine. The managers were still provided with catch options and used 
them as a basis for deciding TACs. The 1990 advice represented a dramatic change in 
the recommendation convention but "business as usual" was generally continued with 
respect to management. 
 
1996-2003: Recovery and new crisis 
In the 1996 ACFM report, the SSB was estimated to be 100.000t, which was said to 
be close to the historical low level. The stock was still "outside safe biological limits" 





and "well below a level where there is evidence that there has been impaired 
recruitment". It was noted that recent analyses had suggested that the stock may 
collapse if sustained F was higher than 0.75 (F had been > 0.75 since 1980 according 
to the same report). The recommendation was to reduce F by at least 20% (to 0.65) 
and a table showed a catch that corresponded to that option. In that case SSB was 
forecasted to increase to 142.000 (close to the MBAL value) by the end of 1997. 
However, ACFM noted that the required decrease in F only could be achieved by a 
reduction in effort in the roundfish fisheries (CRR 221, 1996). This comment had 
been repeated since the 1990 report and was routinely repeated in all subsequent 
reports (CRR 221, 1996).     
 According to the 1997 report the stock was "close to or outside safe biological 
limits". Further it was noted, that the SSB was expected to increase into safe 
biological limits if the current fishing mortality was maintained. The fishing mortality 
was believed to have dropped to 0.63 in 1996. ACFM recommended that the fishing 
mortality should not exceed the 1996 level so SSB could be rebuilt to safe levels. The 
landing corresponding to that F was given in the text (CRR 223, 1997).    
  In the 1998 report, ACFM considered the stock to be "outside safe biological 
limits". For the first time "precautionary reference points" were presented in the 
report.  F (= 0.67) was slightly higher than the Fpa ( = 0.65) and SSB (=136.000t) was 
lower than the Bpa (=150.000t). The recommendation was to reduce F to 0.60 (<Fpa) in 
order to bring the SSB above the Bpa in 1999. The expected landing corresponding to 
the F = 0.60 was presented in the text. (CRR 229, 1998). 
 In the 1999 the stock was still considered to be "outside safe biological limits". 
The F estimate for 1998 was below Fpa but ACFM recommended that F in 2000 
should be less than 0.55 - corresponding to landings of less than 92.300t. ACFM 
noted that the 1997 and 1998 year classes respectively were the poorest and second 
poorest on record. It was therefore needed to reduce F further "to increase or maintain 
spawning stock biomass above Bpa". 
 In a section entitled "Relevant factors to be considered in management" 
ACFM noted that the 1997 and 1998 assessments presently were thought to have 
overestimated SSB and underestimated F.  Further, ACFM wrote: 
 
The same analytical formulation was used in the 1999 assessment, but the likelihood that F is 
underestimated cannot be evaluated at this time (CRR 236, 1999).  





The continued recovery of the stock was depending on the contribution of the 
relatively strong 1996 year class to the SSB. The concern was that the growth rate of 
this year class apparently was lower than usual. Further, ACFM noted that substantial 
underreporting of cod had taken place in 1998 (CRR 236, 1999). 
 In its 2000 report (CRR 242, 2000) ACFM estimated the stock to have been 
below Bpa since 1984 and that it currently was under Blim (the historical limit 
reference point of 70.000t). The SSB was now in a region where "the risk of collapse 
is high". The recommendation was to reduce the fishery to the "lowest possible level". 
A rebuilding plan should be implemented in order to SSB to the Bpa level. It was 
stressed that TAC reductions were not sufficient. Directed fishing, misreporting and 
discarding should be avoided and by-catches should be reduced to the lowest possible 
level. A new plot type that showed equilibrium SSB as a function of Fs indicated that 
the stock would collapse at current fishery mortality. The 1996 year class seemed to 
have been heavily exploited and to have little potential to contribute to the SSB. It 
was noted that the growth rate of cod for unknown reasons had declined in recent 
years. This would delay a recovery of SSB and make the stock more vulnerable to 
high exploitation levels. Further it was repeated that substantial under-reporting of 
cod landings occurred in 1998 but ACFM continued that "there are no reasons to 
suspect substantial under-reporting in 1999 or 2000." (CRR 242, 2000). 
 The 1997, 1998 and 1999 assessment had overestimated SSB and 
underestimated F. This was said to be because "inconsistencies in the commercial 
effort data". In the 2000 assessment the commercial CPUE data of the Scottish fleets 
were consequently omitted, since these were believed to be the most problematic. It 
was mentioned that the difference in signals between survey data and CPUE data 
affected the assessment of some Canadian cod stocks resulting in over optimistic 
management.12  
 In the report of 2001 (CRR 246, 2001) the SSB was said to be at a new 
historic low. F had been at historically high levels and above Fpa since the early 
1980s. ICES recommended implementation of a recovery plan to rebuild the SSB. 
Fishing mortality should be reduced to the lowest possible level. The inefficiency of 
TACs was explicated: 
 
                                                          
12 ACFM (most likely) referred to the now classical case of the over assessment of the cod stocks of 
Newfoundland, which will be discussed later. 





 "ICES has repeatedly stated that for various reasons, TACs alone are not effective in regulating 
fishing mortality"( CRR 246, 2001: 230). 
 
Rebuilding of SSB could be carried out by reducing F or/and by changing the 
exploitation pattern (30mm increase in mesh-size was said to be equivalent of a 30% 
reduction in effort)13. 
 It was said that assessments prior to 2000 consistently had underestimated F 
and overestimated SSB. Further, growth rates in 2000 had been lower than assumed 
previously. The CPUE data were now completely excluded from the assessment and  
the "historical consistency" had thus improved. A more specific explanation of the 
bias resulting from the CPUE data was presented and again the case of the Canadian 
over assessment of cod stocks was referred to. A variety of different assessment 
methods had been used and had given comparable results, which increased the 
confidence in the recent assessment. 
 A long section dealt with information from a quite extensive examination of 
fishermens views on the current assessment. ACFM stated that the views were quite 
diverse but concluded that: 
 
There is general agreement on the poor state of the cod stock, but the stock was considered in a 
better condition in the Northern North Sea than further south (CRR 246: 224). 
 
I will not summarise much of the 2002 ACFM report since some elements already 
have been presented in the introduction of this work. Note that this assessment serves 
another role than the previous assessments, since it is taken to be the reference for the 
currently best justified beliefs with respect to the stock - it is the assessments that is 
assessing its predecessors. Further, the role of this assessment is different since it 
constitutes the explanandum to which the previous assessments are elements of the 
explanans.  
The stock situation is now perceived to be worse than at the 2001 assessment, 
which over-estimated the SSB for 2001 by around 50%. In the 2002 assessment 
CPUEs were also excluded (for the reasons described in the 2000 and 2001 reports). It 
is suspected that the landings in 2001 were seriously underreported. The assessment 
was reviewed by 3 independent scientist and a by a public review with participants 
                                                          
13  From personal communication with Roger Larsen (2002) who is an expert in selectivity of trawls, I 
find that these results are probably only "theoretical". Fishermen very generally know ways to 
counteract the effects of mesh-size increases (e.g. changes in twine types or towing speed).   





from organisations of fishermen. The review claimed that the assessment was in 
agreement with the proper standards and the fishermen broadly shared the perception 
of the stock development. However, the fishermen of the northern North Sea tended 
to see more fish whereas it was opposite in the south (ACFM 2002). 
 
The stock was said to be "outside biological limits" and the recommendations were to 
reduce F. however, there were some signs of optimism or relief. The stock was 
approaching the MBAL.  
In 1997 the stock was said to be "close to or outside safe biological limits" and 
the SSB was expected to increase into safe biological limits if the current fishing 
mortality was maintained. In the appendix (table 3.5.2.4) the stock parameters of the 
assessments are listed and the SSB estimate for 1997 report was 160.400t. Recall that 
the MBAL was 150.000t. I think that it is fair to say that the above statements by 
ACFM then are at least "grammatically incorrect". This could therefore indicate the 
ambition of the scientists to protect and rebuild the stock. 
In 1999, things were a bit delicate but not looking really bad. You had two 
really poor year classes coming in, but on the other hand the strong 1996 year class 
was about to enter the spawning stock. F was lower than Fpa, but it was wise to lower 
it further, because of the poor incoming year classes and because the growth of the 
1996 class seemed to be unusually slow. ACFM was worried about biases and the 
managers were warned of that. It was noted that the two last years had been too 
optimistically assessed. The 1999 assessment was done in the same way and ACFM 
was unable to judge if it was biased too. In 2000 ACFM decided that it was - and very 
much so. The 2000 assessment marks the onset of crisis with ACFM advising the 
lowest possible catch and recovery plans. ACFM explained that the over-assessments 
were due to the use of the CPUE data and made its adjustments accordingly. 
However, it later turned out that the 2000 and the 2001 assessments were also biased, 
which is where we are now. 
 
It was regularly repeated that the TACs alone would not suffice to accomplish the 
reduction in F. However, the practice of providing TAC advice was re-established. A 
certain "catch" (1996) or "landing" (1997, 1998, 1999) corresponded to a certain 
reduction in F. There is therefore an inherent contradiction in the reports from 1996 to 





1999. On the one hand is it stated that TACs cannot regulate F and on the other hand 
the advice is given exactly as if they can.  
  As the terms have generally been used by ACFM and the working group, 
discards and illegal landings are considered to be included in "catch" but not in 
"landings". If the regulatory system was ineffective, a certain catch would still 
correspond to a certain F. If a biologist was sceptical towards the TAC system, 
wouldn't he then use the term "catch" instead of "landing"?  If the advisors are 
assumed to be consistent with the terminology, this change perhaps indicates a 
slightly renewed belief in the efficiency of TACs in regulating F. At least the change 
in words would seem to underline a step back towards the practice of the "classical" 
TAC recommendations. 
 
A brief history of the advices  
A general and very obvious observation is that the complexity of the advice has 
increased tremendously from the mid 1970s and to today. An indication of this is the 
increase in the number of pages in the ACFM reports (or Liason Committe reports 
until 1978. In the mid 1970s the number of pages was around 100 and there was a 
quite linear increase until the 2000 report, which contained about 900 pages (R. 
Poulsen, 2002: 91-92).14  
The increase in volume indicates an increase in the complexity of the scientific 
knowledge in fisheries biology, which mainly resulted from development of the issues 
of species interactions, technical interactions and technical measures. The increase in 
the ACFM reports showed that there was a dramatic increase in the amount of 
information considered important to the managers. The development was from a brief 
recommendation of 2 numerical options (corresponding to the "rational" objective and 
corresponding to a minor, pragmatic reduction of F) to a complex description of the 
situation and an array of possible management options. The managers achieved more 
flexible advice at the price of getting more direct biological responsibility and at the 
cost of having to become more familiar with biological knowledge - the managers had 
to become familiar with the concepts of F and SSB. 
Uncertainties of the assessment turned out to be related to the management - 
they were therefore in part the managers' responsibility. The uncertainties of the 
                                                          
14 I expect that the increase in the volume of the working group reports was similar - or perhaps even 
more dramatic. 





advice were largely shared with the managers, often in quite technical and detailed 
sections. ACFM explained that discards were not included in the assessment because 
they would to give rise to reduced precision (which was traded off with accuracy). 
I have indicated that everything was not always told and that there may have 
been some tactics involved in this. The biologist generally wanted to reduce the 
exploitation level, and that may have been a reason why they did not, initially, 
mention that they did not know what would happen if F was reduced to F01. Further 
they did not say that the SSB, according to the 1997 estimate, had reached the MBAL 
level (in 1997), although this later turned out to be wrong. 
 
The recommendation to reduce F was not followed 
From the quantitative analysis of the former chapter you may conclude that the 
managers trusted the maximum recommendation for TACs but they did not follow the 
general recommendation by the scientist: To reduce the effort and the fishing 
mortality. The main theme of the history is one of the advisors trying to convince 
managers to reduce F. Persuasion was first tried by tempting (rational exploitation 
would increase yields dramatically), then by tempting and warning (the SSB was low 
- SSBs and yields could be higher by improving the exploitation pattern) and finally 
by alarming (the risk of stock collapse). Warnings were increasingly loud but the 




For many years the scientists recommended increases in mesh-sizes, in the benefit of 
which they initially had strong believes. The changes were, however, not adopted 
until many years later, and the changes adopted were often much smaller than those 
recommended (Holden, 1994). Ironically, the implementation of changes largely 
happened after the scientists began to loose faith in mesh-size regulations. Results that 
included multi-species considerations were somewhat ambiguous but indicated that 
the possible gains were much less than was previously assumed. Moreover, mesh-
changes were later said to be of less immediate importance. What was needed in the 
time of stock crisis was immediate response.  
 





It was known that the TACs did not work 
A key question to be examined in this historical section was the question whether it 
was known that the TACs were not effective in regulating Fs. The first warning that 
the TACs were not efficient was presented in the 1987 ACFM report. The explanation 
was given in terms of the mixed fisheries problem. This explanation was repeated in 
1988 and 1989. In 1990 a more general explanation was given. The warnings were 
now really loud and often repeated - and they were followed by the statement of 
ACFM abstaining from giving TAC recommendations from 1990 to 1995. The 
explanation given in the 1990 report was often referred to and it became a routine to 
warn about the incapability of TACs to reduce F.  
 We therefore must conclude that the deficiencies of the TAC system were 
known and that message was strongly and recurrently delivered to the managers. The 
problem must have been very clear to the managers - at least since 1990. 
 
Effort regulations were implemented – but insufficiently so 
As mentioned, effort limits in form of allowable days at sea were introduced – 
although at an insufficient scale. Holden (1994, chapter 6) describes and explains the 
history of “tie ups” in the yearly 1990s. In 1990 the UK - the major nation of demersal 
fisheries in the North Sea – forced its fishing vessels to stay 92 days in port at the 
instigation of the Commission of the EC. There were no restrictions on the 
distribution of the tie up days and the regulation probably had no effect – it met little 
resistance by the industry. 
In 1991 the Commission of the EC proposed a tie up limit of 200 days, which 
was “bitterly opposed” by the industry. As a result the Council reduced the period to 
135 days and similarly reduced an alternative regulation of ten days per month to 8 
consecutive days a month. This regulation was also adopted for 1992 but there were 
exemptions for both years. In 1991 you had no day limits if your mesh-size was at 
least 110mm. In 1992 you had a tie up of 67 days if the mesh-size was 110mm or 
none at all if it was 120mm. As mentioned, ACFM warned in 1991 that the 8 days 
rule would have little effect since vessels do stay some time in ports anyway. 
Moreover, ACFM noted that there was no equivalence between technical measures 
and effort reduction with respect to reduce F (in the short term). ACFM wanted a 
general reduction in F - not just to protect juveniles.  





The Council did not renew the fishing days system for 1993. According to 
Holden (1994), the reason was that the UK had argued successfully that its national 
conservation regulation, which provided for regulation by fishing days limit, obviated 



































Chapter 4: Science, Management - and Industry 
 
I warned you that the surprise was inevitable. We ended up with one horn of the 
dilemma: the managers had knowledge of the problems of TAC regulation. The next 
question is then why was this knowledge was not properly used. I have chosen to 
work with the perspective of knowledge in order to explain the crisis and I have until 
now focused on the content of this knowledge in that it was examined what 
information was delivered to the managers. In trying to explain the crisis we further 
need to see how the knowledge was used in the management system. 
  We have already seen one indication of why the recommendation of effort 
regulation was not followed. The Commissions proposals were in accordance with the 
scientific recommendations but the proposal were not implemented because of 
pressure on the Council by the industry. The history of the technical regulations was 
similar in this respect. The industry seemingly has some power to resist the 
implementations of scientific recommendations.  
 The embarrassing limitations of this project will now become clear. My 
strategy will simply be to clarify these limitations and then to pick a possible route 
from there. I will thus capitulate to some uncomfortable problems resulting from the 
complexity of the subject - but it is my hope that I will surrender in the most useful 
way.    
Return to the representation of the fishery system in figure 1: The fishery 
system as consisting of four subsystems. The resource system is subjected to the 
conditions of nature and the actions of man. Let us say (roughly) that management 
only can influence the actions of man. Further, nature is not an actor since its effects 
are not resulting from deliberations (e.g. they are not resulting from actions). We can 
then reduce the 4 sub-system model to a system of 3 actors and say that the actions 
are the only thing we can do anything about and it therefore is the role of these actors 
in the crisis that it is especially important to explain. 
We have, then, three major actors: The managers, the scientists and the 
industry. Whit respect to the question of the use of knowledge we need to address the 
question of power, because it takes power to use (implement) knowledge. Obviously 
the management bodies contain the formal power since the decision of the Council is 
law. Therefore we need to examine the forces acting on the management system. To 
put it simple: On one side there is the force from the industry on the other side the 





force is from science. Or to put is less simple: In order explain the crisis properly we 
would need to understand all the important interactions between the three actors. 
Further, we would need to understand the forces internal to each actor. For example I 
have often referred to "the managers". This term is of course covering a lot of 
complex and interesting relations within CFP (e.g. the Council vs. the Commission) 
and within the management bodies of Norway.  
But I simply can’t examine all these relations here. To analyse the influence of 
the industry on the management decisions properly would require another thesis and 
anything less than a thesis would probably be superficial and therefore quite useless. 
Further, this perspective would bring us away from the perspective of scientific 
knowledge.15 
 What I will do is to continue with the perspective of the use of the scientific 
knowledge by the managers. The way I want to do it is to examine the developing 
relation between "science" and "management". And as it turns out this relation will 
indirectly tell us something about the relation between the industry and the 
management. The latter relation is, so to speak, reflected in the former and it will 
therefore not be completely left out.16  
 
Three questions  
Let me recapitulate some main points so far in order to proceed. 
The quantitative analysis showed that recommendations for maximal TACs 
were followed – but that the catch options they were based on were severely and 
increasingly biased. The bias was due to two causes: 1) The TACs were unable to 
regulate the fishing mortality. 2) The stock was severely over assessed since 1995. 
The qualitative analysis of the recommendations showed that warnings of high Fs and 
low SSBs were loud and that managers, at least since 1990, were explicitly warned of 
the problems of the TAC system.  
                                                          
15   Note that I don't say that the industry does not use knowledge claims when they put pressure on the 
management bodies. Basically I think the industry uses two types of arguments. One is from temporary 
economic considerations (e.g.: "You can't implement that now - we already have serious economic 
problems"). The other is related to knowledge: "There is no need to implement that". The latter strategy 
is to challenge the scientific claims in saying, "there really is enough fish", or that this regulation 
system "will not work anyway". This is therefore also a knowledge perspective and I should therefore 
really pay attention to it. However I have chosen to focus on the scientific knowledge. 
 
16   It will be apparent that the pressure from the industry is not the only reason why a fishing days 
regulation system has not been implemented on a sufficient and regular basis.  
 





 I think the above naturally leads to the two following questions: 
 
Why was the TAC system not replaced by an effort regulation system?   
Why was the stock overestimated? 
 
But, importantly, there is also a third question, which implicitly is connected to the 
two former questions: 
  
Why was the maximum recommendable TAC nearly always chosen?  
 
I will in the following attempt to answer these three questions, which then will 




























4.1 TACs vs. effort regulation 
From the former chapters it was apparent, that scientists at least since 1990 strongly 
warned about the TAC system and strongly recommended that it should be 
supplemented by an effort regulation system. However, the history of these ideas 
extends further back in reports of dialogue meetings between scientist and managers. 
These dialogues can shed light on the development of the views among these two 
parts on the issue. 
 
TAC vs. effort regulation through the history 
In 1976, ICES held an ad hoc meeting "on the biological basis for fisheries 
management" (CRR 62, 1977). At this meeting problems of managing by TACs in a 
mixed fishery were discussed. It was noted that direct effort control was possible but 
that appropriate measures of fishing power would be needed. The report continued: 
"In the meantime it is likely, that the Commissions will continue to ask for advice in 
terms of TACs" (CRR 62, 1977: 11). This indicates that biologists very early were 
aware of the problem and that they preferred effort control when possible. 
 
At the 2nd dialogue between scientists and managers in October 1980, a statement 
from the Ministry of Fisheries of Denmark was very critical of the reliability of TAC 
advices17. The statement raised the question if the data and methods used for stock 
assessments were sufficiently reliable “to ensure that the estimated catch predictions 
and hence the TACs based upon thereon will lead to the “agreed” objectives”.  It was 
noted that the data base bas deteriorating because of under – and misreporting since a 
quota system implicitly invited to cheating. It was asked directly if a TACs policy had 
“any future at all” and if some other management tool could replace it (CRR 106, 
1981).  
These points were discussed at the meeting and Scientists had answered that 
direct effort control would probably be more efficient and easier to enforce. Effort 
regulation should be aimed at, although there was a long way to go since it was 
problematic to quantify the effort. This statement was repeated by ACFM at the 3rd 
dialogue meeting in September 1981 (CRR 106, 1981) and summary of the discussion 
points was put into the introduction of the 1981 ACFM report (CRR 114, 1981). In 





1982, at the 4th Dialogue meeting the chairman of ACFM repeated the merits of direct 
effort regulation and a statement by the Dutch delegation agreed to the points (CRR 
122, 1982). 
 
At the 5th dialogue, held in 1985 the question of effort regulation was a major issue.  
An American expert, Dr. V.C. Anthony, reviewed the experiences of ICNAF from 
1964 to 1973 with combined management by TACs and direct effort regulation. The 
major problem had been to measure and quantify effort. Anthony maintained that 
effort regulation (ER) was unlikely to be possible to implement on an international 
basis. On a national basis it would imply allocation decisions, which were the task of 
managers. The ICES president and the chairman of ACFM both confirmed the point 
that effort regulation was not a task for scientists.  
 A Dutch discussion paper listed pros and cons of a TAC system and a direct 
effort regulation system (ERS). The effort regulation system was noted to "score 
better". A weakness of the ERS as compared to TACs was that species could not be 
managed individually. This point was however refuted, since TACs not in reality 
could manage species individually. The only advantages of TACs were consequently 
that they could be directly linked to the assessments and that the system was 
politically accepted. The benefits of effort regulation were its effectiveness and that 
discards and mis- or underreporting would be avoided. Therefore, the quality of data 
for assessments would improve. The technical problem of quantifying effort 
remained. However, the best solution to the later problem was to get experience with 
the system. The proper number of licences would become clear in time. Further, the 
licence system could be initially be supplemented by TACs for the most threatened 
species. The Netherlands would for these reasons welcome ICES to recommend 
"effort allowed". 
 A Norwegian and an EC manager welcomed the ERS but claimed that it could 
be difficult to implement at an international level. Moreover, a German manager 
stated that there was no basis for ERS on an international level because of "major 
political issues" but that it would be appropriate at a national level. As the 
representatives of ICES, the Norwegian and the EC manager both emphasised that 
this was not an issue for ICES. A Dutch manager agreed that ICES should not provide 
                                                                                                                                                                      
17   Effort regulation was apparently not (directly) discussed at the first dialogue meeting in May 1980 
(CRR 106, 1981). 





advice of ER but considered it appropriate for ICES to provide advice on its technical 
aspects (CRR 139, 1985).       
In the 6th dialogue in 1987 the question of management systems was one of 
three main themes. A Dutch administrator presented a similar but, compared to its 
predecessor in the 5th dialogue, slightly more detailed analysis of pros and cons of 
TAC and ERS. He explicitly intended the statement to be provocative and the critique 
of TACs was quite frank. He said that decision-makers tended to set TACs higher 
than recommended by scientists in order to meet short-term needs of the industry and 
that enforcement was difficult with a resulting attitude change from obedience to 
disobedience among fishermen. Moreover, he noted that ER could be more 
economically efficient since the same catch could be taken with fewer vessels in a 
license system. 
 In an invited statement, an industry representative said that fishermen would 
have to live with TACs, that effort regulations were important but that technical 
regulations had not yet been used to the full extent. The statement of an ICES scientist 
explained the relation between TACs and ER and what data would be required for 
ER. The paradox was that while an ER system would increase the availability of 
effort data it could at the same time lead to deterioration of the same data, as it was 
the case of catch data in the TAC system. A German manager noted that many 
fishermen and managers were unfamiliar with the ERS and that it in Germany had 
been given up since it was too administratively complicated. Several speakers noted 
that TACs and ER should rather be viewed as, complimentary, than mutually 
exclusive, management means. The 7th, 8th, 9th and the 11th (the latest published) 
dialogues were not relevant to the ER question. However, a Dutch fishery scientist 
noted in the discussion of the 7th dialogue (CRR 171, 1989) that effort regulation in 
form of allowable fishing days had been "surprisingly well accepted by the industry", 
since it allowed planning of operations. Furthermore, the system would lead to a 
reduction of fleet size in the long run. The scientist proposed this method as a first 
step to reduce fishing mortality. 
 
The 10th dialogue in 1995 the fisheries of the Bay of Biscay and the Atlantic waters of 
the Iberian Peninsula were discussed (CRR 227, 1999). However, a member of the EC 
commission (EC DG XIV) made a more general statement on "Recent developments 
in the fishery management policy". He stated: 






The lack of connection between the element of annual biological management by stock and the 
structural element that control capture capacities has lead to the consideration that direct control 
of fishing effort would better than the TAC system allow for the establishment of the desired link 
between these two elements. Therefore the Commission sees merits in management in terms of 
effort and capacity regulation. But it has so far not been politically possible to implement such 
management schemes (CRR 227, 1999: 20).  
 
Further he presented the following request to the scientists by the Commission: 
 
The Commission wants a direct link between research and the management needs for 
information, a link that is not always functioning. The best example of this is when the 
Commission asked the scientist for information on the relation between the characteristics of the 
fishing vessels and their fishing power. There was very little response from the scientists. That 
means that EC finds itself unarmed for the coming discussion on effective management through 
the control of fishing efforts (CRR 227, 1999: 20). 
 
 
Problems of TAC regulations were early recognised 
I have now presented the historic discourse relating to the question of effort 
management, as it is apparent from the dialogue meetings and I will now comment 
upon it. I remind of the view of the scientist on the desirability of direct effort control 
as it was expressed in the ACFM reports since the late 1980s.  
 The problems of TAC management for a mixed fishery subjected to severe 
over- capacity were early recognised by both scientists and managers. The statement 
by the Danish Ministry in second dialogue in 1980 is noteworthy since it turned out to 
be almost a prediction. The problem of assessments and regulating by TACs were 
connected to the catch forecasts not being reliable (as in my second chapter). This 
indicates that at least some the managers were well informed about the strengths and 
weaknesses of the biological knowledge and the management system. 
  
Technical and political problems 
The scientists noted the benefits of direct effort regulation but also stressed that 
proper quantification of the effort would be difficult. Dutch representatives advocated 
strongly in favour of the ERS and later claimed to have good experiences with a 
licensing system. They therefore wanted ICES to study and develop the basis for ER 
further. Other managers and scientist asserted that ER would not be possible 
internationally, in part for technical reasons, and in part for "political reasons". ER 
would be a national issue related to allocation questions and it was consequently not 
an issue for scientists but for (national) managers. As a result, there was a general 





agreement on the problems of TACs but not on what to do about them. There were 
technical challenges to an ER system but science was seemingly, at least initially, not 
urged to face them. The issue could seem to have been postponed and the 
responsibility transferred to national managers. 
As a national issue the ER made little progress, except in the Netherlands - 
although UK as mentioned introduced an ineffective fishing days limit in 1990. A 
reason for this could very well be a version of the notorious "prisoners dilemma". 
Why should one nation carry out expensive research and implement unpopular 
restrictive measures when the other nations did not? Only the other nations would 
benefit from the inconvenience of the nation in question. This may have been the 
national barrier to the ERS. The national barrier was in this way linked to the 
technical barrier. ICES had not been encouraged to do research on ER since it was a 
national question.  
 
Unclear division of responsibility 
I do not know what communication was carried out between 1989 and 1995 with 
respect to the ER question - except from what the scientist wrote to managers in the 
ACFM reports. However, something must have happened in the meantime - probably 
resulting from the urgency of action needed to regulate F - as stressed by the scientist 
in the ACFM reports. First, the Commission had not been strongly in favour of 
introducing ER (internationally). Later it faced "political problems" of implementing 
it. As mentioned in the former chapter, the Commission proposed drastic measures in 
form of fishing days for 1991 and 1992, which were later weakened by the Council of 
Ministers and which it did not renew for 1993.        
  This shows that ER soon returned to be an international issue - at the 
responsibility of the CFP (and Norway). The fishing days system was, however, not 
renewed in 1993 because UK successfully argued that its national conservation 
legislation obviated the need for Community provisions. "With the argument over 
"subsidiarity" fresh in its ears, the Commission was doubtless in no mood to argue 
against the UK" (Holden, 1994: 112). Again, little or nothing happened nationally, but 
the point is that the responsibility once more became national. Finally ER returned to 
be a CFP issue, to which the current fishing days limit introduced this year (i.e. in 
2003) is a proof.  





 To recapitulate: The ER was first suggested as an international system. Then it 
was agreed that it rather was a national issue. Subsequently it was implemented in a 
(weak) international version, which was not continued because it was argued that it 
was a national issue. Finally, facing a severe crisis, ER was implemented 
internationally. This sequence took place in a period of about two decades and 
obviously identifies a very unclear division of responsibility between the international 
management body and the national management body. As the Danish poet Storm 
Petersen said: When two persons shares a responsibility, the result is about 1% for 
each. An unclear division of responsibility too often means no actual responsibility - 
and this has played a central role in the development of the crisis. My example is 
effort regulation and I have argued why ER is a very important issue. The important, 
somewhat complimentary example of Holden is that of the enforcement policy 
(Holden 1994: 261).18  
 
The barrier of the CFP to effort regulation 
The CEC in the mid 1990s blamed ICES (or science in general) for not having 
undertaking research towards ER. This blame was irrespective of that CEC some few 
years earlier together with other managers found that ER was not an issue for ICES 
but instead was a management issue related to (national) allocation questions - a point 
to which ICES had agreed. This is the technical side of the problem. Science 
seemingly acted too slowly when it was asked to investigate the question19. However, 
I personally do not doubt that the management bodies would have been able to 
promote research of this kind if they really stressed its importance but I will comment 
generally on such scientific reluctance later. 
 
The proper question now is what the political problems were in relation to the 
question of implementing an ERS. The term "political problems" was frequently used 
                                                          
18   The enforcement question is a somewhat complimentary perspective to that of ER since if the 
enforcement was strong, ER would be less needed - the TAC system would work better. However, I 
have chosen to work with ER, because I personally do not believe in the strategy of excessive 
enforcement. It is virtually impossible to monitor and enforce all fishing vessels on the vast ocean. It is 
simply too expensive - the gains cannot cover the costs. Perhaps satellite based monitoring could 
change this somewhat but anyway - I do not like the signal it transmits to the fishermen (the Big 
Brother view in Orwells sense). I suggest co-operation  (e.g. co-management) as a more probable 
strategy (compared to supervision). 
 





in the dialogues by different managers with respect to an international ERS but it was 
newer spelled out what the problems were, which suggests that there was an implicit 
understanding of their nature. However, whenever there is a problem, the most 
practical approach is to explain it and try to solve it. The fact that the "political" 
problem was frequently mentioned but only hinted seems to me to indicate that it was 
something that may have been perceived as an issue that it was somehow 
uncomfortable to talk about.  
 One possible interpretation of the political problems is of course, as 
mentioned, the extreme resistance that the fishing days system met by the industry. If, 
counterfactually, the system had been popular it would probably have been renewed 
in 1993 to be gradually incorporated into the CFP on a more permanent basis.  
I think, however, that there is a more fundamental interpretation of the 
"political" reasons why ER has not been welcomed and developed earlier and more 
consistently within the CFP.  
 
The view of the Danish Minister 
In 2001, the Faroese politician Óli Breckmann asked the contemporary Danish 
Minister of Food the following question:  
 
Would the minister positively consider a possible invitation from her Faroese college to study the, 
as a whole, successful Faroese arrangement of fishing days in order to compare it to EUs 
catastrophic arrangement of fishing quotas (National assembly, 2001 - my translation)? 
 
Breckmann argued that the CFP had been very unsuccessful since "all stocks" had 
been "halved" since its introduction. On the other hand he explained that the 
introduction of a fishing days system on the Faeroe Islands had been as success since 
the fishery had been stabilised following the introduction of the system in 1996. 
Cheating, by-catches and a destructive fishery were now, he said, avoided.    
 The minister (Ritt Bjerregaard) congratulated the Faeroes with its success but 
noted that it perhaps was a bit early to draw final conclusions on the Faroese 
experiences. She continued that what was suitable for the Faeroes not necessarily was 
the right thing for EU, which had to consider different nations with different fishing 
                                                                                                                                                                      
19 . In September 1996 CEC further requested ICES to investigate the question on how to measure 
fishing power in order to facilitate direct effort management (CRR 223, 1997: 13). 





patterns. She explained that the quotas were an important instrument with respect to 
the allocation of resources between third countries. Moreover, she said: 
 
Also with respect to the internal distribution of the catch possibilities in EU, the CFP builds on 
the principle that the member countries are guaranteed fixed quota shares. These are given 
conditions, that not generally can be replaced by a fishing days system (National assembly, 2001 - 
my translation). 
 
The minister finally noted that Denmark would support a more selective fishery by 
further technical regulations.  
  
The minister thus implicitly admitted the problems of the TACs with respect to 
conservation of the stocks, but explained why an alternative fishing-days system was 
politically impossible. The quotas were instrumental to the allocation of resources - 
both between third countries (e.g. EU-Norway) and between member countries of EU. 
These were given (unchangeable) conditions.20 
  
The conservation policy of CFP: Relative stability  
The above perhaps got us a bit further. The minister did not mention problems of 
resistance to ER by the industry. The resulting interpretation of the "political" 
problem is therefore in terms of the international resource allocation. At least this was 
the perception of the minister - and the perception of a social system of those in power 
of it is pretty much the reality of that system. Further, the explanation, as derived from 
the minister, was supported by a telephone interview with a senior manager, Ole 
Poulsen, in the (now) Danish Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries.21 But why 
should a fishing day system be excluded for this reason? Is it really impossible to 
allocate fishing days in stead of percentages of TACs? Perhaps a little more history 
could give us further insight in the problem.  
 
The Marathon Negotiation 
Holden (1994: chapter 3 and 4) described how the conservation policy of the CFP was 
build. Let me briefly summarise his analysis of its development. An important catalyst 
                                                          
20  ACFM apparently shared this view. In a ACFM meeting in 1997 almost all members considered that 
TAC was not adequate as the sole method of management, but many believed that TAC advice was 
still required by the management authorities because they represented a mean of allocation (ICES CM 
1997/A:2: 7-8). 
21  This telephone interview was conducted (by me) the 7th of January 2003. 





of the CFP was the introduction of EEZs since conservation measures by individual 
management bodies would make little sense before this arrangement. The CEC 
presented the Council with a proposal for conservation and management of fisheries 
resources in 1976. Nevertheless, it took six years of tough negotiations before a 
conservation policy was settled and agreed by the Council of Ministers in January 
1983. Basically the problem was that there were not enough resources to meet the 
combined demand of the member states, which resulted in two main disputes: the 
dispute about access and the dispute about allocation. The first dispute was mainly 
between France, that wanted the national exclusive zone to be as small as possible 
("fishing up to the beaches"), whereas UK wanted them to be as wide as possible, 
(UK had the largest EEZ share in EC).    
 The dispute of allocation was connected to the access dispute, since when the 
EEZ areas were agreed to be largely common, it became important to secure national 
fishing possibilities. Quotas and shares of TACs became the instrument of quantifying 
the fishing possibilities with respect to allocation. Partly because TACs were 
recommended by ICNAF and NEAFC as conservation measures, and partly because 
the stocks were scientifically measured in terms of biomass. The TAC system was 
therefore the natural choice: it was both a conservation measure and the instrument to 
deal with the problematic allocation question. Clearly stocks fluctuated and for that 
reason, the Commission proposed that each country should be guaranteed a fixed 
percentage share of the TAC. This was termed the principle of "relative stability". 
The relative stability was calculated in terms of cod equivalents on a basis of 
historic catches. It was not a straightforward calculation since the sum of percentages 
in the relative TAC shares, claimed by each country, was much more than 100 (in part 
the claims were high because of negotiation purposes, from which a step back would 
be seen as a defeat by the national industry). Important themes in the negotiations 
were: which historic reference period should be used, how special provisions for areas 
heavily dependent on fishery should be made (the later Hague Preferences), how the 
former distant water fleets should be compensated for "jurisdictional losses", tactics 
with respect to technical measures and, finally, how the control policy should be 
designed. Let it suffice here to note that the term "Marathon Negotiation" used by 
Holden seems to be quite adequate (Holden, 1994: chapter 3). 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 





The House of Cards 
Holden likened the above negotiation to a war of attrition. The negotiators were very 
relieved at the agreement in January 1983. But the managers were aware that it was an 
"uneasy compromise", wherefore the Commission likened it to a house of cards: it 
would tumble if any of its elements were moved. The strategy of the Commission was 
consequently to establish the system as the normal, unquestioned routine (Holden, 
1994 p58 notes, that precedence is important in the community - often it is the case 
that initial ad hoc solutions quickly become strong routines). The first TAC - for 
1983- was finally agreed the 20th December 1983.  Since the fishing in that year was 
almost over, the TAC served no other purpose than the extremely important role of 
implementing and confirming the principle of relative stability and thus establishing 
the routine (Holden, 1994: Chapter 4). 
 
From a shaky house of cards to the impossible strength of paradox  
According to Holden (1994: 68) the system of TACs and quotas proved to be 
"considerable more robust", than it was originally thought by its founders, which in 
addition is confirmed by the history subsequent to Holdens book on the CFP. The 
robustness - or the inescapability - of the principle of "relative stability" is confirmed 
by the Danish minister above. Holden described some of the shocks the principle 
withstood during history. An example was when the quotas were not big enough to 
cover the special provisions for the areas that were heavily dependent on fishing (the 
Hague Preferences). Moreover, the crisis in the demersal fishery - in particular related 
to the fact that scientists strongly recommended the TACs to be replaced or at least 
supplemented by effort limits, must be considered as important shocks, which the 
principle survived as well. It was no longer a shaky house of cards it was the core 
element of both the conservation and the allocation policy - one of the fundamental 
pillars of the CFP. 
    Nevertheless, I do not think the strength of  "relative stability" was only 
derived from its iterated precedence, but also from the very reason why its routine 
was urged in the first place: the uncomfortability of its initial compromise. Its strength 
is thus derived from reflection on its weakness. This situation can be likened to the 
tale of Gleipner in the Nordic mythology. Gleipner was the chain by which the asa-
gods tied the most feared hound, Fenris. The chain was made in the strongest way the 
gods could conceive: of paradoxes; the sound of the cats paw and the beard of women 





- and until Ragnarok this chain kept the terrible beast at rest. In the same way I think 
the Ragnarok of renegotiating the allocation of resources in CFP is feared - in so far it 
needs a recalculation from fixed shares of annual cod equivalents to allowed fishing 
days of fleet-segments. Some fleets would be hit harder than others by the probable 
rule of thumb that those already must suffering from over-capacity will suffer the 
hardest further reductions. This question could be so politically sensitive that it could 
not be entrusted scientists as a "technical problem". 
 
A confirmation  
I had a telephone conversation with Ole Poulsen from the Danish ministry again the 
1st of May 2003. I asked him further questions on his view on the problems of 
introducing ER. He noted, that managers were aware of the problems by regulating by 
TACs. However, he stressed that ER would never replace TACs. It would be an 
"academic exercise" (to try or take steps towards ER). He confirmed, that the problem 
was that of international allocation of resources. There would, "technically", be no 
simple way of transforming TACs into, for example, fishing days. What is the relation 
between engine power KW and fishing mortality for gill-netters, he asked. Facing the 
technical ambiguities member countries would be strongly opposed to set their share 
from the "relative stability" at stake (Poulsen, 2003, pers. com).  
  
Can the barriers to ER be specified? 
Poulsen explained, that the problem is basically a sensitive political problem of 
allocation, which interacts with technical problems. The technical problem is one of 
lottery: Maybe you win maybe you loose; but you just don't gamble with your 
livelihood.  
But we can perhaps specify the problem a little more. Seen from the 
politicians or managers view, the problem is one of not loosing in the lottery - with 
respect to the "relative stability". This is a macro-perspective that I have tried to 
explain by reflecting on the historical development of the conservation and allocation 
policy of the CFP.  But there is another perspective: that of the fisherman. The 
fisherman faces two problems: that of gambling and that of short-term losses. The 
gambling perspective is perhaps two-fold for the fisherman. First he faces the problem 
related to the relative stability: will our nation loose out? Secondly he faces the intra-
national gambling perspective: will I, being in this fleet-segment and having this boat 





loose out? The other problem relates to the ER being an effective regulation measure, 
which must be expected to lead to loss of earnings in the short term. 
  The view of the fisherman strongly influences the view of the politician; such 


































4.2 About over estimations 
How to approach an understanding of the nature of over assessments? I think there are 
two main approaches: The internal perspective of the knowledge of science (science 
according to science) and, on the other hand, an external perspective of the knowledge 
(for example a sociological approach). 
 Finlayson (1994) made an important contribution towards an explanation of 
the now classic case of over assessments of the Cod stocks of the Grand Banks of 
Canada. His position is that of a strong sociology of knowledge (Holm, 2001: 93-
124), from which he opposes a "traditional" approach of explaining over assessments: 
  
"Tradition" holds that the "success" and /or "failure" of stock assessment science is attributable 
solely to the ability or inability of scientists to objectively and accurately understand, describe 
and predict the dynamics of external natural reality (Finlayson, 1994: 10). 
 
I do not agree with the strong sociology of knowledge (SSK). For if science, 
counterfactually, was able to predict, understand and describe objectively, I would 
consider that a successful assessment. Further, the position of SSK, as expressed by 
Finlayson22, does not allow an explanation of the stock crisis but only an explanation 
of the changed perceptions of the stock. I find the latter somewhat bizarre since it 
implies that there, according to Finlayson, not necessarily was a crisis in the stock, 
which on the other hand must be thought to be the main reason to bother with science 
and its role in explaining the fisheries crisis in the first place. 
 I think this point is more than a quarrel of words and abstract theoretical 
positions because the position of SSK, consequently, excludes the explanatory 
relevance of assessment science as such with respect to the over estimations.23 Yet, 
                                                          
22  The ontological / epistemological position of Finalyson is apparent from the following quote ("The 
Harris report" can be said to be the first report that recognised the stock crisis - a result that has been 
confirmed by all subsequent assessments):  
 
"Despite what may appear to some readers as a congruence between my claim and those of the Harris 
Report, there is a powerful difference. Harris (and most other critics of DFO science) assume that 
knowledge claims about the state of the Northern Cod stocks can be, in principle at least, independent of the 
social context of the production of those claims. In other words, there is a "truth" that transcends time and 
place that can be revealed through the proper application of science. (The latter half, I think, does not follow). 
 The social constructivist perspective, however, holds that knowledge about the natural world must 
inevitably be constructed within and reflect a specific historical /cultural context. There is nothing in the 
natural world that uniquely determines the scientist's attribution of meaning to data (Finlayson , 1994: 32). 
 
This is the position I intend to challenge in appendix 9. 
 
23   It is tempting to add that Finlaysons only points out the "arrogance" of natural science - is there a 
"tribal war" he does not mention? 





since the present work is of more practical nature and intention than discussions of 
abstract positions I will leave the issue here, although I have included a, somewhat 
informal, challenge to the position of Finlayson in an appendix (appendix 9).  
On the other hand I do not at all deny the importance of sociological 
explanations. On the contrary I find that the internal perspective of science and the 
external perspective of sociology are complementing each other towards a fuller 
understanding. This is a view that recognises interaction between nature, science and 
sociological forces resulting in knowledge (in a broad sense) - and changes in 
knowledge. I therefore do recognise the importance of the empirical work of 
Finlayson - given a slightly different interpretation, and complemented with the 
perspective of the science itself.  I will consequently use an outline of his explanation 
structure to see if we by it can approach an explanation of the present North Sea cod 
case.  
 
The explanation by Finlayson 
Let me briefly present my reading of the general argument in "Fishing for truth" 
(Finlayson, 1994). For clarity I will reconstruct the argument as a modus ponens 
structure with two premises. 
 
1    Fisheries science (by DFO, Canada) was subjected to a wide interpretative                                            
flexibility 
2  A range of social forces exploited the interpretative flexibility  
∴   The over assessments are explained as a social construction24 
 
This is my construction of his argument and I have already hinted why Finlayson 
probably not will agree to this interpretation. I nevertheless find it to be the strongest 
interpretation and I will use it for now. Further, if I do not make the presented 
reconstruction, I (strictly) cannot use the framework of Finlayson for my purpose 
because his position (as explained above) does not allow for an explanation of the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
24  This interpretation makes the term "social construction" somewhat redundant, in so far the term then 
refers exactly to the presented argument structure (e.g. the over assessments were explained by 
interpretative flexibility subjected to exploitation of certain social forces). What is meant by "social 
construction" by Finlayson is a bit unclear to me.  





stock crisis. Finlayson, is by his SSK25 position forced to adopt another explanandum: 
the changed perception of the stock, which to his position not, at least not necessarily, 
is related to changes in the stock itself.   
 
Interpretative flexibility 
The concept of "interpretative flexibility" plays a central role. Finlayson offers the 
following definition: 
 
From the social constructivist perspective, the possibility of reading different but, a priori, 
equally plausible conclusions into a single data set is called "interpretative flexibility" (Finlayson, 
1994: 33). 
 
Let it suffice for now to say that the retrospective pattern in F and SSBs (as shown in 
chapter 2 for the North Sea cod stock) is a manifestation of interpretative flexibility. 
The data for, say, 1999 have not changed very much (if at all) but the interpretation 
with respect to the stock condition in that year certainly has. Later in this chapter I 
will address origins of interpretative flexibility in addressing assessment methodology 
and data limitations.     
If the account of an explanation as presented in my introduction is accepted 
something is explained to the degree that you see that it was likely (which can be seen 
as the main virtue of explanations). The interpretative flexibility alone does not make 
an over assessment more likely than an under assessment. It is therefore not sufficient 
to establish interpretative flexibility in order to explain the over assessment. The 
flexibility in itself could just as well have resulted in under assessment. 
 
The main themes and social forces: 
Institutional marriage of science and politics is the claimed "backbone" Finlaysons 
work. Science became embedded in the state, resulting in tension of two different 
types of rationality - a "bureaucratic, political" rationality vs. a "scientific" rationality 
resulting in the social dynamics he describes (Finlayson, 1994: 2). The driving social 
force was the commitment of science to a management success after introduction 
EEZs (which were admitted for scientific/management reasons). The form the 
commitment was given was scientific optimism: 
 
                                                          
25  "Strong" Sociology of Science. A description of SSK positions is given in Holm (2001: 93-124).  





In this case, the commitment to the idea of a strongly rebuilding Northern Cod stock was so 
powerful that it can be shown to have been read back into ambiguous data through analytical 
models built upon necessary but hypothetical assumptions about population and ecosystem 
dynamics (Finlayson, 1994: 13). 
 
This is the main social force that, in exploiting the interpretative flexibility, made the 
over assessments likely.  
The interpretative flexibility (IF) is established through a critical view on the 
assessment and its methodology (Finlayson chapter 4). Certain social forces affect the 
IF: The incentive structure within the science department led to a knowledge 
production, which was inefficient with respect to its mandate (e.g. to assess the stock). 
Careers and recognition depend on publications in major scientific journals. This in 
turn tended to lead (ambitious) scientists to disregard routine assessment work in 
favour of "interesting" issues that are suitable for "fine" publications. For the same 
reason data, being material for publications, were not shared freely. Application of 
new methodology by "Young Turks" to the data was thus hindered (Finlayson chapter 
5). 
 Moreover, Finlayson (chapter 6) argues the case of an epistemological 
incompatibility between inshore-fishermen and science. The overconfident science 
neglected repeated claims of inshore-fishermen, maintaining that the stock was not 
increasing since they experienced dwindling catches. Science was on the other hand 
"epistemologically compatible" with the rationally organised offshore fleet that 
experienced increasing catch rates - and for which the CPUEs were used to calibrate 
or "tune" the basic assessment model.26 27 
 
Over assessment of North Sea cod 
With Finlaysons explanation in mind I will now return to the present case of the North 
Sea. I will begin by describing the basics of the assessment methods used for the 
North Sea cod to get an impression of the "interpretative flexibility" involved. The 
following is not at all meant to be any comprehensive or sufficient technical 
                                                          
26 Note that these points perhaps imply a problem for the SSK position of Finlayson. If he a) admits the 
importance of the knowledge of inshore fishermen and b) recognises the undesirability of an incentive 
structure, which is a barrier to production of good scientific knowledge, then does he not, implicitly, 
admit a "truth seeking" property of (scientific) knowledge (e.g. a sort of realism or correspondance 
theory of truth)? Or, on the other hand: why does he, seemingly, feel himself obligated to establish IF? 
 
27 Another, perhaps stronger, reason that the data of inshore-men were not used were the logistic 
problems or high costs of proper sampling of this fleet. 





description of stock assessment methods (I am no expert). The point is just to give 
brief, non-mathematical, outline of the methods used, which hopefully will be a 
sufficient base for some comments. The comments will partly be in terms of how the 
science appears to a (somewhat) layman and partly in terms of what problems there 
seems to be according to the science.  
 
The essence of VPA 
The basic population model used by ICES is the Virtual Population Analysis model. 
The VPA model is a "catch at age method" (or a cohort analysis) that is based on data 
on catches and age data of samples of the catch. The method analyses the historical 
development of a stock as composite of its age groups or cohorts. The fundamental 
principle is that the number alive (of a cohort) at the beginning of next year is equal to 
the number alive at the beginning of this year less the number that is caught and less 
the number that has died from natural mortality (Hilborn and Walters, 1992: 364). 
 
Data and parameters 
The data on landings are central in the VPAs, and the VPA will therefore be sensitive 
to noise and biases in these. According to Hilborn and Walters (1992: 368) discarding 
and further fishing induced mortality can be thought of as underreported catch. Here 
is one source of error: you need the catches (or actually: the inflicted mortality on the 
stock) but what you have got is the landings. Further, you need estimations of the age 
distributions of the catches from age determinations of samples of the catches.  
The VPA will also require an estimate of the natural mortality (M). This 
estimate is notoriously difficult to obtain. Moreover, M has been shown to vary 
between years and between ages. Until 1986 a "traditional" value of M = 0.20 was 
used for all age classes. (CM 1985/Assess 9: p63 - and earlier WG reports for the 
North Sea demersal stocks). After 1986, Ms resulting from "Key runs" of the more 
complex multi-species models were used (CM 1986/Assess 9: 3 - and later WG 
reports). The mortalities from the multi-species models were considerably higher for 
ages lower than 4 (but quite similar for older ages). Multi-species interactions had 
thus proved to impact the mortalities. The effect of the higher Ms was to increase the 
stock sizes and reduce the Fs of younger fish since if they die faster, there must have 
been more of them before. Later key runs did not change M very much (for example 
CM 1987/Assess:15). 





 In order to transform numbers at age into biomass, some further parameters 
are needed - e.g. length at age and weight at length keys. These are dependent on the 
current growth conditions of the cod and can therefore sometimes introduce problems 
for forward projections of the stock (as mentioned in the ACFM reports of the late 
1990s). Further, a maturity ogive is required in order to calculate a spawning stock 
biomass. It was shown in chapter two that the SSB is quite sensitive to the 
assumptions of maturity. 
 
VPA procedures 
At some point all fish of a cohort are, or can reasonably be assumed to be, dead and 
the number of fish in the cohort is zero. With this information you have sufficient 
information to calculate what the stock was in the years before in an iterative 
backward fashion.  However, the problem is that the information on past stock history 
is less interesting than information regarding the present stock size. The present 
cohorts are not "complete" and there are accordingly too few parameters to calculate 
the cohort sizes. One way to proceed is by use of statistical methods (generally 
preferred by North American scientists). Another way (favoured by Europeans), used 
by the demersal working groups for the North Sea, is to estimate further parameters. 
For the latter method you would either need some independent estimate of the stock 
size, or you would need to estimate or assume fishing mortalities on the fished cohorts 
(e.g. a terminal F assumption) (Hilborn and Walters, 1992: 356-360). In this way the 
VPAs can be "tuned" by other sources of data e.g. CPUEs or data from surveys in 
order to narrow down the interpretative flexibility. 
 With respect to forecasting the stock, assumptions, models and estimations 
relating to the question of recruitment are needed. This aspect is notoriously difficult 
and can affect the assessment considerable (see for example CM 1996/Assess:6: 95). 
Since the recruitment is particularly difficult to estimate, the stock size, as mentioned 
earlier, is more difficult to assess when heavy exploitation has truncated the age 
structure towards so its bulk consisting of fewer and young age classes. I will 
nevertheless return to the tuning aspect of the assessments.   
 
The dilemma of VPA 
As indicated above VPA from catch data (and an M estimate) can in itself only 
provide information on the cohorts no longer present in the fishery. Similarly, the 





longer a present age class has been in the fishery (the older it is), the more 
information you have on that age class - and vice versa. This reinforces the difficulties 
of assessing the heavily exploited stock.  
 What kind of flexibility does VPA in itself exhibit? The fundamental data is 
the catch data - it is this data you basically try to interpret. There is, ceteris paribus,  
two very different interpretations of a certain catch. On the one hand the catch could 
be taken from an abundant stock by a modest F, on the other hand, the catch could be 
taken by a small stock by a high F.  This is the dilemma: The VPA, by catch data 
alone, will not tell you what the manager needs to know. For with respect to 
management the important question is exactly if the stock is in a good condition with 
a low exploitation rate - or if it is the opposite (or somewhere in between). The role of 
the tuning is to narrow down the range of possible interpretations (the interpretative 
flexibility). Consequently, the tuning is crucial. As explained, even a "perfect" set of 
catch data will be subjected to interpretative flexibility.   
 
XSA tuning 
There are many methods used for tuning the VPAs. During the history of stock 
assessment for the demersal stocks in the North Sea a great number of methods have 
been developed, used and later refined or replaced. Yet, the change in methodology 
has seemingly been less frequent in the later years. Since 1994 (CM 1994/Assess: 6) 
the working group has used the XSA (eXtended Survivor Analysis) method to tune 
the VPAs.28 The XSA method is now the standard method used by ICES (Lassen and 
Medley, 2001: 58).  
         XSA is a tuning method based on dis-aggregated abundance indexes (CPUEs 
from commercial fleet and scientific surveys). The population and the abundance 
index are linked by a catchability parameter, witch is allowed to vary between years 
and ages. You provide the model with an estimate for the natural mortality and an 
initial guess on the number of survivors of the oldest cohort present in the stock. By 
standard VPA stocks sizes are then calculated. From these an initial catchability (and 
a related modifying) parameter are calculated. Subsequently, the stock estimate is 
corrected by use of the abundance indexes and averages of stocks estimates are 
calculated. The latter are used as a new starting point for a VPA and the process is 





continued iteratively until convergence (sometimes divergence - results) (Lassen and 
Medley, 2001: 58-59).    
 Further two supplementary models are used in combination with the XSA.  
One model is used for "down weighting" of older data - for example with respect to 
CPUE data. It is known that CPUEs develop through time (technology and learning 
tend to increase catchability). When using CPUE data the earlier WG-reports usually 
choose a reference period of for example 10 years in stead of using the whole known 
time series in order to avoid that the catchability had increased too much in the 
meantime. Now a model is used to calculate a "tapered" down weighting. The second 
auxiliary model is that of "regularisation": 
 
The basic idea of regularisation is to assume that the exploitation pattern and the fishing 
mortality do not change abruptly from one year to the next…In many fisheries it is reasonable to 
assume that certain variables vary slowly (e.g. the fishing mortality)…The regularisation 
parameter (λ) controls how much variation between years is expected between years in the 
fishing mortality (Lassen and Medley, 2001: 60-61). 
 
The XSA version of regularisation with respect to F, used by the Working Group, is 
called "shrinkage to the mean". It means that the last F in the series is not allowed to 
change very much in that it will be weighted averaged by use of some of the F 
estimates prior to it. 
 
An impression 
I expect that you (at least if you are not a fisheries biologist) would agree that the 
methodology is quite complex. There are many parameters that need to be estimated 
and the assessment is sensitive to these and to the quality of the data on landings. My 
impression is that there has been a process of standardisation of methods during the 
last two decades. The methods are now integrated in large software packages. This 
could be interpreted as a way of standardising the subjectivity of scientist. In the early 
meetings of the working group he would perhaps say: "I think we should limit the 
CPUE series to the last 10 years". To day it would perhaps be:"I think we should set λ 
at this value" and so on. There is, perhaps, no essential, practical difference.29  
                                                                                                                                                                      
28  From reading of the Working Group reports between the mid 1970s and until 2001 with respect to 
the North Sea cod assessment.  
29  There may be sociological aspect of the standardisation of models into large software packages. A 
biologist working with stock assessment told me the experience of one of his colleges at such 
assessment meetings. He said that there were roughly two types of scientists present: those who knew 





Consider first the choice of the following quote from the description of "methods and 
software" under the subheading "XSA" from the 1998 report of the working group on 
the assessment of Demersal Stocks in the North Sea and Skagerrak: 
 
The implementation of various analysis tools is chosen on basis of explorations. The decision on 
such choices as ages for which catchabilities are assumed dependent on stock size, time taper and 
fleets to be included is based on inspection of diagnostic output including residuals plots and 
retrospective analysis for a range of options (CM 1999/ACFM:8: 7). 
 
This explains that assessing fish stocks is a sort of interactive process. You set the 
model, look at the results and then you change some parameters a little or discard the 
data on these and these fleets etc. The methodology is therefore dependent on an 
important element of subjectivity or implicit knowledge of the scientist. But there is 
also an "objective" element: the use of residual plots, which is a statistical procedure 
to optimise "goodness of fit" of the models. The standardisation of methodology has 
probably resulted in more consistent results - but they are not necessary less biased. 
The flexibility of interpretation has probably not decreased since the exactness of the 
assessment is probably much more given by data precision than the specific tuning 
model (Pope, 2003: personal com.).  
 
Interpretative flexibility 
The two quotes above illustrate two things: interpretative flexibility and the use of 
somewhat implicit biological knowledge or experience. Once you are looking for 
these aspects you can find them in about every stock assessment report. I should not 
think that this it is controversial at all - it is an integrated part of assessing stocks. Let 
me however point out again that the range of interpretative flexibility basically is 
dependent on the data quality. In the extreme: If your landing data are perfect and you 
catch, say 50% of the fish in scientific surveys there would be little flexibility (even 
there theoretically still would be a possibility of a bias). Consequently, there would be 
little scope for social forces exploiting the flexibility in the sense of Finlayson.    
                                                                                                                                                                      
"the program" (trained in mathematics, statistics or computer science) and the more classical biologists 
who did not know "the program". He indicated that there was a clear difference in epistemological 
power of these "types" of scientists. The "programmers" would "run" the program, the "biologists" 
would be silent and perhaps a bit nervous of revealing ignorance of how the programme really worked. 
Yet, the "biologists" would sometimes sit back with a gut feeling of what was happening in the stock 
that would not always be expressed by the run of the programme. I do not include this perspective, 
since I have no "real" information on the issue.  





 The range of the uncertainty is assessed by for example sensitivity analysis. 
You change a parameter a little and you monitor how sensitive the assessments are to 
that parameter. However, this will not necessarily tell you of possible biases. The 
nature of discards and illegal landings is such that you never really will know their 
impact. It is something you know that you don't know. And again these become issues 
of subjective judgement (e.g.: should the weak estimates of discards and illegal 
landings be included or not - a trade off between bias and precision). Let me finally 
point out that the over assessments themselves confirm these points.  
 All this goes towards saying that there, unavoidably, is a scope for social 
forces exploiting this flexibility through the subjectivity. If scientist implicitly or 
unconsciously, agree that things are going great then they certainly could read it into 
the data and vice versa. But reflecting on the methodology of VPA: you cannot 




Consider now the definition of interpretative flexibility. Finlayson defined IF as the 
possibility of a priory equally plausible interpretations of a single data set. As we 
have seen, the VPA works such that it succeedingly - a posteriory - narrows down the 
interpretative flexibility of a certain historic year, which is another way saying that it 
was a priori flexible. But what does "equally plausible" mean? I think the latter term 
ignores the action of the implicit knowledge of biologists. Granted, that the IF is large 
(depending on the data), but the larger it is, the more important is the subjective gut 
feeling of the scientists. I think, that IF then should perhaps be redefined simply as 
"possible interpretations". To this range of possible interpretations the biologist could 
then qualify: "But we think the stock is about here and these are the probability 
distributions, the possible biases are this and this etc." In one word: Transparency in 
communicating uncertainty. By the way: If only dealt with uncertainty in terms of 
statistics, the treatment of uncertainty may be more transparent to the scientists - but, 
importantly, not necessarily so to manager and almost certainly not to the fisherman. 
 
The case of North Sea cod assessment: Possible social forces  
With the explanation Finlayson in mind, let us turn to the present case. I think there is 
a main difference. The social force that was driving the argument (e.g. exploiting the 





IF) was the commitment of science to a management success, which with respect to 
the over assessment was moulded in optimism.  
 
Independence and political neutrality  
ICES is broadly recognised to be an independent scientific institution. It claims that 
its advices are "unbiased and non-political" (ICES, 2003: 
www.ices.dk/aboutus/aboutus.asp). This is in strong contrast to the relations between the 
institutions of science and politics in the example of Finlayson. 
 Originally ACFM consisted almost solely of national members. At the 
dialogue meeting in May 1980 CEC stated that this composition of ACFM would not 
enhance its objectivity. On the contrary CEC stated that this could result in ACFMs 
advices beeing "the lowest common denominator of national agreement" (CRR 106, 
1981: 43). The episode is curious since the rule that ACFM members should be 
chosen from a pool of national nominees was not requested by ICES but by 
"managers".30 ICES representatives, however, firmly rejected these accusations.  
The point of politically non-neutrality of ICES has nevertheless not been 
mentioned at later dialogue meetings, or so it seems from the Dialogue Reports. 
Management bodies have repetitively stressed the importance of objectivity of the 
science. But this was argued from stressing that social and economical concerns 
should be clearly separated from science. The point is that these warnings were not 
concerns of the objectivity of ACFM being distorted by national politics. Further the 
warnings were formulated in terms of that ICES should continue to separate its 
science from social and economical considerations (see for example the discussion in 
1985 dialogue CRR 139, 1985).  
 Moreover, in later years, there has seemingly been little difference between 
the assessments presented by working groups and by ACFM - contrary to especially 
the early 1980s. When considering sources of biases in the assessment we should then 
not only take ACFM into account but also consider the working groups who make the 
initial calculations. The fisheries scientist John Pope says that it is his impression, that 
the working groups are independent of national interests: "You think as an ICES 
scientist" (Pope, 2003: Pers.com).  
                                                          
30  According to Poulsen (2002: 37), the rule was a result of Norwegian pressure, which may indicate 
some strategic role of the rule - at least in the early history of ACFM.  





Further ICES scientists are not committed to, for example, CEC. Their 
contribution is on a voluntary basis (Corten , 1996: 12). It is my impression that there 
is little reason to suspect that national - or international politics plays any significant 
role within ICES. This is not to say that the advises are unbiased or objective, which I 
think they probably never can be. What it says is that the institutional relation is such 
that you would not expect these kinds of political concerns to be important. Therefore 
the current case is different from that of Finlayson: The situation of science being 
embedded in the political structure, creating a commitment of the former to the latter, 
is not the case. 
In Finlaysons argument the commitment of science to politics was expressed 
as an over-optimistic interpretation of data: the biologist were confident that their F01 
strategy was paying off. The expectations were high and, so to speak, confirmed by 
themselves. With respect to the ICES case the fisheries biologist, Corten, on the 
contrary argues that a main problem within CFP is that ICES scientists have lost the 
commitment to rational objectives (like F01) because they became disappointed by the 
poor management results of the past two decades (Corten, 1996).  
 
Struggling to be "objective" - and worried 
Even not caused by the political structure it could still be the case that that the 
working group and / or ACFM were optimistic, and that this was causing them to over 
assess the stock. In fact it could be argued that any over assessment exactly is 
characterised by the expression of optimism in interpreting data (i.e. no optimism - no 
over assessment). I think latter is too simple. There is nothing preventing an optimist 
from under assessing a stock - the reason being simply that the scientist generally 
struggles to interpret data in an objective way. This is naturally what the scientist sees 
as his first virtue (and I hope I can include myself). Above, I have just indicated that it 
is not always possible. And sometimes data are delusive. 
Further, I do not think the scientist were optimistic. If you doubt this then 
return to the recommendations of the years that were over assessed (from 1996 and 
on). The advisors consistently claimed the stock state was very poor and that 
reduction in effort was needed to reduce F etc. Yes, the stock was seen to recover 
considerably, the 1996 class was seen to be strong. But that makes my point rather 
than to refute it: The "optimism of stock recovery" should exactly not be expected 
because of a more general pessimism: Biologists were worried and disappointed over 





the lack of implementation of effective management means. And still they believed in 
a quite rapid recovery - and later in modest recovery or modest decline - where the 
situation later was "discovered" to be much worse. This rather points towards saying 
that data let them astray than the contrary.    
 I therefore see no reason to invoke an explanation similar to that of Finlayson. 
The premises of the North Sea case are simply different from the over-assessments of 
the Grand Banks cod stocks in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
 
Steps towards a technical explanation  
Can we not explain the over-assessments then? I think we can. When you believe, as I 
do, that there is a finite number of cod in the sea at any time, then it follows that there 
always is a technical explanation if we fail to assess how many cods there were. 
Irrespective of whether we will ever approach that explanation or not. In this case I 
did just not succeed in finding a strong complementing social explanation. That is, I 
do not see that or how the interpretative flexibility was consistently "exploited" by use 
of the "sociological" approach.   
 Let us therefore turn towards the scientist own explanations. The two cases of 
over-assessment (i.e. North Sea cod and Grand Banks cod) are strikingly similar in 
this respect. The CPUEs were creating biases in the VPA tuning and the growth rate 
of the cod was at the same time slowing down and recruitment was week. In the case 
of the Grand Banks, three processes were making the CPUEs “artificially” high. 
There were technological improvements (also among the inshore fishermen), fast 
learning of good fishing spots in new areas and increases in cod concentrations 
(McGuire, 1997). In the North Sea the situation is strikingly similar.  
In a joint fisherman-scientist project 336 skippers from across the North Sea 
were in 2002 asked to note differences between the current and previous years. The 
study claims to confirm the perception of the scientists31, although with a higher 
resolution: The cod was becoming depleted in the southern North Sea (individuals 
noted to be "small"), whereas the fishermen in the north were experiencing increased 
catch rates of larger cod. (Duncan, 2002).  
 
                                                          
31  Perhaps this refers to a similar (somewhat less internationally co-ordinated) study, which is refereed 
in the 2001 report of ACFM (CRR 246: 223-224). From the collected information ACFM concludes 





The situation very much resembles a "classic" case of VPA error: 
 
The place that VPA has most often been found to be wrong is when catchability has increased 
while the stock was declining. In these cases, the assumption that the terminal F has not been 
changing in the most recent few years leads to a systematic overestimation of the stock size 
(Hilborn and Walters, 1992: 364). 
 
Bias, precision and uncertainty 
You always expect the catchability to increase (through learning and improved 
technology). But the problem is naturally particularly important when the catchability 
increase is higher than you expect. And the "shrinkage" of the XSA does not help. On 
the contrary the "shrinkage" could actually reinforce the bias of the estimations. If F is 
generally increasing, the increase will, if shrinkage to the mean of the Fs is applied, 
only be noticed by a certain time lag. 
 A third case of over estimations of an important cod stock is that of the 
Icelandic cod in the late 1990s. From a request by the Icelandic Minister of Fisheries, 
Rosenberg et. al (2002) investigated this case of over-assessment by use of alternative 
assessment methods and simulation models. They concluded: 
 
Whether this is a price worth paying is a question for later consideration. But we do seem to have 
confirmed that it was indeed XSA shrinkage parameter settings that led to the apparently 
ubiquitous retrospective pattern in XSA fits to the Icelandic cod data (Rosenberg et. al 2002: 9).    
 
The price mentioned is referring to the "price of precision". The trade off is with 
respect to XSA shrinkage is, therefore, between bias and precision. "If taken at face 
value", the results of Rosenberg et. al suggested that it would have been better if the 
shrinkage was left out in that case. A work by Patterson et. al was referred to have 
indicated that uncertainty of the XSA method  was "greatly underestimated" for all 
parameters and that the method appeared to generate "overly high forecasts of stock 
sizes and allowable catches" (Rosenberg et. al 2002: 9). 
 Was science "overconfident" as Finlayson noted it to be in the Newfoundland 
case? Perhaps the "signals" were somewhat mixed. In every ACFM report since 1996 
ACFM by a "standard phrase" has claimed that: "The biological data available from 
scientific sources are relatively good" with respect to the North Sea demersal stocks. 
This is the first thing mentioned in the introduction section named "Data". Later, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
that there is a general perception of the poor state of the cod stock but that it is better off in the north 
than in the south.   





however, it was sometimes qualified that under or mis-reporting were suspected to 
take place. From 1999, the data section also mentioned that the commercial effort data 
were perhaps not reliable. As mentioned before, the report this year noted the two 
previous assessments to be over-assessments.  
  But there were no representations of the possible uncertainty. There were no 
confidence intervals (which are perhaps not possible to calculate formally in the used 
methodology - but anyway) or probability distributions. When I read the report (as a 
"layman") I have little idea of the actual uncertainty involved. Is it 10% or 50%? It 
turned out to be up to 100% - sometimes even more. An administrator said that he 
was really surprised when he read the 2000 report - and I do understand that. 
On the ACFM meeting in 1997 it was discussed if science was sufficiently 
precise to support the TAC system. It was suggested that a realistic level of precision 
was around 25% whereas many managers perceived the precision of advices to be 
10% (ICES CM 1997/A:2: 7-8). 
 
So what? 
My intention is not to gloat over the over-assessments in the easy view of hindsight. 
Furthermore the above is nothing but outlines of explanation sketches, which may be 
fruitful. The "real" technical explanation should of course be undertaking by experts 
like those of the ICES scientists themselves. My intention is different; there is also a 
social issue here: The choice of models is not only a scientific question. This, I think 
should be made clearer to other stakeholders (i.e. managers and fishermen). It must be 
asked what kind of assessment we want with respect to the trade off between bias and 
precision. Further, the uncertainty of the assessment must be clearer to the other 
stakeholders. 
 Moreover: If there has been some "strategic" purpose in not revealing the 
"real" uncertainty, then I think that this strategy is not very likely to achieve its 
objective - i.e. to induce confidence and a perception of "relevance" of the advices. In 
that case I, on the contrary, think that transparency will be a much better strategy. Is it 
possible to look more into these questions?   
 
The 1999 ACFM meeting 
I have argued that the largest change in perception of the state of the cod stock 
between two consecutive years was between the 1999 report and the 2000 report. The 





2000 report was the report that established the crisis. Therefore, it would be 
interesting to know what happened at the 1999 ACFM meeting. Was there a suspicion 
of things being not right? Fortunately, there is some information on this since a 
summary of the findings and discussions on the meetings are recorded (i.e. in the 
Minutes of ACFM documents). 
 
The meeting took place in ICES (Copenhagen) from the 26th of October to 4th of 
November 1999.  
On the 28th of October a discussion took place with respect to reference points. 
It was noted that there was a perceived bias in some of the North Sea round fish 
stocks and that this perhaps should be reflected in the precautionary reference points: 
 
It was noted that the bias of 20% that is suggested by the Sub-group may be a serious under 
estimation of the uncertainty. The actually (sic) estimates of CV (coefficient of variation) are 
often not 20% but rather around 100%. It was concluded that the perception of a bias in the 
assessment was not so well founded that this would warrant a change in the reference points (CM 
2000/A:2/ACFM:00A:4). 
 
The 29th of October the discussion was picked up again: 
 
The possibility of bias in the North Sea roundfish assessment was again discussed. In accordance 
with the decision made by ACFM on the previous day the reference points are left unchanged. It 
was now discussed if the advice should takes (sic) any bias into account, the value of 20% 
(overestimating biomass and underestimating F) was suggested. The conclusions of the plenum 
discussions should be effectively communicated to the WGNSSK (CM 2000/A:2/ACFM:00A:4). 
 
The 30th of October the discussion on the perceived biases was continued. The chair 
of ACFM reviewed problems of deciding when to correct for biases and when not to. 
It was not only a problem for VPAs but also for a model of recruitment abundance. It 
was mentioned that a common reason for bias was technology improvement in the 
commercial CPUEs. The summary continued (and I am sorry for the inconvenience of 
a long quote but I think this is important): 
 
ICES responsibility was discussed from the starting point that it is the scientists (AWG) 
responsibility to evaluate if the perception of a bias in the assessment is well founded. It is the 
responsibility of ACFM to judge if this perception should be included in the advice. ICES should 
in this evaluation be objective (as possible) and it is up to the managers to be precautionary. It 
would be irresponsible of ICES to ignore the bias if this conclusion is considered well founded 
and the scientists are probably in a better position to make that judgement than the managers. It 
was discussed to what extent the PA procedures take bias sufficiently into account. It was 
recognised that the procedures used at present do not take bias into account and that perhaps the 
PA reference point should not do so either.  






We should also be aware that if we now say that our assessments are biased and if we reject them 
based on this, then what we have advised in the past has been useless as well. 
 
ACFM was reminded that problems like Tapering, technological creeping in commercial fleets, 
influence of environment variability on stock productivity, etc. are scientific issues that should be 
pursued in cooperation with science committees in particular RMC. 
 
The conclusion of the discussion was a reconfirmation of the discussion that was held on the first 
day: We do not fiddle around with the assessment to correct for the bias. In cases where we have 
long time series trends and maybe a likely reason for the bias we could consider correcting for it. 
In summary: 
 
1) Decide if the assessment can be accepted or not. Decide if the assessment reflects trends only or 
whether also the absolute estimates are useful. 
2) If the assessment is accepted then this is the basis for "state of the stock" and "catch option 
table". 
3) Bias should be judged on a case by case basis. Basis should be commented upon in the 
Elaboration and Special Comment. In those few cases (if any) when the evidence of bias is very 
strong this bias is included in the Advice (2000/A:2/ACFM:00A). 
 
Finally there is one more reference to the bias given under the heading: "MINUTES 
PLENUM 1-4 NOVEMBER". 
 
North Sea cod: Long discussions on whether the assessment is subject to a bias or not. The 
assumed bias would be to underestimate F and overestimate SSB. ACFM found that it is quite 
uncertain if there is a bias but certainly there is tendency. ACFM concluded that the advice shall 
be based on the assumption that the assessment is not subject to a bias on the form described 
above but that there is a strong suspicion that the assessment is over-optimistic 
(2000/A:2/ACFM:00A). 
 
What was said in the special comment of the 1999 ACFM report? The report 
mentioned that the 1997 and 1998 presently were thought to be have overestimated 
SSB and underestimated F and continued:  
 
The same general analytical formulation was used in the 1999 assessment, but the likelihood that F is 
underestimated and SSB is overestimated cannot be evaluated at this time (CRR 236, 1999: 234). 
 
Let me now comment on the above. It really goes without saying that the suspicion of 
a serious bias was strong. After all this point was discussed at four different occasions 
on a very stressed meeting.  
One sentence, I think, is striking: 
 
We should also be aware that if we now say that our assessments are biased and if we reject them 
based on this, then what we have advised in the past has been useless as well. 
 
Taken on face value, this is a very serious claim because it states that the assessments 
were "useless" if they were biased, which they finally were admitted to be the 





following year. But it is perhaps not only the content of the sentence that is striking, 
but also its grammatical style: It uses 1st person plural, whereas most of the summary 
is in terms of "ACFM" (ACFM decided, asked, made etc.). Further, the sentence is 
striking because it is "alone" - there is no "follow up" and therefore it seems that it 
could be hinting something rather than saying it. Or, on the other hand, perhaps the 
sentence is only striking to me because I implicitly was looking for these things. 
Therefore, the sentence could either indicate an implicit agreement of that the 
preservation of a good record of advice would count towards not implementing the 
bias in the advice (interpretation A). Or it is simply saying that the advises are useless 
if the bias is real (interpretation B) (or both: A and B).  
Another sentence I noticed is the one saying: "We do not fiddle around with 
the assessment to correct for the bias". This sentence clearly represents" the struggle 
for objectivity". The "easiest solution" would in fact be to fiddle around with the 
models and make the bias go away. But that is unscientific and not "objective". The 
model gave us this result and it looks like a bias. The question is then if is a bias or a 
random pattern, which could (or rather should) be neglected.  
In this regard, ACFM discussed the question of responsibility. The working 
group should establish if it is a bias. And if it is, ACFM should decide if it should be 
included in the advice. The decision rule is thus: WG decides if the bias is "well 
founded". If so, ACFM will comment on it - and if there is "strong evidence" for it - 
include it in the advice. I am a bit bewildered here because "well founded" and 
"strong evidence" seems quite equivalent to me. Then both WG and ACFM have to 
evaluate if there is a bias and the decision rule contradicts itself. 
 Interpretation A: The decision rule was "constructed" in order to make it 
possible to agree in rejecting the bias and still feel "objective". Interpretation B: The 
decision rule was an attempt to deal with the difficult question if a bias should be 
considered or not in a formal, "objective" way.    
In the 1999 ACFM report it was said that the likelihood of an over assessment 
could not be evaluated. The question of bias was not mentioned, although it was said 
that the previous two assessments were over assessments. Thus ACFM had 
"dissolved" a suggested bias into two over assessments and a current possibility of 
one more. But it was not mentioned what scale of over assessment was involved.  
What would you do as a manager? Shrug, perhaps? You had got your 
recommendation, so why bother about a special comment saying that ACFM does not 





know if the current assessment is overestimated? I have constructed the latter as an 
"A-interpretation". The B interpretation goes: "The last two assessments were over 
assessments. Further, the likelihood of a current over assessment is unknown."     
 
Transparency 
My point is that whatever interpretation is right (A or B) transparency of the advice 
seems to be an obvious solution. Transparency does not solve the question of who is 
responsible of what within ICES, but it does make the responsibility easier to carry - 
and less important. ACFM could say: "This is what the model says and we don't know 
where we are this time", which will leave it to managers what kind of advices it 
considers useful (or useless). The above can, therefore, be seen as a lack of proper 
communication between managers and scientists.   
 
Assessments could be better 
On the technical side, the main obstacles to reliable assessments are perhaps high 
exploitation levels and limitations in data. Clearly the first point is a management 
question. The second is, obviously, related to costs, although not only so.32 There is a 
limit to how much it pays off to invest in research since the marginal return of 
investing in science is expected to decrease. Further, there is a limit to the possible 
precision of assessments (Degnbol, 2003). However, similar to the case of Finlayson, 
it is possible that certain social forces can affect the precision of the assessment 
negatively for a given input of resources.   
 Reflecting on "The widening gap between fisheries biology and fisheries 
management in the European Union" a fisheries scientists, Corten, summarised some 
of his main points as the follows: 
 
The lack of results in fisheries management had a distinct effect on biological research related to 
fisheries. Three of the most important consequences were a decrease in national funding, a 
decreasing interest in routine stock assessment, and a decreasing commitment of biologists to the 
former objective of rational exploitation (Corten, 1996: 5).  
 
This was noted to lead to a possible downward spiral, with "reduced advice leading to 
poor management, and poor management leading to poor advice" (Corten 1996: 15).  





According to Corten (1996), an unfavourable incentive structure with respect to the 
production of knowledge useful for assessments applies to the present case of 
fisheries science (e.g. ICES, national research etc.) - similar to the case Finlayson 
described for DFO science in Canada. But the current case is different because the 
incentive structure became related to the research funding policy. Corten explains that 
while the national funding for assessments decreased it at the same time became 
possible (and important) to scientists to apply for EU subsidy programmes. These 
programmes were, however, intended for "innovative" research and not for routine 
assessments. The scientists thus had to reduce their time for used assessment research, 
but also the budget since many of the EU projects were jointly financed. The "status" 
of the scientist became increasingly dependent on his score on "external contracts" 
(Corten, 1996: 6-7).        
 What could be specifically be improved? The assessments suffer from biases 
and / or lack of precision due to insufficient information on discards, unreliability of 
commercial CPUEs and illegal landings. A cost efficient way to get information on 
the two first and somewhat amend the latter would be to put observers onboard - at 
least on larger vessels. Generally the problem is more related to lack of proper 
planning of data collection. There is a need of better co-operation between countries, 
between institutes in one country and even between departments of one institute. 
There is often an unfavourable competition between resources, resulting in a non-
efficient use of resources with respect to better assessments.33 These points call for 
planning of research on a proper level. 
 Further, scarcity of resources limits ICES in its work. Many ACFM and WG-
documents report scarcity of available time. The workload increased dramatically 
with the complexity and numbers of requests. This question was specifically 
addressed in the October meeting of ACFM in 1998. In an analysis it was stated that: 
"Consistent and reliable advice is unlikely to be produced on a sustained basis under 
the current overstressed advisory system." The analysis mentioned three possibilities: 
1) Resources should be increased. 2) Workload should be decreased. 3) Efficiency 
should be increased. It was noted that the two first possibilities were unlikely to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
32  Corten (1996) cites a figure of the costs of assessment related biological research in the North Sea, 
Skagerrak and Kattegat: 15 million ECU (excluding fixed costs and depreciation of research vessels). 
 
33   These points (general and specific) "resulted" from a conversation with the fisheries scientist John 
Pope (May 2003). 





happen. Therefore advisory process should be reviewed in order to increase efficiency 
(CM 1999/A:2: 33). Obviously, however, there is a limit to increases in efficiency 
without ending up in the problem you started out with: the problem of consistency and 
reliability of the advices.  
The question of peer review also relates to constraints in time and human 
resources. 34 In discussing the possibility of independent review, it was noted that 
reviewers outside the working group would face technical problems of understanding 
the WG reports. Specifically, the 1997 report was not reviewed by anyone 
independent to the WG, because the WG report was only available 3 days before the 
ACFM meeting (CM 1997/A:2: 7). 
 My point is that the WG assessment and the ACFM advise represent the final 
steps in a long and very expensive research process. To limit the resources available 
at this high but relatively inexpensive step would (to a layman) seem to be a very 
inefficient way of proving "value for money" advices, when the knowledge 
















                                                          
34  There is perhaps an interpretation "A" here too. 





4.3: The maximum recommendable  
 
Why was the TAC generally set at the maximum (sometimes a little more, sometimes 
a little less) of what was recommendable? Obviously this question calls for an 
analysis of the objectives of the fishery. As it turns out, the objectives in the present 
case were little specified. The lack of a specified objective may be thought to leave 
the fishery system to be very "open". To put it strongly: Scientists will initially not 
know how to advice and managers not how to make decisions. Therefore, the question 
of "the maximum recommendable" can also be explored through an analysis of the 
form of the advice and changes in this. When objectives or management decision 
procedures are not specified there will at the outset be no formal or obvious relation 
between scientists and managers. The boundaries are flexible and the roles and rules 
evolve as you go. Moreover, the flexibility or softness of the former relation could 
make the system sensitive to the third actor: The industry. But perhaps the latter is 
really a "chicken and hen problem". For what came first: the flexible boundaries and 
lack of a specified objective or the industry as an actor? 
  
The advisors' objectives and their initial self-perceived role  
In 1976, ICES held an ad hoc meeting "on the biological basis for fisheries 
management" (CRR 62, 1976). The Council of ICES requested a review of the 
objectives of fishery management and encouraged the scientists to "question the 
adequacy and relevance of their function in the process of fishery management". The 
findings of the meeting were published in a report (i.e. CRR 62) which is an important 
document on how the scientists initially viewed their own role in the management 
process. These findings were summarised in the 1976 report of the Liaison Committee 
(CRR, 56: 21-26) and later, on the first Dialogue Meeting in 1980, managers were 
provided the report and were encouraged to read it (CRR 106). The report presented 
the biologists view on proper management. 
 The main part of the 1976 meeting was focused on the objectives of fisheries 
management. It was noted that: 
 
Because biologically based objectives such as the highest physical yield from a resource has been 
thought to represent a more generally acceptable aim of fishery management than for instance 
economic objectives, fishery scientists have played a primary role in formulating and promoting 
objectives for resource management (CRR 62, 1976).  
 





The objectives were discussed with respect to properties of certain reference points. 
Maximum Sustainable Yield was stated to be regarded "a common aim" for 
administrators and scientists. Yet, the MSY concept (the yield from fishing at Fmax) 
was critically reviewed on a technical biological basis. The scientists wanted to 
replace MSY concept by an Optimal Sustainable Yield concept in order to avoid risks 
related to MSY harvest. The OSY should consider the optimum exploitation pattern, 
optimal spawning stock size and minimum fishable stock level. The OSY would still 
be calculated by (single species) yield per recruit models. Specifically it was 
recommended first to calculate a TAC corresponding to F0135 and then to modify the 
TAC against the objectives of spawning stock and fishable stock. It was stated that 
this policy would reduce the fluctuations in TAC, the risks of depletion and at the 
same time increase the catch rates and the reliability of the scientific advice.  
 
The biologists thus perceived that they had a central role in the management process. 
They were not merely "technicians" who measured quantities of fish; they were 
actually performing the key task of designing the objective of the fishery. This role is 
explained and confirmed by the claim that biologically objectives were recognised to 
be the most acceptable. 
The benefits of the discussed objectives are obviously not purely biological. 
Catch rates or CPUEs concerns the fisher and not the stock. Also the issue of risk may 
be considered an socio-economic issue. The advisors had, so to speak, challenged the 
boundary or rather: They had taken an expansionistic stand in an uncharted territory 
since a boundary as such has to be faced before its position can be challenged. In the 
following I will point out elements from the dialogue meetings that can give an 
indication of the nature and evolution of the advices and the boundary between 
science and management.   
 
The first dialogue (May 1980) 
The practice of dialogue meetings was, on the initiative of ICES, established in order 
to facilitate the communication between managers and scientific advisors (and later 
also representatives of the fishing industry).  
                                                          
 35   F01 is the F for which the increase yield for an small (infinitesimal) increase in F is 10% of the 
increase in yield that any small (infinitesimal) increase in F in pristine stock would result in.      
 





In the first dialogue meeting CEC stated that ACFM gave much firmer advices 
than the former Liaison Committee. The overly important reason for that was, 
according to CEC, that ACFM had seen the consequences of providing options: 
 
Invariably, the option which was chosen was that which gave the largest catch in the short term 
without considering the long-term consequences. In these circumstances and taking account of 
the state of many of the most important fish stocks, ICES to its credit, took over a role of 
management. In deed, it had to, because its recommendations had to be based upon assumptions 
about the way in which the stocks would be fished (CRR 106: 42-43). 
  
CEC warned that a consequence of the "almost mandatory" advices: ICES would be 
seen as the body taking the final decisions and it would be "conceivable" that political 
pressure would be exerted on the Committee (CEC hinted that the 1979 report 
suggested the latter). Further, the managers should decide the policy and then inform 
ICES about it.  
CEC wanted a more formal relation with ICES since it was not an ICES 
member. This was unsatisfactory for both parts since ICES was not paid for its 
services, whereas CEC wanted a formal commitment for ICES to respond to requests 
of EC. Moreover, CEC felt that it would be mutually beneficially if an EC observer 
was allowed at the WG-meetings. 
CEC stressed the importance of that the advices should only be based on 
biological criteria. Implicit or explicit economical and social considerations should be 
omitted. The CEC hoped that its suggestions would enable ICES to play its true 
scientific role and leave the responsibility of the management to the management 
bodies. 
 
There was "a long discussion about the desirability for ACFM to present its advice in 
form of management options".  Administrators sometimes felt that the advice was a 
"fait accompli". Managers wanted to be able to choose between alternative 
"biologically acceptable" alternatives. The ACFM chairman said that the options 
would be presented in the next report, but that it was not always possible to give 
options. Further it was said that the effectiveness of advising in form of options would 
be strongly dependent on managers asking specific questions related to specified 
objectives. "If this is not done, managers should not criticize biologists for not giving 
sufficient options" (CRR 106, 1981: 4).  





It was nevertheless realised that it in many cases would be difficult to agree on 
objectives of stocks shared between countries with different social, economic and 
political conditions. In addition, the problem for fisheries of demersal species was that 
its mixed nature would make the choice of objective dependent on economic and 
political considerations as well as biological.  
A statement from Norway criticised that EC had asked ICES for an 
extraordinary advise on "some shared stocks in the North Sea" to consider possible 
"amendments" of the previously given advice. The advices should, according to the 
Norwegian statement, "only be submitted in consultation by all the coastal parties 
concerned"(CRR 106: 40). Perhaps this was what the ICES president had in mind 
when he said: "There is little sympathy for requests which are produced by political or 
economic pressure groups rather than because of apparent changes in the stock. (CRR 
106, 1981: 29). 
 
The 2nd dialogue (October 1980) 
At the 2nd dialogue the CEC expressed that it was pleased with that it now was 
provided catch possibilities, although it understood the reservations ACFM had in 
granting these (as in chapter 3). Then CEC stated: 
 
Because all who are concerned with fisheries management are fully aware that a range of catch 
possibilities exists and because the data from which to calculate them are freely available, it 
would seem, to the CEC, that it is best for ACFM to make the calculations and to present the 
results so that it can then authoritatively comment upon them, as it has done in the Introduction 
to its reports (CRR 106: 63).  
 
CEC was interested in knowing what ACFM meant by saying that its TACs to 
achieve a certain F had been over optimistic. CEC would like to have firm evidence of 
this since ACFM in some fora was accused of being over-cautious.  
 The CEC asked ACFM to present Fmax (current and previous values) in a 
consistent tabular form.   
 
In the discussion ACFM noted that there presently was a transition period between 
two management regimes and that managers yet had to agree on their management 
objectives. In this situation it was necessary for ACFM to assume that the new 
management would broadly have the same aim as the former, which was fishing at 
MSY. ACFM would not advice to reach MSY fishing in one step since this would 





lead to a major disruption of the fishery. In addition, a stepwise reduction of the 
fishery would make it possible to see if the theoretical expectations followed or if the 
latter were unrealistic because of species interactions.    
 In the discussion it became clear that the setting of objectives clearly was a 
task of managers. ACFM noted that it only would be possible to advise on biological 
possibilities in achieving objectives, when these had been defined and agreed upon. 
Moreover, ACFM would welcome comments on the objectives on which it based its 
advice. 
 
Boundaries and institutional dilemmas  
In the first dialogue a boundary was recognised. CEC stressed that there should be a 
clear separation of science and politics. The pressure EC was subjected to by the 
industry is apparent from its warning of the potential for ACFM receiving pressure if 
its advice was inflexible and that it - perhaps in neglect of some implicit 
understanding with Norway - had asked for possible amendment of quotas. The CEC 
did not want the work of ACFM to be biased due to the industry pressure. At the same 
time CEC somehow wanted a closer "control" of science. It wanted to be a formal and 
paying customer and it expressed a desire for having observers in the working group. 
The latter was, however, not granted - exactly because it was important that "impartial 
objective scientific solutions" of the working group was not "influenced in one way or 
another" by representatives of  "customers" (CRR 106: 4). Furthermore, CEC had 
clarified the power relations. CEC was a customer and when it wanted catch options it 
should have them. Otherwise it would be perfectly able to acquire the options by other 
means. 
As indicated above, the relation between mandated science and politics is 
dilemmatic. Finlayson (1994) describes the complex and almost paradoxical 
relationship between the institutions of state and science. Legitimacy of the state’s 
fishery policy is derived from its closeness to the fishery science and the objectivity of 
the latter. However the objectivity of the science is derived from its independence 
from the state. Science can only serve the purpose of the state when it is legitimate, 
but the political power will only support science when it serves the political objective 
(Finlayson, 1994: 151).  
The proper link between government and science is therefore delicate. If it is 
too tight, political pressure may bias the scientific knowledge products. If is too weak, 





the scientists may be inefficient with respect to their institutional mandate. The 
complex and paradoxical relation will perhaps facilitate that a little politics at times 
sneaks into science and perhaps also that a little science at times sneaks into politics.  
 
The missing objectives 
ACFM had argued that it would be easier to advice on catch options if a specified 
objective was agreed upon. In fact it may be added that an advice makes little sense if 
there is no specification of what the advice is for. ACFM regarded the lack of 
objectives to relate to the transition in management regimes following the 
introduction of EEZs. In order to advice it had assumed a continuation of the previous 
biological objectives and invited CEC to revise or comment on these. It was thus 
clearly recognised that the setting of objectives was a task of managers. The policy of 
stepwise reduction was mentioned to have two reasons: An socio-economic reason 
(disruption of fisheries) and a biological reason (multi-species concerns). It is perhaps 
noteworthy that the issue of separating science and politics was not invoked in this 
regard.   
 CEC had explained difficulties in agreeing on objectives. The difficulties were 
social and economical - concerning both international and inter-species questions. 
Apparently CEC implicitly accepted the biological objectives since they asked for 
Fmax in tables. However, CEC did not yet reveal if or how it was committed to these 
objectives. Remember that the conservation policy of CFP (e.g. the "relative 
stability") was negotiated between 1977 and 1983.    
 
The 3rd dialogue (September 1981) 
In the introduction of the meeting, the ICES president said that it was desirable if 
management representatives would provide feedback on the objectives implicitly or 
explicitly stated in the ACFM reports. 
 The chairman of ACFM presented its new form of advice, which was used for 
the first time in the July 1981 report. ACFM would provide catch options for the 
stocks where it was possible. Yet, ACFM would not present options for depleted 
stocks, or for stocks suffering from recruitment failure. Further, for stocks fished 
largely in excess of the biological reference points ACFM would provide options 
"within safe biological limits" and recommend one of these options. For stocks largely 





fished at the biological reference points ACFM would provide options "within safe 
biological limits" and only indicate a preference (CRR 106, 1981).  
 
Statement of CEC: The industry problem  
In its statement the CEC welcomed the dedication of the meeting for a discussion on 
objectives. However, the intention of CEC was not to develop an overall policy. In 
stead CEC wanted to set the biological advise (and the objectives it was based on) in 
the political arena, in which CEC tried to achieve agreement, and to explain why the 
form of advice rather was a hindrance than a help to effective management.  
 CEC reminded that it previously had stated that the setting of objectives was a 
management task. However, the contemporary serious problems of the fishery were a 
hindrance for decisions. The fishery was an open access system where increased fuel 
prices and decline in fish prices lately had turned a break-even situation into that of 
unprofitability. This lead to an increased pressure for larger catches even that these 
only would result in a short-term release. The CEC continued noting that: " 'Solutions' 
(sic) were made and still are sought in operational and market subsidies, even though 
economic analysis shows that such subsidies do not provide a solution but lead to 
increased exploitation of the fish stocks". 
 The CEC agreed with ACFM that a long-term objective would be to reduce F 
and bring the fishery closer to MSY and that the reductions should be stepwise. The 
benefits would be higher catch-rates (profitability), greater stability, better forecasts 
and planning possibilities and elimination of recruitment failures.  
 Where CEC disagreed was with respect to the tactics of reaching the objective. 
The CEC considered that there was no necessary reason to reduce F by any 
predetermined amount (if at all) unless the stock was suffering from recruitment 
failure, although the CEC agreed that F should not be allowed to increase. There was 
no point in ACFM recommending reductions that were unacceptable to managers. 
Reaching agreements would be increasingly difficult, and ACFM would become 
increasingly "disenchanted" that its advices were not accepted - which was the present 
situation.  
  CEC also stated: 
 
If the dialogue between ICES and managers is going to be meaningful, it cannot be conducted on 
the basis of ACFM deciding what information and advice it will entrust to the managers. 





Fisheries science does not exist in a closed world and the managers will turn elsewhere for advice 
if ACFM adopts this attitude (CRR 113:29). 
 
CEC continued that if ACFM (to the above quote) responded that its advices were not 
mandatory, then that was only theoretically true. For CEC found that Norway 
considered the recommendations of ACFM "nonnegotiable".  
CEC therefore found that the policy of ACFM to recommend annual 
reductions in F of 10% or more was a hindrance to an overall management policy. 
First F should be stabilised and then it should be slowly reduced. 
 
Adopting roles and rules 
The new form of advice can be seen as a sort of compromise. The catch options were 
granted but were not provided for stocks suffering from recruitment failure. Further, 
the recommendation by ACFM would be increasingly restrictive with a decline in the 
stock condition. Catch options would only be provided "within safe biological limits".  
A puzzle is why CEC wanted less restrictive recommendations once it had got 
its catch options. After all it had argued for the catch options in terms of that it needed 
flexibility and because it wanted the responsibility itself. The comment on the 
"strategic" issue that Norway would stick to the recommendations is, at least partly, 
an answer. On a more general level I think we can explain in terms of the 
"institutional dilemma". One hand CFP had stressed the importance of separation of 
science from politics (and it did that on several later occasions). Managers needed an 
"objective" science (otherwise it doesn't really back you up). On the other hand 
managers of CFP needed actual backup for their policies: "Sorry, but this is what 
ICES recommends" - without the recommendation being completely "unpalatable". 
Therefore, the CEC had to influence first, the way the advices were given and 
secondly, the recommendations themselves.  
 I included another statement of the power relation: If the catch options were 
not granted, it would perhaps be a problem for ICES - but not for the managers of the 
CFP. Yet, ACFM apparently resisted the pressure to change their recommendation 
policy: ACFM continued recommending 10% F reductions. Actually ACFM at times, 
especially later, increased the annual F reduction to 20-30% - on the paper that is.   
CEC had explained thoroughly why objectives were not easily agreed upon in 
the CFP. Or rather they did in fact agree on the objectives. Yet, they were facing an 





immense pressure from the industry, which was already suffering from serious 
economic problems. In the 4th Dialogue in 1982, the state of these problems was 
confirmed when "some administrators" noted that there was "no real prospect of 
sound management" before the enormous over capacity of "some member countries" 
were brought under control (CRR 122: 4). Thus the CEC found that is was unable to 
commit itself to a policy in order to achieve the objective (e.g. decision rules), 
although that it did say that it would not allow increases in F.  
 The roles that were developing were clearly those of science allowing a 
certain maximum limit and management, because of industry pressure, to take all 
science would allow. However, the pressure would perhaps also destabilise the 
biological limits that science felt it was necessary to constrain the freedom of the 
managers.    
       
From normative to explorative advice 
After the 3rd Dialogue a former ACFM chairman reflected on the changes in the form 
of advice  (CM 1982/Assess:21). He (succinctly) described the changes as a transition 
from "normative" to "explorative" advices. The explorative advice was favoured in a 
situation where objectives could not be agreed on. The former chairman continued: 
"The only norms to be indicated being the norms introduced by the biological system 
itself (…) covered by the term "safe biological limits". The former chairman added 
that the position of ACFM was inconsistent to the explorative advice with respect to 
"additional conservation measure". For example ACFM was still, normatively, 
recommending increased mesh sizes.  
 This paper, which reflected on the transition from "normative" to explorative 
advice, was later presented at the 4th Dialogue in October 1982. In the discussion, 
perhaps raised by this paper, it was noted that one should distinguish between 
predictions and advices. Advices could only be given when an objective somehow 
was assumed. The 4th Dialogue report notes that some speakers felt that "ICES should 
restrict itself to making predictions" (CRR 122: 4).  
The latter is perhaps another expression of the "institutional dilemma". The 
managers wanted "predictions" but they should at the same time be (labelled as) 
"advices".  





The CFP Conservation policy of 1983 
In 1983 the fisheries CFP was completed by the adoption of the conservation policy, 
which simultaneously was the resource allocation policy. The conservation policy was 
adopted by the Council of Ministers as the Council Regulation no. 170/83. The 
objective was seemingly stated in article 1 of the 170/8336: 
 
In order to ensure the protection of fishing grounds, the conservation of the biological resources 
of the sea and their balanced exploitation on a lasting basis and in appropriate economic and 
social conditions, a Community system for the conservation and management of fishery is hereby 
established (Council Regulation No. 170/83). 
 
Article 2 goes: 
 
The conservation, measures necessary to achieve the aims set out in Article 1 shall be formulated 
in the light of the available scientific advice, and in particular, of the report prepared by the 
Scientific and Technical Committee for fisheries provided for in article 1237(Council Regulation 
No. 170/83). 
 
So according to Article 2 the aims are presented in article 1. In referring to the 170/83, 
Corten (1996: 3) notes that: "The Community committed itself firmly to the objective 
of rational exploitation of the resources, in order to achieve the maximum socio-
economic benefits of the stocks". This must accordingly be Cortens interpretation of 
Article 1. However, the problem, as it turns out, is exactly the flexibility of 
interpretation of the sentence. Nothing was mentioned of "rational" exploitation and 
the "balanced exploitation" is not specified. What about the phrase "appropriate 
economic and social conditions"? Did that phrase commit the Community? Let us see 
how the dialogues continued. 
 
The 5th Dialogue (October 1985) 
A statement from Norway noted that there, for the demersal fish Stocks of the North 
Sea, often was a "significant gap between the catch levels recommended and the rate 
of exploitation that the scientists in practice are prepared to accept". This made it 
"difficult to identify the real biological issues" and the "weight to attach to the 
principal scientific recommendation." Decision-makers would find it difficult to know 
                                                          
36 The Council Regulation No. 170/83 is (for example) presented in Wise (1984: 263-269). 
37 The role of STFC or later STECF would be interesting to examine. However, I cannot do that in the 
present work. 





"when to be tough and when to be complacent". If the stock needed "stiff protection" 
that, as well as the opposite, should be made clear (CRR 139, 1985: 21). 
 
The critique by Norway indicates that politics perhaps not yet had been purged from 
the now exploratory advices. According to the form of advice, ACFM provided catch 
options "within safe biological limits", whereas they would recommend a decrease in 
F towards F01. Since Norway undoubtedly knew the form of advice, it must either 
have doubted that the "safe biological limits" provided "stiff protection" or that being 
outside safe biological limits was a way of saying that the stock needed "stiff 
protection". In either case it seems that Norway hinted that the term "safe biological 
limits" was not rigid enough to avoid "political exploitation".  
    
In the discussion Holden, a commissioner of the CEC, made two points relating to the 
question of objectives. First he noted that F01 was not a biological but an economic 
reference point and that it thus was irrelevant with respect to the scientific advice. He 
mentioned that to reach the reference points (in the short term) would imply social 
and economic problems and would require tough political decisions. Secondly, he 
questioned the scientific justification of the expected benefits from Fmax. In a 
discussion on the relation between ICES and fishery management, 
 
..,. Mr Holden questioned whether fisheries administrators can be considered as managers, but 
felt instead that the politicians, who respond to the various pressures to which they are subjected, 
especially from their fishing industries, are the actual managers. This is the case in the EEC 
where the Commission interprets the scientific advice and drafts legislation but the Council of 
Ministers makes the final decisions. He indicated that within the EEC, the management 
objectives have to be set in the light of these pressures and circumstances. Because of this, there is 
no single long-term management objective within the Community; but a current aim is to 
endeavour to maintain the fishing mortality at the same level from year to year (CRR 139, 1985).  
 
The administrators were thus no longer interested in the objectives as assumed by 
biologist in order to advice. Holden explained that there still were no actual 
objectives; the 170/83 regulation had not improved this. In explaining the decision-
making process, Holden pointed out how the industrial pressures impacted on the 
council of ministers to prevent agreement on management objectives. Holden (1994) 
provides a more detailed analysis of these matters.38  
                                                          
38  Decision making process: 1-16 and the effect of industry pressure on the Council of Ministers: 
"Political Expediency vs. Scientific Advice": 88-116.    
 





In the 6th dialogue (October 1987), the discussion of long-term objectives was 
one of three main issues. Yet, there was no statement from CEC on the issue, even 
that it had arranged the meeting. Long-term objectives were perhaps still not a 
possibility in the CFP (CRR 158).   
 
The 7th Dialogue (November 1989) 
The theme for the dialogue was "biological, economic and social considerations in 
determining objectives of fisheries management". 
Holden, explained, relating to the issue of "stability", that the critical problem 
was over capacity. The fisherman had to pay his loan "today" in order to be able to 
fish "tomorrow". Investment in the stock to get higher catches and stability was not an 
option. Holden maintained a certain "ratchet effect". When advices permitted high 
TACs, the industry pressure would result in the highest possible TAC ("stability" 
would not be "invoked"), whereas "stability" would be invoked to make the 
reductions as small as possible when advices recommended smaller TACs.  
 Holden also explained the conflicting pressures the EC and governments are 
subjected to. Many stocks were fished far beyond what is optimal, which generated a 
pressure on management to reduce the exploitation level. On the other hand the 
managers needed to respect the "democratic process" by responding to the pressures 
from the fishing industry.   
 
The lack of commitment to 170/83 
If the summaries 5th and 7th dialogues seem somewhat repetitive, I apologise for that 
but it is actually in itself a point: Little or no improvements had resulted from the 
establishment of the conservation policy. The stocks were still heavily over fished and 
the pressure on the national governments in order to set the TACs as high as possible 
continued to be very strong - and effective. 
 Holden (1994) explained that the 170/83 rather than being a policy to facilitate 
implementation of conservation measures, paradoxically, became a hindrance to 
implement them. In the 170/83, the terms "social and economic considerations" were, 
seemingly constituting parts of the description of the objectives in the conservation 
policy. Yet, it was, according to Holden, exactly with reference to "social and 
economic reasons" that measures, which the industry felt to be restrictive, were 
blocked by the national ministers in the Council. The phrase "social and economic 





reasons" provided a legal basis for not adopting proposals (or delaying proposals). It 
was in Holdens words "a magic talisman", a reason that provided a ready justification 
for voting against proposals, since the social and economic reason did not have to be 
specified. And the talisman was kept for exactly this reason (Holden, 1994: 113-115).    
 
Safe biological limits 
In the 1985 Dialogue, a statement from Norway had hinted that the term "safe 
biological limits", which was fundamental in the form of advice from 1981, perhaps 
did not provide "stiff biological protection". Let us therefore examine the use of this 
term.  
In the 1981 form of advice, which basically was not revised until 1991, Catch 
options would only be provided within safe biological limits and they would not be 
provided for stocks "which were depleted or suffered from recruitment failure" (CRR 
114: 2). Therefore, the condition for a stock being within "safe biological limits" must 
logically have been that it was not "depleted or suffering from recruitment failure". 
In the 1986 report ACFM noted 150.000t to be the lowest SSB level at which 
"a consistently good recruitment had been observed". The SSB was in the same report 
estimated to be 78.000t. To obtain a SSB of 150.000 at the beginning of 1988 would 
require a closure of the fishery. Still ACFM recommended a catch less than 125.000, 
which corresponded to a predicted SSB of 73.000t in 1988. Further, ACFM provided 
catch a option corresponding to an F that was such that the resultant SSB in 1988 was 
expected to be 55.000t. (CRR 146, 1986: 80). Hence, according to the stated form of 
advice, a SSB of 55.000t was within safe biological limits, which in turn was 
contradicted by stating that 150.000t was required to give consistently high 
recruitment. For the latter was after all the content of the definition of the "safe 
biological limits". 
Similarly, the ACFM report of 1984 had provided a catch option resulting in 
an expected SSB of 84.000t in 1985 (CRR 131, 1984: 62). The highest option in 1985 
would result in SSB being 95.000t in 1986, in 1987 the highest catch option would 
imply SSB of 106.000t in 1988, and in 1989 it was 91.000t for 1990. In the 1989 
report, ACFM reminded that an SSB of 150.000 was the suggested minimum. ACFM 
warned about the low egg production that may result from the concurrent low SSB, 
which was estimated to 96.000t. It was said that the 1984-1988 year-classes gave 





"reason for concern in this respect".  Yet, ACFM recommended a catch corresponding 
to an SSB of 102.000 in 1990. 
Thus ACFM had either given up its "form of advice" of only providing catch 
options inside safe biological limits, or the suspicion of Norway, that the "safe 
biological limits" were too flexible to protect the stock, was justified. In any case the 
advices provided cannot exactly be said to have been within safe biological limits. 
After all the stock was at a historically low level. 
 
Management by avoidance 
Although flexible, the term "safe biological limit", introduced in the form of advice in 
1981 was an important precursor of the later MBALs and the Precautionary 
Approach. It was important in representing a new way of thinking: Management as 
not being in terms of where you want to be but in terms of where you don't want to be. 
This new way of thinking was suitable for two purposes: The biological purpose of 
not "collapsing" the stock, and the implicit management purpose of being able to meet 
short- term industry needs while still being backed up by science. It was flexible and 
scientifically objective at the same time. 
 
Introduction of MBALs 
In 1991 ACFM changed its form of advice. Now ACFM would basically recognise 
two types of stocks: Those with an SSB higher than a Minimum Biological 
Acceptable Level (MBAL), and those for which that was not the case.  
Stocks below the MBAL, would be "outside safe biological limits" and ACFM would 
advise in order to rectify this. To set objectives was a task of managers. ACFM itself 
would only have one declared objective: To maintain fisheries within sustainable 
ecosystems. ACFM was worried of the state of some stocks (CRR 1979, 1991: 4-8) 
(note that the culmination of the first crisis of the cod stocks was in 1992) - and the 
cod stock was one of the most important stocks within CFP. 
The important difference between the form of the advices prior and 
subsequent to 1991 was that "safe biological limits" were now specified. For the cod 
stock the MBAL was set at 150.000t. The explanation was as follows: Detailed data 
existed from 1963 an onwards. The spawning stock had recently declined to a 
historically low level of 70.000t. The lowest SSB level from which a recovery of the 





stock had been observed (since 1963) was 150.000t, which ACFM therefore 
considered to be the "lowest desirable level" or MBAL (CRR 1991: 78). 
 The MBAL was thus equal to the SSB level, which in the 1986 report was 
mentioned to be the minimum value for which consistent recruitment had been 
observed. The 1991 definition of  "safe biological limits" thus clearly contradicted the 
implied meaning of the term in the previous advices for the cod stock (as described 
above).  
 The MBAL was set from a scientific point of view - it was purely biologically 
defined. Further, it was a number set by assessment science. And you cannot argue 
about a number - unless you want question the objectivity of that number. Science had 
taken a firm stand even that the ground perhaps was still a bit shaky. After all it was 
perhaps a bit arbitrary that the stock had recovered from exactly 150.000 tons since 
1963. But now there was a biological fix-point. Yet, rules for navigation around that 
fix-point were still not specified. Remember that the cod was instantly on the wrong 
side of the MBAL - and it stayed on that side until today, even that you thought you 
had reached the MBAL in 1997 (although ACFM perhaps did not admit that it 
thought that the stock had exceeded it).  
 The 1991 report also introduced three other biological reference points 
(BRPs): Fhigh, Fmed and Flow. Fhigh was the F for which survival was so low that 
recruitment historically was not able to compensate the losses in 9 of 10 years, 
whereas Fmed, was the F for which compensation was observed half of the years and 
Flow: compensation in 9 of 10 years. It was explicitly (and in capital letters) noted that 
the BRPs were not objectives. The BRPs should only serve as a "guide to aid 
managers in choosing from the range of options open to them" (CRR 179, 1991: 6). 
Personally I am not sure how important these BRPs were to the managers, but they 
perhaps underscored a slight change in the discourse towards "pure biology". As it 
turned out there was an implicit problem of the BRPs: They were, strictly, only useful 
if the general level of Fs did not change, which it did for (for example) the cod stock. 
If the F increases, the BRPs for F will increase too. In other words, the BRPs will only 
guide you to go no further than where you are - and if F increases anyway, the "guide" 
will consequently accept successively higher F levels.39 
 
                                                          
39  Fmax and Fmsy are subjected to related problems. When the assessment parameters change these 
reference points will change too. The same goes for the MBALs and the PA reference points. 





Biological critique of MBAL advices 
In one way, the MBAL could be seen as a boundary shift. Science regained some 
territory and defined a border. For science and stock conservation this could be seen 
as a step forward. Nevertheless, some scientists saw the change as a step backwards. 
In "The use of the MBAL concept in management advice" Corten strongly criticised 
the change in the form of advice (Corten, 1993). The MBALs had become "the 
cornerstone" of the advice, which Corten felt was wrong for several reasons.  
 Firstly, the position of the MBAL was not known and would change with 
history since it was dependent on recruitment relations, which were heavily dependent 
on unknown environmental factors. This was a problem when a stock would approach 
the MBAL since managers would tend to delay a hard decision when there was no 
hard justification of that decision.  
Secondly, the MBAL would tend to be interpreted as an objective by 
managers. And as Corten explained, the phrases used to describe the MBALs could 
support that interpretation in that the phrase "lowest desirable level" for example was 
used for the cod stock (CRR 179, 1991: 78).  
Thirdly, the MBAL was ignoring the ecosystem effects of fishing. If the 
MBAL of a commercial species allows a high F, this could result in extinction of 
other, non-commercial, species. Which, I add, would contradict the explicit objective 
ACFM stated when it introduced the MBALs.  
Corten argued for a return to the "rational" objectives, i.e. Fmax or rather F01, 
which would provide a combined solution to the problems of the MBAL. 
 Firstly, the rational reference points were also arbitrary, but they were 
arbitrary optimums instead of arbitrary minimums. Secondly, they would provide 
higher and more stable catches at lower costs. Thirdly, they were much more 
precautionary. Let me explain the latter. For the cod stock the Fmax was generally 
calculated to be around 0.3 or less and the F01 was generally around 0.2 or less. The 
2002 values are 0.248 and 0.148 respectively (ACFM 2002: 40). On the other hand 
the later Fpa, which was calculated to correspond to an expected SSB being equal to 
the MBAL or Bpa was 0.65. In other words the rational exploitation level "were 
around three or more times as precautionary" as the MBAL or as the later 
Precautionary Approach.  
ACFM had changed from "normative" to "explorative" advices. This was 
essentially because managers had asked for flexibility or catch options. And Corten 





felt that it was wrong. More freedom was left to the managers than was "justifiable on 
biological grounds". The MBAL, Corten said, was the "last defence line" to put a 
"limit to the freedom of managers". To him it was a question if "to advice or not to 
advice" (Corten, 1993: 7). 
 
The multispecies perspective: Changing the paradigm? 
Yet, there was perhaps another reason why ACFM - in being exploratory advisors - 
did not stress the rational reference points as much anymore: The results of the multi-
species models.  
In 1985 the Multi-species Assessment Working Group met "to continue trials 
with Multi-species-VPA models". The results were quite striking: The yield curves 
when inter species predation was included were much flatter "than conventionally 
assumed" - and the cod stock currently appeared to be under-exploited (CM 
1986/Assess:9: 21). If F was halved, the yield would be unchanged or even decline 
moderately, whereas the SSB would increase (by more than 100%) but much less than 
predicted if predation was not included (CM 1986/Assess:9: figures 4.3.7 and 4.3.8). 
Later multi-species works generally confirmed these results. The multi-species 
perspective did not affect the short-term forecast, the retrospective stock history or 
the assessment very much. What was changed considerable were the medium, and in 
particular long-term predictions. Whereas the general conclusion from single species 
predictions was that most stocks were fished at levels of fishing mortality far above 
Fmax , the outcome of multi-species predictions was that the level of fishing was close 
to F01 (CM 1996/Assess:6 : p578). Therefore: 
 
Multispecies predictions would thus tend to give relatively more importance to recruitment 
overfishing in managament considerations at the expense of considerations pertaining to of 
growth overfishing (CM 1996/Assess:6 : p578).  
 
On the background of the multi-species results it is thus tempting to conclude that 
whereas "rational" exploitation was more precautionary than the later Precautionary 
Approach, the Precautionary Approach on the other hand was more rational than the 
"rational" exploitation. When Corten argued for F01, and when ACFM continued to 
present the rational reference points in the ACFM reports there, accordingly, are two 
interpretations. "A": the reference points is a "rhetoric device" to "tempt" managers to 
reduce exploitation towards more precautionary levels - or in fact more economic 





levels: it is still expensive to over-fish - which is a normative interpretation. The 
interpretation "B" is that the multi-species results still were/are too controversial to be 
recognised. However, let me be fair: For the later years the gains in yield as expected 
from the rational reference points seem to have decreased (i.e. the yield curve has 
become more flat) in the ACFM reports. Moreover, the above probably only 
concerned one of Cortens three points. 
 At the 6th Dialogue in 1989, a ICES scientist had presented the gains that 
would had been possible for the period from 1971 to 1986 from rational management. 
If the F had been reduced gradually towards Fmax, the average catch of cod in the 
North Sea would have been 300.000t and not the 200.000t that became the actual 
situation. If, by technical measures, no fishing of juveniles was allowed, the average 
catch would have been 350.000t (CRR 158, 1989: 7-17). The SSBs in 1987 from 
managing by the "biological strategies" would, according to the single species 
models, have been 1.300.000t by fishing at Fmax - about 5 times the highest recorded 
SSB levels. 
At the same time multi-species calculations were saying that the cod was 
under-exploited. There clearly was a conflict and perhaps a paradigm shift was 
developing. 
 
The reviewed conservation policy  
In 1992 the conservation was policy was reviewed. With respect to objectives it said: 
 
As concerns the exploitation activities the general objectives of the common fisheries policy shall 
be to protect and conserve available and accessible living marine aquatic resources, and to 
provide for rational and responsible exploitation on a sustainable basis, in appropriate economic 
and social conditions for the sector, taking account of its implications for the marine ecosystem, 
and in particular taking account of the needs of both producers and consumers (Article 2 is cited 
in Holden, 1994: 223). 
 
In comparison with the 170/83 this was certainly a step towards the setting of 
objectives. However, the stated objectives obviously involve trade-offs and there was 
no specification of how to prioritise the objectives or how to implement them. An 
Article 8 provided for that objectives "may" be specified, which perhaps admits the 
former. (Holden, 1994: 223). The Council of Ministers was thus still not very 
constrained by the legislation of the conservation policy. In the view of Holden the 
1992 legislation implied that fixing of objectives was only seen as an "occasional 





necessity" (Holden, 1994: 225). The Council was still not "committed". There was a 
flexibility, which the advices, as will follow, still allowed for. 
 
Safe biological limits and MBALs  
The MBAL based form of advice carried on until 1997, where the Precautionary 
Approach was incorporated into the form of advice. There are no Dialogue Meetings 
from between 1991 to 1997 relevant to the present question and I do not have much 
further information on the perceptions of this form of advice. But let me briefly 
compare the MBAL-format to the previous forms of advices. 
 Before 1991 the "rigid" part of the advice was the range of catch options 
provided, which was constrained to be "inside safe biological limits". The "safe 
biological limits" were, however, not defined and thus subjected to flexibility and 
political or socio-economic pressure. The latter was expressed by the discrepancy 
between the "unofficial MBAL" mentioned in the 1986 report and, on the other hand 
what was must have been implied as "safe biological limits" in order to provide the 
range of catch options that were apparent form the ACFM reports. This was in spite of 
that the description of the "unofficial MBAL" very much resembled the official 
description of "safe biological limits". On the other hand, the later official MBALs or 
"safe biological limits" were "rigid", but there was no "rigid" or predetermined way of 
deciding on the range of catch options to be presented or on what to recommend from 
this range. For stocks below the MBAL: 
 
…, ACFM will in so far as possible give advice on what measures are needed to rectify the 
situation. The severity of this advice and the extent to which management options are possible, 
will normally depend on the degree of depletion of the stock and on what information is available 
on the historic series of stock and recruitment (CRR 179, 1991: 7). 
 
So the MBAL was rigid, but what to do when you were below it was open to 
interpretation. The MBALs was one step forward and one step back with respect to 
provide "stiff" biological protection: The policy for giving advices was still flexible, 
which we can see from the actual given advices. 
Until and including the 1994 report the range of catch options provided was 
from corresponding to an F equal zero and up to status quo F. Remember that the 
years from 1991 to 1994 were the years of the culmination of the first crisis. The 
reports of 1995 and 1996 increased this catch option range to 1.2*Fsq. In the 1991, 





1992 and 1993 reports none of the presented options would be expected to increase 
the SSB back to the MBAL in the following year. In the 1994 report F < 0.20*Fsq 
would, in the 1995 report F< 0.3 would and so forth. In these years, however ACFM 
did not recommend any TAC. Instead ACFM recommended a reduction of F to 
0.70*Fsq. 
 The point is that only by combining the rigid elements of the two forms of 
advice you would make the advice strict in order to ensure the SSB to be within safe 
biological limits in the sense of the unofficial or official MBAL. 
 
Surrogate objectives 
Importantly, the MBAL, as biologists had warned against, had probably become a sort 
of "surrogate objective". And as Corten had noted the phrases "desirable level" and 
"target level" did perhaps not do much to prevent this. The thought of a fix-point was 
gaining foothold, which was an improvement with respect to conservation, although it 
with respect to management was in terms of "where you don't want to be". 
Nevertheless, there were still no effective constrains on the advices in order to "force" 
a recovery.   
 
The Precautionary Approach 
The Precautionary Approach (PA) was incorporated into the form of advice in the 
1997 ACFM report, and the resulting form of advice has continued until today. The 
intention of ICES was to provide advice in accordance with the international 
agreements of the PA. In order to carry out the PA advice ICES would continue with 
its stated objective of 1991 (i.e. in terms of a sustainable ecosystem). A distinction 
was made between limit and target reference points. The former were to constrain 
harvesting "within safe biological limits", whereas the latter were objectives within 
the providence of managers.  
In order to avoid the limit reference points (Flim and Blim) ICES/ACFM would 
propose two more reference points, Fpa and Bpa, at which, when uncertainty was taken 
into account, the probability of reaching the limit reference point was very low.  
Moreover, ACFM would encourage and assist managers in defining target reference 
points and, if necessary, in designing recovery plans (CRR 223, 1997: 8). The burden 
of proof had shifted such that the less you knew about the stock the more 
precautionary you would have to be.  On the May 1997 ACFM meeting the term "safe 





biological limits" was mentioned to be "subjective" (ICES CM 2997/A:3). The 
Precautionary Approach would imply rigid definitions in order to eliminate the 
subjectivity. 
 
PA in ACFM advices  
In the 1997 report the PA reference points were not yet defined - the MBAL of 
150.000t thus continued to define "SBL". In the 1998 report the PA reference points 
were defined: 
 
ICES considers that: 
Blim is 70.000t, the lowest observed biomass.   
 
ICES proposes that: 
Bpa be set at 150.000t. This is the previously agreed MBAL and affords a high probability of 
maintaining SSB above Blim, taking into account the uncertainty of assessments. Below this value 
the probability of below average recruitment increases (CRR 229: 207). 
 
What does it mean? Does the "this value", below which recruitment is impaired, refer 
to Bpa or Blim? 
 
Furthermore, ICES/ACFM established Flim = 0.86, which was the F "estimated to lead 
to potential stock collapse". In addition ICES/ACFM proposed a Fpa=0.65 to be the F 
for which there was a 95% probability of avoiding Flim, when uncertainty was taken 
into account.  
In the introduction it was explained that making the MBAL equal to the SBL 
was a "needlessly restricted interpretation" of a multidimensional concept (Fs, SSB 
and more). For stocks being inside SBL there were two conditions: 1) The stock level 
should be such that it with a high probability was above the level where recruitment is 
impaired (Blim). 2) The F should be such that it with a high probability would not 
drive the stock towards the Blim. In other words: to be inside SBL, the stock should be 
inside the PA reference points (CRR 229, 1998: 5).     
In the introduction the Blim was defined as the limit SSB "below which 
recruitment is impaired or the dynamics of the stocks are unknown". Consequently the 
above question is answered: The recruitment was impaired below 70.000t. The PA 
reference points were thus (qua Blim) less precautionary than the MBAL. 
 
 














Figure 15. Stock recruitment plot for Cod for the combined ICES areas of the North Sea  (IV), Skagerrak (IIIa) 
and Eastern English Channel (VIId). The data series is from 1963 to1998. Source: ACFM CRR 229, 1998: Table 
3.5.2.2, p213. 
 
In figure 15, the recruitment of each year is plotted against the SSB estimate of that 
year. The data are from a table in the 1998 report, which lists the assessment outputs 
from the concurrent assessment. It therefore represents the ACFM 1998 report 
perception of the stock history. Certainly the Blim is an SSB, below which the 
probability of high recruitment is impaired. But it is perhaps more important that this 
also seems to be true for the old MBAL value of 150.000t - which was introduced, 
unofficially, in 1986 for that reason.  
The WG on North Sea stocks was for its meeting in October 1997 requested to 
"propose limit reference points to be avoided with a high probability" (CM 
1998/Assess:7: 620-623). The WG referred to a work of The Study Group On the 
Precautionary Approach to Fisheries Management, which had recommended PA 
reference points to be associated with no more than 5% probability of the limit 
reference points being exceeded. The WG group used this as a guideline and 
presented its results in a table with the heading: "Biological reference points based on 
PA criteria". The results for the North Sea cod were Blim=150.000t, Fpa.5=0.73 and 
Bpa.5=221.000t. The WG had used the old MBAL as a limit reference point, which the 
WG noted to be subjected to a the following criterion: 
 
…stocks for which there is adequate information on historic stock and recruitment, the MBAL is 
defined by the level of spawning stock below which the data indicate that the probability of poor 
recruitment increases as stock sizes decreases;… (CM 1998/Assess:7: 620). 
    
Which resembles the description of the unofficial MBAL ACFM in 1986 (and in 
some subsequent reports). Using the MBAL as the limit reference point, which was in 































accordance with the PA due to the above MBAL criterion, the WG had calculated the 
Bpa reference point, which was estimated to be associated with a 5% risk of reaching 
Blim - or the MBAL. The Bpa was accordingly 221.000t. The WG had calculated the 
reference points on a basis of medium term simulations but mentioned the following 
technical problems: The reference points were very sensitive to the chosen 
recruitment model, some sources of variability were not included and the procedures 
to estimate variances may had resulted in underestimates. Therefore the WG warned 
that: 
 
These points will all tend to result in underestimates of the variability in SSB in the medium term 
and thus in overestimates of Fpa. For several stocks the precautionary approach reference points 
indicated should therefore be considered overestimates of Fpa and underestimates of Bpa (CM 
1998/Assess 7: 622). 
 
The WG therefore considered its Bpa was perhaps not sufficiently precautionary. What 
happened between the calculations of the WG in October 1997 and the 1998 ACFM 
report I do not know. But I do know that the Blim of 70.000t and the Bpa of 150.000 
continued in the ACFM advice for the cod stock until and including the latest ACFM 
report in 2002.  
The Study Group on Precautionary Reference Points For Advice on Fishery 
Management (SGPRPAFM) met in February 2003 to propose revisions of the 
reference points. This WG proposed to raise the Blim to 160.000t, which was "slightly 
above the present Bpa" (SGPRPAFM, 2003: 34). The SGPRPAFM concluded: 
 
North Sea cod has received a substantial amount of scrutiny over the most recent years because 
of the rapid decline of the stock to well below the current Blim. The existing reference points for 
North Sea cod were established in 1998. Blim (70.000t) was determined using a rounded Bloss (from 
the method of Cook) while Bpa (150.000t) was taken as the MBAL current at that time. (…). 
 
In the period since setting these reference points, recruitments for cod have stayed low and the 
SSB has continued to decline; the most recent estimate suggests that SSB is around 38.000t. It is 
clear that for some time recruitment has been impaired and that this becomes increasingly 
evident in the structure of the stock and recruitment plot which shows a more or less steady 
decline to the origin.  
 
An examination of the stock-recruitment plot shows that recruitment impairment has been 
occurring some way above the existing Blim. Whereas within the ICES precautionary approach 
framework, Blim is by definition taken to indicate a point below which impairment occurs. There 
is clearly an issue to address here and the current Blim is inappropriate. On basis of new evidence 
in data which have been added since the 1998 the WG should consider the change point of 
160.000 tonnes as a potential candidate for Blim and investigate the consequences in terms of PA 
points for this stock (SGPRPAFM, 2003: 37). 
 





So the Blim of 1998 was set by using another method than the WG did in 1997 and the 
addition of later data points pointed towards revising the Blim up to 160.000t. Is the 
above discrepancy then explained?  
 When I look at figure 15 I do not think so. Further, as the WG noted, the 
MBAL was defined to indicate the SSB level below which recruitment was impaired. 
The WG had in 1997 accordingly calculated PA points to avoid that the limit of 
150.000t with a high probability. Moreover, it is somewhat strange that ACFM first 
requests a team of experts to calculate the reference point and then later rejects the 
result. It is true that the last 5 data points reinforce the interpretation that Blim should 
be at least 150.000t. The rounded Bloss method implies to set Blim as a rounded figure 
of the lowest observed stock size (CM 1997/Assess:7: 9). This was how Blim was set 
and is still is defined for the cod stock. But so set Blim at 70.000t, given the 1998 data 
series, can hardly be termed precautionary. And for every subsequent data point since 
1998 (with very low recruitment and SSB levels) this should have become 
increasingly apparent. 
At least I expect you to agree that the presentation of PA reference points were 
not exactly straightforward. I cannot "prove", but I do suggest, that the above 
confusion is somehow due to the highly political sensitivity of the issue. Implicitly or 
explicitly biologist were concerned about the immediate catches of fishermen. The PA 
values were never a strict biological calculation, and as before, the interpretative 
flexibility can be exploited by social forces in one way or another. If, on the other 
hand, I have been led astray be successive misinterpretations I would like to be 
informed about it since I admit that I feel "uneasy" about the suggestions above. The 
question of PA reference points is of so conflicting nature that I almost do not know 
what to think about it, which, however, to me seems to support the above suggestions 
rather than to refute them.40  
 How does this relate to the question of the "maximum recommendable"? The 
PA reference points formed the basis of the recommendations subsequent to the 1997 
report.   
 
                                                          
40 In all cases I think the question of PA reference points would be worth to investigate further. The 
role of the recruitment assumption in calculating the reference points is interesting. What happens to 
the PA reference points if you assume that "the gadoid outburst" is over? 





The Maximum Recommendable 
The question of why "the maximum recommendable" was chosen by managers turned 
out to require a two-sided analysis. One the one hand: why the managers decided on 
the "maximum". On the other hand: what during the history was implied by 
"recommendable" by the advisors. 
 Why the managers decided on the "maximum" is perhaps not so surprising. It 
was because of the intensive pressure on and by the industry. The industry was 
subjected to a general over capacity since the introduction of the EEZs and faced 
increasingly severe economical problems as the stocks and TACs declined. Note that 
the decline was not only due to over-fishing but, importantly, also due to the decline 
of the "gadoid outburst". The fleet North Sea had been built up on high expectations 
because of the high recruitment. So there were probably at least two reasons for the 
existence of over-capacity and at least two reasons for the decline in stocks. This gave 
the CFP a very tough start. Fishermen and therefore managers faced severe problems - 
agreements were difficult or almost impossible to obtain. 
As noted by Holden, the CFP became discredited from the very beginning 
since catches of the important demersal stocks were declining after its introduction 
(Holden, 1994: 151-154). No one would blame nature, so CFP had to take the beating. 
The latter relates to a complimenting perspective of knowledge: the question of trust 
and legitimacy of the management system, which relates to the complementing side of 
the inefficiency of TACs in regulating F: The issue of compliance to regulations and 
MCS.  
Importantly, the management system for these reasons above became, with 
respect to legislation, "designed" to allow the industry pressure to be effective. There 
was never an agreement on a useful specification on management objectives. And 
there was newer any specification on how to achieve the "general objectives". 
Consequently, there was no commitment to any specified policy. The legal side was 
flexible to interpretation - and thus open to external pressure. 
Granted the above, "the managers problem" became, in terms of the 
"institutional dilemma", to obtain recommendations by an "objective" science, which 
were compatible with the "open system" and which was suitable for a system where 
the focal point was to obtain difficult political agreements. The criterions by which 
the advices were given changed and I have tried to understand how and why they 
changed.  





Explanation in metaphors: power and frames 
Since the word of the Council of Ministers is law the nominal power was theirs. But 
the Council did not want this power due to a "democratic" recognition of the will of 
the industry. Each national minister faced the pressure from his or hers national 
industry. The Commission had the power of proposing, but when proposals were not 
accepted it was necessary to make new proposals until agreement in the Council was 
reached. I have indicated that the power was in favour of the CEC in its relation with 
science. But whereas CEC had the upper hand in its relation with science, it was not 
so in the relation between CEC and the Council. The Council was in turn subjected to 
the power of the industry. In this way there was, somewhat metaphorically, a sort of 
power transmission system working through the two management bodies from the 
industry to science. The terminal power of the industry would not allow itself to be 
constrained. When there were some rigid elements in the advice, the power would 
find a way through the flexibility that surrounded them. 
 This is why have I used so much space on the initial history, which I think 
perhaps is the most important part of the history of the CFP. In chapter 4.1 I described 
how the political climate was such that TACs became "inescapable" and effort 
regulation "impossible", which I argue can also be related to the initial history. The 
relative stability became "hard" partly on a reflection on the weakness of the 
compromise it represented. In this chapter we see a similar story. The initial framing 
of the fishery system was very important because the frame, however initially soft, 
becomes hardened. The fundamental institutional settings become more and more 
difficult to change.  
 Am I contradicting myself? One hand I say that the "frame" is hard, on the 
other that "the boundaries" were soft. What I mean by "the frame" is the "relative 
stability" in terms of TACs and the lack of specified objectives. The frame is the core 
of the system, and it is an essential property of that core, that it was (and still is) 
hollow: objectives and decision rules were not specified. The form of this frame was, 
at least partly, a result of pressure form the industry. The industry pressure required 
soft boundaries between science and management and influenced how boundaries 
within it moved - and the frame allowed the boundaries to be flexible. 
 On the other hand the formal power was, as mentioned, always in hand of the 
"managers" (i.e. the Council). And it was the managers who decided on the "frame". 
Counterfactually, the frame could thus have been different; the core could have been 





"hard" (say specified objectives and "strict" decision rules). In that case the 
boundaries between science and management would perhaps had been more clear and 
stable and the industry would consequently not have been allowed to be a (strong) 
actor.   
 The above is the "chicken and hen" problem and I cannot "solve" it - except by 
pointing out that the only possible explanations of such questions are evolutionary 
explanations: The industry as an actor must have co-evolved with a fishery system 
that allowed it to act. And evolutionary explanations are in fact exactly historic 
explanations, such as the one I have tried to provide.  
 I have in some places indicated how politics, seemingly, sneaked into science. 
How science perhaps "sometimes sneaked into politics" and sometimes did "sneak 
into politics" I have also indicated in several places in this and in the former chapters, 
and I think there is no need to elaborate this point. For I am trying to explain the cod 
crisis and I think that when "science sneaked into politics" it was generally in order to 
protect the stock (or to build it up towards rational exploitation) - in one way or the 
other. When politics sneaked into science, it was on the other hand led by the 
understandable, but unfortunate, requirement of the industry: to provide a short term 
socio-economic relief at inescapable cost of the long-term prospects. 
  
How the three questions meet 
In the last 3 chapters I have tried to answer the three questions that seemed to be focal 
with respect to explanation of the cod crisis as a management problem: Why was the 
TAC system not replaced by an effort regulation system? Why was the stock 
overestimated? Why was the maximum recommendable TAC nearly always chosen? I 
indicated that the questions were perhaps connected. 
 When I above said that the management was not committed to any specific 
policy that is not entirely right. For the CEC did apparently commit itself to the policy 
of not letting F increase. Here is then one way the three questions meet. The TACs 
that were agreed did not allow increases in F (on the contrary the catch options 
predicted considerable reductions) but the regulatory inefficiency of the TAC-system 
did. Further, the assessments were such that the actual increases in F were often not 
recognised until later. But "later" implicitly meant that it was another (and higher) F 
that the managers were committed to not allowing to increase. This is a sort of ratchet 
mechanism somewhat similar to the one mentioned by Holden. I will provide an 





indication of this. On its meeting in the fall of 1992 ACFM discussed how to present 
its advice: 
 
For the North Sea overview section, it was suggested that the base year for the recommendation 
on roundfish should be changed to a more recent year, as relating to 1989 was becoming 
progressively more difficult. However, this suggestion was rejected for fear that the 
recommendation might lose its impact if it was seen to be have been changed, even if the 
percentage was modified as to equate it to the original recommendation (CM A:2, 1993: 18).   
   
At the same time the example indicates, as suggested above, that when science sneaks 
into politics, it is in order to protect the stock.  
 
Rituals and institutional cramps 
In the last part of chapter 2 it was mentioned that there was a large discrepancy 
between the intended reductions in F, which was the basis of the recommendation, 
and the Fs that, retrospectively, resulted from TACs corresponding to those 
recommendations. The example, that F in 1990 "should have been" less than 25% of 
the F in 1985 was given. If you continue the argument further back the discrepancy 
obviously is larger, although ACFM (and before it the Liaison Committee) prior to 
1985 generally recommended in terms of smaller reductions before 1985 (i.e. 10% 
reductions).  
This kind of recommending something you know will not come through year 
after year could be called a "ritual"; an act that initially was thought to be meaningful 
but in time lost its original meaning. The lack of significance of the act is recognised, 
but the habit continues because the system "expects" it. The system even demands the 
habit to continue.  
This was why ACFM did not want to give TAC recommendations between 
1990 and 1995. ACFM was tired of the ritual. Therefore ACFM indicated that the 
TAC recommendation was really a ritual and that it did not want to continue it. 
However, ACFM still provided the catch options so the managers at least could 
continue their part of the ritual. And the managers did that. From the catch options 
and the chosen TACs it is possible to see that they intended to reduce F by 20% in 
1991, 10% in 1992, 20% in 1993, 30% in 1994, and 25% in 1996. By this they would 
have reduced F to 30% of its 1990 value in 1996.  





 In 1996 ACFM perhaps was kindly asked to continue the old ritual41, at least it 
did so. Did ACFM suddenly believe in the TAC system? I do not think so - unless its 
continued warnings of the inefficiency of TACs were also rituals. The reductions 
recommended by ACFM were 20% for 1997 and 1998, 10% for 1999 and 20% for 
2000. This implies that the F in 2000 "should" have been 46% of its 1996 value. Or 
from 1985 to 2000 the recommendations and TACs should have achieved to reduce F 
to about 3% of its 1984 value. But the F continued to increase. That is why you could 
say that the catch options and (most of) the recommendations and adoption of TAC 
pertain to "a ritual".  
 
Sorry about that, I do not intend to offend anyone. The point is actually quite 
contrary: People sit in different positions of the system and do their best although they 
know that it is wrong. But actually it is slightly worse: Individuals mostly only know 
that their part of the system is wrong. But the system needs that you do your part and 
therefore you do it. You know that it is impossible to change anything anyway. And 
then it is indeed impossible. 
This is what could be called an "institutional cramp". A cramp is, seen from 
the perspective of the muscle, a painful local tension. And how should the nerve in 
this muscle be able to do anything in order to ease the tension? The nerve has to 
transmit the signal; the tension in the muscle has to continue. The nerve just hopes 
that the cramp in its location will disappear, and it fortunately does not know of the 
myosis that has spread to the other muscles too.  
  So seen from every local part of the system, the ritual must continue. But it 
happens to be an expensive ritual, for all parts of the system costs money; the science, 
the managing, the subsidies and the economic losses that the industry experiences 




                                                          
41  This is guesswork. A requests from The EC Directorate General for Fisheries was put in the 1996 
ACFM report it goes: 
 
The Commission is fully satisfied with the way the new form of advice is being discussed at present. 
However, I would like to stress the importance of receiving scientific advice in usefull terms, taking into 
account the existing management tools and the constraints imposed by the current state of the art of 
fisheries in the Union. Our officers are willing to collaborate in that regard (CRR 221, 1996: 8).   









The cod crisis can be seen as a management problem subjected to an unfortunate 
coincidence of over-capacity and recruitment decline. The perspective of scientific 
knowledge - with respect to the quality and use of this knowledge in the management 
system - provides a step forward towards an explanation of the crisis. 
 Recommendations for maximum recommendable TACs were generally 
followed by the management institutions. However, the TACs were/are recommended 
and decided on basis of catch forecasts, which were/are completely inadequate with 
respect to the specified intention of F reduction.  
It is indicated that the discrepancy between "predicted F" and F as seen by the 
latest assessment relates to two main issues: The incapability of TACs to regulate F 
and, since 1995, consistent over-estimations of the stock and associated under-
estimations of F.   
 The above findings led to an investigation of why the inappropriate 
management measure of TACs were continued in spite of scientific warnings and 
recommendations of an alternative effort regulation system. Moreover, the above led 
to an investigation of possible reasons of the over-assessments. The third but related 
question that was investigated was why management bodies generally decided on the 
TAC, which was "maximally recommendable". 
 The over-assessments seemed to be best explained in technical terms relating 
to biased data for tuning of the VPA assessment model and to the tuning procedures. 
Yet, the assessment problems were indicated to also relate to issues of a "social 
nature". For example assessment quality relates to the question of allocation resources 
for assessment science. Further, the reliability of assessments relates to management 
since heavily exploited stocks are difficult to assess accurately, and since the 
regulatory inefficiency of TACs is associated with a deterioration of data. Moreover, 
assessment science involves "social" questions with respect to a possible trade of 
between bias and precision of assessment models, and with respect to an adequate 
presentation of the uncertainty of the assessments. 
Why TACs were not replaced by effort regulation was related to the problem 
of resource allocation within CFP. Long and difficult negotiations resulted in the 
principle of "relative stability", by which every member state (and Norway) was 





guaranteed a fixed percentage of the TAC of each stock. The principle of relative 
stability constitutes a fundamental part of the CFP. The TAC system could not be 
thought to be replaced by an effort regulation system since there, technically, would, 
be no straightforward way of translating the resource allocation given by the relative 
stability into an effort regulation system. On the political level the member state 
would be reluctant to gamble about its resource share, and the same is perhaps the 
case on the level of the fisherman, who belongs to a certain fleet-segment. Further, the 
effort regulation system would be expected to result in short-term losses since it 
would be a more effective way of regulating, which consequently could reinforce a 
possible industry resistance to effort regulation. 
The question of why the "maximum recommendable" generally was 
implemented as the TAC was explored as a two-sided problem. The "maximum" was 
chosen in order to meet short-term needs of the industry, and it is indicated that the 
industry achieved this by lobbying on those national representatives who together 
constitute the Council of Ministers.  
The question of what was "recommendable" is complicated. The management 
system was "open" in that there were no specified objectives or specifications of, for 
example, decision rules with respect to possible scientific advices. This made the 
management system vulnerable to pressure industry pressure - the industry was 
allowed to be an actor. But the pressure also had to affect the scientific 
recommendation since the management institution generally was constrained by the 
"maximum recommendable". Hence, normative scientific advices were a constraint to 
the pressure for higher TACs - the normative "maximum recommendable" was not 
enough.  
 The pressure by the industry was, therefore, expressed in the request by 
management bodies for flexible advices. The concept of catch options was suitable for 
granting this flexibility. Yet, facing what could be called the managers "institutional 
dilemma", management bodies still needed the advice to be a scientific or objective 
recommendation in order to provide scientific support for a policy. The advices 
became explorative, which was compatible with the lack of a specified policy. 
However, predictions were not sufficient to provide political support. The role of the 
advisors hence developed from one of the hypothetical imperative: "If you want this 
(higher and more stable catches etc.) then do that (mesh size increases, lower F)", to 
one of categorical imperative: "Do not let SSB be lower than this". This was a change 





from "management by where you want to be" to "management by where you don't 
want to be". The change in advice was suitable for the management arena in that it 
provided scientific support for the policy combined with the maximal flexibility, 
which was required for management by an unspecified policy, subjected to intensive 
pressure. 
 The categorical limits set by biologists in form of "safe biological limits" now 
became the next constraint and these accordingly had to be flexible. I have indicated 
the flexibility of these limits by exposing their changing and mutually contradictory 
nature. However, when the biological limits were quantified, it would be politically 
impossible reject these limits as "objective" without eliminating the scientific support 
for a policy. When the stock was below a quantified biological limit, the form of 
advice, however, became flexible. Further, it is indicated how the nominal form of 
advice was not always followed.  
The policy of recommendations was thus flexible enough to be sensitive to 
"political forces", whether it was through conscious processes or not. Hence, it is in 
general indicated that wherever there is interpretative flexibility, there is also 
sensitivity to social forces. And interpretative flexibility can originate both in 
technical or scientific domain and in the way advices are provided. This flexibility, 
together with intensive political pressure, is not biologically stable; the probable result 
was the current cod crisis. 
 
To put it pointy (but intended humourous) the cod crisis could therefore be explained 
simply by saying: 
 
Oh yes, they did fish too much. But to allow it with extremely expensive science and 
















The above conclusion is in one way written too strong, but in another it is not strong 
enough! Let me explain. This work has been subjected to a severe time constraint 
(which probably is quite evident in several places). I started 6 months ago from 
scratch: I knew absolutely nothing of the North Sea fisheries, which I consider to have 
been an advantage. As an external you do not at the outset accept the order of things 
as "normal". You look at the system and try to discover its logic: How does it work? 
And you compare this to how it is "nominally" said to work. If there are some 
conflicts you try to understand them and so on.  
 On the other hand my initial ignorance of the system later became a hindrance. 
For to understand the precise mechanics of such a fishery system is very demanding. 
When the mechanic says: "the problem is probably in the electrical system", that 
information is only useful when is followed up by a further analysis; i.e. "the 
disconnect is due to this plug". And I admit that I perhaps did not succeed in that 
respect. But I think I have at least managed to open the hood of the car, and also to 
point at some parts of the engine that seem to be dysfunctional. 
What is needed is a precise diagnosis of the fishery system and there is 
consequently a need for further and more comprehensive studies.  
 
Recognition of problems 
I do not intend underestimate the difficulties involved, but it is almost a logical 
necessity, that the first step towards solving problems is to recognise them.  
With respect to science it must be recognised that there is interpretative 
flexibility, and it must be recognised also that social forces can exploit this 
interpretative flexibility. 
Management bodies must recognise that the TACs system does not work 
under the present conditions; i.e. the "ritual" must be recognised as such. Further, it 
must be recognised exactly why effort regulation is "impossible". What can be done in 
order to make it possible? After all it is hard to conceive a system more costly society 
and stakeholders (especially the industry) than the present system. 
 Fishermen must recognise that stocks can be, and often are in trouble even 
when they sometimes have high catch rates. Further, fishermen must interact with 





management and scientist in a more constructive way than in order to argue for higher 
TACs (and I know that the latter is not entirely fair).  
 It must consequently be recognised that a constructive dialogue is needed 
between these three parts. It must be recognised that planning of and implementing 
steps towards achieving objectives is needed.  
 
Institutional tradeoffs  
One aspect of the "institutional dilemma" was the "proximity" of science to 
management. The institutional setting was in the present case such that you would 
expect the basic scientific work to be independent of management or politics. The 
latter was its advantage compared to the case of the cod stocks of the Grand Banks. 
However, both cases suffered from a science, which was not adequately committed to 
its institutional mandate due to some unfavourable incentive structures. The latter 
could indicate that the commitment of science to its mandate is at least somewhat 
independent of the proximity of the science to the management institution.  
 The latter is fortunate in that the present work generally points towards saying 
that separation of political or socio-economic concerns from the process of preparing 
scientific advice is desirable in so far it is possible. Moreover, in so far it is not 
possible to maintain this separation this must be recognised. If the above is correct 
there is no necessary trade-off and it should be possible to commit science to its 
institutional mandate without affecting the ideal of its political independence.   
 
In the present case the unfortunate coincidence of over-capacity and recruitment 
decline resulted in an socio-economic pressure, which both the institutions of 
management and science were unable to resist. The consequences did least of all 
benefit the industry. As a topic for further research it would perhaps be fruitful to 
examine the nature of the relation between management and science, and the tradeoffs 
involved in this relation. This could be done through a comparative study of actual 
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Figure 16. Comparison of fishery systems by two parameters: Advisory process and decision making process.  
 
Wilson and Degnbol (2002) described the case of Atlantic Bluefish in the US. They 
argued that science in this case was hindered by its legal mandate to express what it 
felt was the present situation of the stock. The legal mandate of science required it to 
express the assessment in terms of standard assessment models, which would pass 
peer review. The latter, however, barred scientists from expressing their judgement 
that the stock was not heavily exploited, but had instead become largely inaccessible 
to the fishery due to a change in the migration pattern of the fish. Consequently, the 
"hard" advisory process and the "hard" decision making process resulted in, perhaps, 
unnecessary restrictive management measures.42 
 I have already introduced the example of the Grand Bank cod, as interpreted 
by Finlayson. The decision making process was relatively clear in this case: It was the 
F01 strategy. However, socio-economic pressure, facilitated by the institutional 
location of the science and enhanced by its commitment to politics, resulted 
(according to Finlayson) in a consistent exploitation of the interpretative flexibility. In 
other words science was primarily soft due to its institutional location. 
  The present case is different. It was an "open system". There were no specified 
objectives or commitment to them in form of decision rules - and the advisory process 
was, so to speak, forced open by socio-economic pressure. Or you could perhaps say 
that there was a mutually reinforcing interaction between the softness of the decision 
process and the advisory process. The open system was sensitive to socio-economic 
pressure - and did perhaps exactly evolve in order to maintain that property because of 
the pressure. Therefore, the flexibility associated with a soft system was not used 
                                                          
42  There may be an alternative interpretation: Perhaps science was sensitive or soft towards socio-
economic pressure, but the "hard" rules for the advisory process barred this softness from affecting the 
advice (conversation with Petter Holm, May 2003). In that case the hard rules "saved" the fishery from 
ending in a situation similar to the Grand Bank cod example. The question is thus if the legal mandates 
"distorted" science or if they kept science from being distorted. 





constructively as it may be possible in an "ideal system". In stead strong socio-
economic pressures exploited the flexibility leading to depletion of the stock.  
 The likely trade of between a "hard" system and a "soft" system, is that the 
soft system is "adaptive" and can thus be more efficient than, on the other hand a 
"hard system", which is likely to be more robust towards socio-economic pressures, 
but which may be inefficient. How to balance with respect to this trade-off is one of 
the major challenges in designing and planning a fishery system. I suggest that one 
external parameter, which should be taking into consideration, is the extent of 
expected socio-economic pressure. A tough situation requires tough decisions. And 
tough decisions are, from experience, unlikely to be taken unless there is a "hard" 
framework for taking that decision. Without a rigid framework no manager or 
scientist would be able to stand firm on their ground facing intensive socio-economic 
pressure.43  
 The "mature system" is the ideal system, where the scientific advisory process 
is hard but, the management process is allowed to be flexible, which allows for more 
efficient management towards agreed objectives. The necessary condition for the 
mature system is that the possible "distorting" socio-economic pressures is not strong 
enough to affect the management significantly. This ideal system of course requires 
preconditions, which were not met at the onset of the CFP (i.e. an "adequate" relation 
between available resources and catching capacity). The latter perhaps reveals what 
you could call the tragedy of management: When thing are good you cannot 
implement management measures "because there is no need to", when things are bad 
you cannot implement the measures because the industry already has problems. A 
mature system could be based on joint participation of stakeholders in the 
management process (i.e. co-management), but the necessary condition is that 
stakeholders are willing to agree on a common objective and to accept means to 
achieve it. 
 The "mature system" is, however, likely to be a utopia for fisheries 
management. It may even be an unstable system since the catchability always 
increases - and so does the catching-capability of the fleet. Basically this will generate 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
43  Holden argued, that managers in respecting the democratic process should respond to pressure. I do 
not agree. First, the democratic process is (should be) mainly working through election of political 
representatives. Politicians are not exclusively elected by fishermen. Secondly, result of this 





an increasing pressure for higher catches. Further, a well-regulated fishery generates 
high catch-rates and therefore strong incentives to fish more. One possible solution is 
that of the economists: To attempt to internalise the externalities induced by fishing - 
for example by ITQs. Well-known problems related to this suggestion are the 
consequences of ITQs with respect to considerations of equity and social stability.  
However, it is, with respect to the question of managing the stock "rationally", 
notoriously difficult to achieve a state of perfect property rights in fisheries, so the 
above problems may still apply to some degree. 
 The above suggest that it may be preferable to design a combined portfolio of 
hard and soft elements. There is may be a need to safeguard any system, including the 
"mature" system. One way is by the Precautionary Approach. For example, it is 
conceivable to design a  "hard", pre-programmed decision system, which applies 
whenever the stock is on the wrong side of the PA reference points. Once the stock is 
on the right side of the Bpa and the Fpa, more flexibility or softness is allowed. 
Actually, this was the idea of the advice-policy of ACFM as early as when the catch 
options were introduced in 1981. When the stock was outside safe biological limits, 
there would be no options. On the other hand managers would have flexibility when 
they were inside SBL. The idea carried on and was developed with the MBAL 
concept and the PA.  
The problem was in the present case that when you were on the good side on 
the limit, there was no objective to "attract" the stock level to stay there. And when 
you, on the other hand, were on the wrong side, the limits and rules for advising and 
managing were not rigid enough to provide protection. Consequently, what is needed 
are the objectives (target reference points), rigid biological limits and rigid procedures 
for advising and rigid decision rules to apply for the "below limit" situation. The 
rigidity of the lasts two elements could, for example, be obtained by extended 
independent peer review processes.  
 
Quite independent of the above trade-off between hard and soft management is the 
question of the proper scale of management. Ideally, the scale of management should 
mach the scale of the resource - for example in this case by a North Sea council. This 
is likely to facilitate planning of objectives by co-operation of the different 
                                                                                                                                                                      
"democratic process" similar to the present serves no one (i.e. a somewhat technocratic position). But 
this is another discussion. 





stakeholders. Further, decentralisation to a "proper" scale is likely to facilitate 
commitment to an agreed policy, and the division of responsibility would be expected 
to be clearer. Finally, the proper planning of data collection for assessment of a 
certain fishery could be expected to be enhanced by decentralisation, provided that the 
regional council is granted the necessary means and responsibility. 
  Where the advantage of the relation between science and management was the 
relative institutional independence of the latter to the former, the drawback was, as 
was often pointed out by the managers, a slow and not always efficient 
communication. Here is therefore another possible trade-off: Facilitated 
communication at the cost at scientific independence. I suggest that the severity of 
this trade-off may be related to the scale of management. But an analysis of these 
questions would require comparative studies of fishery system cases.   
 
Final credo 
Believe it or not: I have "struggled to be objective". But I will agree that my 
information is not complete and so is my analysis of the information I have. Therefore 
my "answer" is far from the complete too. Further, my answer, to some degree, must 
be "conditioned" by my personal idiosyncrasies. But that does not necessarily make it 
"wrong". And perhaps my strength could be that my biases might be somewhat 
averaged since I personally have tasted a bit of biology, social science and of fishery. 
I have not "tasted" the management perspective, so you could argue for a bias here. 
But I do recognise the difficult position of the manager: being subjected to pressure 
from all sides and having responsibility, and being forces to take impossible 
decisions. My intention has exactly been to explain why the managers position is that 
difficult, and what we perhaps could do to improve this. Remember that I do not 
intend to criticise any persons but a system - it is the system we can and need to 
revise.      
 
The near future of management of the demersal species in the North Sea is extremely 
important. The CEC has proposed a recovery plan for the cod stock from which the 
following quote is taken:  
 
Control of fishing effort is a central pillar in this recovery plan. Experience has shown - and 
scientific advice has confirmed - that TACs and quotas on the one hand and technical measures 
on the other are not sufficient to regulate fishing mortality, particularly when, as at present, 





fishing capacity is too large for the available fish resources. Furthermore, in mixed fisheries, as in 
cod fisheries, several species are caught together as fishing continues until all the TACs for all the 
species concerned have been caught. In the process the low TACs for some species such as cod 
are overshot. This is one of the main reasons why scientists have long been advising limits on 
fishing effort (CEC, 2003). 
 
It is needless to add that I hope the Council will adopt the recovery plan and that there 
will be political will to support the industry with eventual short-term losses, which 
hopefully will be less necessary with time. 
 































                                                          
44 With respect to my thesis I consider this a win-win situation. If the Council adopts the recovery plan, 
which implies that effort regulation really is urgently needed and the Council (backed against the wall) 
has to agree on continued effort regulations. If the Council will not adopt the proposal (or they dilute it 
sufficiently to be without significant effect), I am right because I have correctly described the barriers 
to effort regulation. And if you consequently claim me to be unscientific because of a lack of 
falsifiability, I will be delighted to falsify the principle of falsification.  
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Figure Ia. Nominal landings and Working Group landings. 1975-1995: North Sea only. 1996-2003: North Sea (IV), Skagerrak 







Figure Ib. Ratio of Nominal landings to the Working Group landings. 1975-1995: North Sea only. 1996-2003: North Sea (IV), 









































1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Nom.L /  WG L
Nom.L = WG L














/  WG L 
Nom. L 
 / WG L 
1975 230 236 186 185 0.97 0.78 0.80 1.01 
1976 210 236 213 209 0.89 0.89 1.00 1.02 
1977 220 220 185 182 1.00 0.83 0.83 1.02 
1978 220 236 261 263 0.93 1.11 1.20 0.99 
1979 247 247 231 249 1.00 1.01 1.01 0.93 
1980 200 200 249 265 1.00 1.33 1.33 0.94 
1981 220 220 287 301 1.00 1.37 1.37 0.95 
1982 235 235 256 273 1.00 1.16 1.16 0.94 
1983 220 240 237 234 0.92 0.98 1.06 1.01 
1984 215 215 197 205 1.00 0.95 0.95 0.96 
1985 259 250 188 195 1.04 0.78 0.75 0.97 
1986 130 170 158 169 0.76 0.99 1.30 0.93 
1987 200 175 167 182 1.14 1.04 0.91 0.92 
1988 148 160 142 157 0.93 0.98 1.06 0.91 
1989 124 124 110 116 1.00 0.93 0.93 0.95 
1990 113 105 99 105 1.08 1.00 0.93 0.95 
1991  100 87 89  0.89  0.98 
1992  100 98 97  0.97  1.01 
1993  101 94 105  1.04  0.90 
1994  102 87 95  0.93  0.93 
1995  120 112 120  1.00  0.93 
1996 141 130 124 126 1.08 0.97 0.90 0.98 
1997 135 115 121 124 1.17 1.08 0.92 0.98 
1998 153 140 137 146 1.09 1.04 0.95 0.94 
1999 125 132 91 96 0.94 0.73 0.77 0.95 
2000 79 81 72 71 0.98 0.87 0.89 1.02 
2001 0 45 54 50 0 1.10  1.09 
2002 0 49.3   0    
2003 0 27.3   0    




182 184 177 183 1.00 0.98 1.04 0.971 
1991-1995  105 96 101  0.96   
 
 
Table I)  Maximum recommendable TACs, Agreed TACs and landings as used by the Working Group and some ratios between 
these. Since no TACs was recommended for the years 1991- 1995, these years are treated separately with regard to averages. 
Further the last three years are excluded in the averages, since the recommendation of TAC = 0 can be thought to be qualitatively 
different and because of reasons explained in the text.  
 
Sources: 
Data on landings: 1975-1983: CRR 214:1995, 1984-1995: CM ACFM:7, 2000 and 1996-2001: ACFM, 2002 (the latest 
available). 
Data on recommended TAC: As explained in text. 
Data on agreed TAC: Any source can be used since these do not change. For example the latest CRR report containing the year 
in question. 
 


















 Table II 
 
Year SSBhist.(t) Source SSB2002 (t) SSBhist. / SSB2002 
1978 164.000 1979: CM: G7 141.640 1.16 
1979 154.500 1979: CM: G7 146.010 1.06 
1980 271.000 1981: CRR 114 161.660 1.68 
1981 280.000 1981: CRR 114 173.980 1.61 
1982 239.000 1982: CRR 119 169.080 1.41 
1983 255.000 1983: CRR 128 137.760 1.85 
1984 120.000 1984: CRR 131 118.590 1.01 
1985 92.000 1985: CRR 137 112.180 0.82 
1986 78.000 1986: CRR 146 101.520 0.77 
1987 110.000 1987: CRR 153 93.080 1.18 
1988 96.000 1988: CRR 161 87.680 1.09 
1989 91.000 1989: CRR 168 80.530 1.13 
1990 87.000 1990: CRR 171 69.370 1.25 
1991 64.000 1991: CRR 179 63.210 1.01 
1992 51.000 1992: CRR 193 61.240 0.83 
1993 58.000 1993: CRR 196 57.850 1.00 
1994 63.000 1994: CRR 210 57.600 1.09 
1995 78.000 1995: CRR 214 63.070 1.24 
1996 103.000 1996: CRR 221 76.250 1.35 
1997 160.400 1997: CRR 223 79.740 2.01 
1998 136.220 1998: CRR 229 70.150 1.94 
1999 128.080 1999: CRR 236 56.900 2.25 
2000 66.710 2000: CRR 242 41.110 1.62 
2001 54.700 2001: CRR 246 30.280 1.81 
2002 37.600 ACFM: 2002 37.600 1.00 
 
Table II. Historical SSB estimates (as assessed in historic year) and recent (2002) SSB estimates. 1975-1995: North Sea only. 
1996-2003: North Sea (IV), Skagerrak (IIIa) and Eastern English Channel (VIId). The 2002 assessment was rescaled to cover 
only the North Sea for the years before 1996. 
 
Rescaling: 
The latest (2002) assessment is for the combined area (IV, IIIa and VIId), whereas the historical SSB 
estimates prior to 1996 were for the North Sea only. Since there was not a separate SSB estimate for 
IIIa and VIId these could not be added to the North Sea estimate to give an estimate for the combined 
area for all years. Instead the 2002 was rescaled as to cover only the North Sea area for the years prior 
to 1996.  
The rescaling was done by use of the latest series of SSB estimates available for the separate 
areas. This series was from the 1995 ACFM report (CRR 214, 1995), which contains a series of SSB 
estimates from 1978 to 1995 for the separate areas. When the SSBs from the separate areas are 
summed, the resulting series is comparable to the 2002 series for the years 1978-1995. Since the 
average of the combined 1995 series is actually almost identical (by a factor of 1.002), to the average 
of the 2002 series, there was no need of rescaling the averages. A scaling factor was calculated as the 
ratio of the average SSB for the North Sea only to the average SSB for the combined area. The scaling 
factor was 0.8889, which shows that the Skagerrak (IIIa) and Eastern English Channel (VIId) only are of minor 
importance in that they in average contain about 11% of the spawning stock of the combined area. .   
The scaling factor was multiplied to the 2002 SSB estimates from 1978-1995 to give the 2002 

















Year of assessment Source 
1981 CM 1981, G:8 
1982 CM 1982, Assess 8 
1983 CM 1983, Assess 18 
1984 CM 1984, Assess 10 
1985 CM 1985, Assess 9 
1986 CM 1986, Assess 16 
 
 

























Year of assessment Source 
1995 CRR 214,1995 
1996 CRR 221,1996 
1997 CRR 223,1997 
1998 CRR 229,1998 
1999 CRR 236,1999 
2000 CRR 242,2000 
2001 CRR 246,2001 
2002 ACFM, 2002 
 















 Table VI 
 
Year  Fhist. F-type Source F2002 F2002 / Fhist. 
1977 0.88 (2-8) CRR:85, 1978 0.71 0.80 
1978 0.74 (2-8) CRR:93, 1979 0.81 1.09 
1979 0.95 (2-8) CRR:102, 1980 0.69 0.72 
1980 0.72 (2-8) CRR:114, 1981 0.79 1.09 
1981 0.57 (3-8) CRR:114, 1981 0.77 1.35 
1982 1.01 (3-8) CRR:119, 1982 0.90 0.89 
1983 0.82 (3-8) CRR:128, 1983 0.91 1.10 
1984 0.91 (3-8) CRR: 131, 1984 0.86 0.94 
1985 0.85 (3-8) CRR:137, 1985 0.83 0.98 
1986 1.00 (3-8) CRR:146, 1986 0.86 0.86 
1987 0.86 (3-8) CRR:161, 1988 0.91 1.06 
1988 0.80 (2-8) CRR:168, 1989 0.89 1.11 
1989 0.89 (2-8) 1990: CRR 171 0.99 1.11 
1990 0.79 (2-8) 1991: CRR 179 0.72 0.91 
1991 0.93 (2-8) 1992: CRR 193 0.93 1.00 
1992 0.86 (2-8) 1993: CRR 196 0.86 1.00 
1993 0.94 (2-8) 1994: CRR 210 0.91 0.97 
1994 0.85 (2-8) 1995: CRR 214 0.85 1.00 
1995 0.81 (2-8) 1996: CRR 221 0.72 0.89 
1996 0.63 (2-8) 1997: CRR 223 0.92 1.45 
1997 0.63 (2-8) 1998: CRR 229 0.87 1.38 
1998 0.59 (2-8) 1999: CRR 236 1.02 1.74 
1999 0.90 (2-8) 2000: CRR 242 1.18 1.31 
2000 0.83 (2-8) 2001: CRR 246 1.23 1.48 
2001 0.91 (2-8) 2002: ACFM 0.91 1.10 
 
Table VI: Historical F estimates (as assessed in historic year) and recent (2002) F estimates. 1975-1995: North Sea only. 1996-











































































































































    





1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
1995  0.809 0.615 0.653 0.679 0.722 0.724 0.725 
1996   0.633 0.734 0.787 0.914 0.918 0.921 
1997    0.627 0.687 0.841 0.857 0.866 
1998     0.588 0.949 0.992 1.025 
1999      0.900 1.064 1.177 








  2001       0.830 0.912 
 
 





Year of assessment Source 
1995 CRR 214, 1995 
1996 CRR 221, 1996 
1997 CRR 223, 1997 
1998 CRR 229, 1998 
1999 CRR 236, 1999 
2000 CRR 242, 2000 
2001 CRR 246, 2001 
2002 ACFM, 2002 
 


































An informal challenge to a theoretical position 
Allow me to, informally, challenge the abstract position of Finlayson as it is apparent 
in "Fishing for truth" (Finlayson, 1994). For a more detailed description of the 
position I will refer to the book itself, however I have indicated the position in 
footnote number 22. It is this position I want to "challenge" by a small thought 
example. 
In a later paper (McCay and Finlayson, 1995) Finlayson apparently adheres to 
a much more "realistic" position in that explanatory relevance of stock changes are 
allowed. However, my critique was never meant to be ad hominem.  
 In think there are some elements in "Fishing for truth" that indicate that 
Finlayson is somewhat ambiguous with respect to his "position". Some of his 
arguments imply some sort of realism (see footnote 5) whereas his stated theoretical 
position rejects it. Perhaps this "tension" is apparent in the following quote alone:   
 
Fisheries scientist do not now, and probably newer will know enough about fish and their 




Cods in a bathtub 
Imagine that I one day invite Finlayson home for a cup of coffee. In my bathtub I 
have put 4 cods. I ask him: How many cods are there in the bathtub?  If I understand it 
right Finlayson now is in dilemma. Of course he will probably answer "4". If so, I ask 
him what "truth is illusive" means to him. He will then have to say that it means that 
we will never know how many cods there are in the sea. I will then ask him to tell 
what relevant difference with respect to truth being illusive there is between the cods 
in my bathtub and the cods in the North Sea. I would admit that one such difference is 
that some cods swim in and out of the North Sea - unlike my bathtub. But then I will 
ask him if he would agree that there was a definite number of cods in the ICES area 
IV on the 1st of January 2003 at 00.00.00 GMT.  If he answers "yes", we will then 
agree on what "truth is illusive" means: It refers to an epistemological problem - or, 
consequently, a problem of insufficient scientific knowledge. If he answers "no" he 
would have to qualify some relevant difference that I have not thought of - I think the 
burden of evidence is then on his side. 
 On the other hand he could answer to my first question: "I do not know". 
When I ask him to explain his answer he would perhaps do it in term of epistemology 
(e.g. "are these really cods?" - "or "I see 4, but senses are illusive, maybe there are 
just 3"). Then we also agree as above. Otherwise he would explain in terms of 
ontology: "I see 4 cods but I do not know if they are really there". If so I will admit 
that it is a completely consistent viewpoint but that it happens to be different from my 
view. Further I will ask him if he still would not be interested in knowing how many 
cods there seems to be to us. There is then a philosophically interesting theoretical 
difference but there is no practical difference. 
 
This should not be taken as a naive way to defend "common sense ontology" or a 
correspondence theory of truth or to say that science is really objective. I know of 
theoretical problems of these positions (e.g. observer dependence, the lack meaning of 
observer independence, inductive problems, under-determination of language etc.). 





My point is simple but different: I do not (at least only) want to challenge Finlayson 
in terms of abstract theoretical positions but (at least also) I want to challenge him in 





















                                                          
45   This is a bit crude - but since the present work is not a philosophical dissertation it will have to 
make the point. Perhaps this place is not the best place for such a discussion theoretical positions- but I 
could not resist the temptation. 
